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ABSTRACT 
 
The Religious Foundations of Civic Virtue.  
(August 2010) 
Christie LeAnn Maloyed, B.A., Emory & Henry College 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Cary J. Nederman 
 
 Scholarly accounts of the history of civic virtue in the modern era have with few 
exceptions been wholly secular, discounting, ignoring, or even outright rejecting the role 
religious thought has played in shaping the civic tradition. In this dissertation, I focus on 
the influence of religion on the civic tradition, specifically in the eighteenth century in 
Scotland and America. I examine the ways in which the religious traditions of each 
nation shaped the debate surrounding the viability of civic virtue, the place of religious 
virtues among the civic tradition, and the tensions between using religion to promote 
civic virtue while protecting individual religious liberty. In the Scottish Enlightenment, I 
examine the influence of Francis Hutcheson’s moral sense philosophy and Adam 
Ferguson’s providential theology. In the American Founding, I contrast the New 
England religious tradition exemplified by John Witherspoon and John Adams with the 
public religious tradition advocated by Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Paine, and Thomas 
Jefferson. This work demonstrates not only that religion influences the civic tradition, 
but also that this influence is neither monolithic nor self-evident. In order to understand 
how religion shaped this tradition, it is necessary to take into account that different 
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conceptions of religion produce different understandings of what it means to be a good 
citizen. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE RELIGIOUS FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIC VIRTUE 
 
When a task force for the American Political Science Association reported on the 
state of American democracy in 2002, its conclusions were sobering: “democracy is at 
risk” and that risk comes from “an erosion of the activities and capacities of 
citizenship.”1 The same could be said of the majority of industrialized liberal 
democracies worldwide. Scholars have generally noted decreased civic engagement in 
both political activities and voluntary associations, most famously Robert Putnam, who 
argues that this decrease in engagement is undermining the role of civic virtue in 
society.2 Some scholars, philosophers, and even politicians have expressed concern that 
excessive individualism is undermining the possibility of developing shared values or a 
sense of the public good. Fears abound that an uncompromising dedication to individual 
rights and the pursuit of the unencumbered self will ultimately eradicate a sense of 
responsibility towards our fellow citizens and community. In response to these concerns, 
a number of scholars have sought a historical and theoretical basis for developing a civic 
tradition that can confront these challenges, reviving interest in the politics of virtue and 
civic engagement. For instance, Benjamin Barber has argued for increased participation 
in order to strengthen our communities. Others, like Michael Sandel, have argued for a 
stronger, constitutive conception of community. Alasdair MacIntyre has suggested an 
                                                
This dissertation follows the style of Political Theory. 
1 Stephen Macedo, Democracy at Risk (Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution Press, 2005), 1.  
2 Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000). 
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even more transformative role for virtue by returning to Aristotelian principles of 
government and civic life.3 
The project of inspiring a sense of common purpose and encouraging civic and 
political involvement is not a new one. As scholarship on the civic republican tradition 
has grown during the last several decades, the centerpiece of the republican tradition, 
civic virtue, has also received increased attention. Civic virtue is a broad term that has 
traditionally been associated with the civic humanist or republican traditions of thought. 
In this work, I use the term civic virtue to describe a political concept that refers to the 
relationship between individuals and their social and political communities. Civic virtue 
refers to a condition of moral excellence and defines what is required of an individual to 
be a good citizen. The scholarly accounts presented on the history of civic virtue in the 
modern era have with few exceptions been wholly secular. In fact, the role religious 
thought has played in shaping the civic tradition typically has been discounted, ignored, 
or overtly rejected. I argue that discounting the influence of religion on civic virtue has 
produced an incomplete and inaccurate view of this tradition.  
To understand the ways in which religious thought has contributed to and shaped 
the language of the civic tradition, this dissertation has two primary aims. The first is to 
examine the civic tradition in the eighteenth century in Scotland and America, a time 
when the politics of virtue was vigorously debated, as was the role of religion in society 
generally and in the civic tradition particularly. Confronted with the rise of 
                                                
3 See especially Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004); Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1996); and Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). 
 3 
commercialism, the fact of pluralism, and natural rights theories, various efforts were 
made in the Scottish and American traditions to adapt classical republican concerns to a 
modern context. In doing so, political thinkers of this period attempted to blend together 
republican and liberal traditions. This dissertation supports the conclusions offered by 
scholars, including Paul Rahe, Vicky Sullivan, and Richard Dagger, who contend that 
republican and liberal concerns are not as diametrically opposed as is often thought, and 
in fact, many of the thinkers writing in this era share a concern for both individual liberty 
and the cultivation of virtue.  
Second, I demonstrate that the role of religion in the civic tradition, especially in 
the eighteenth century, has often been ignored or rejected. The influence of religion on 
civic virtue has been discredited for at least three reasons. First, scholars have 
emphasized that in the modern era, the classical focus on philosophical and religious 
conceptions of virtue are replaced with a science of politics. As such, greater attention is 
given to the design of political institutions that can overcome the self-interested nature of 
humanity rather than efforts to cultivate virtue. Second, to the extent that the cultivation 
of civic virtue continues to receive attention, it falls largely within the social realm rather 
than the political. Hence, it is no longer assumed that it is the role of government to 
instill virtue in citizens; rather this falls under the purview of social, civil, or religious 
organizations. Third, even when religion is given serious scholarly treatment as a means 
to cultivate virtue, it is often reduced to broad categories of the Judeo-Christian tradition 
or civil religion. This overlooks the diversity of religious traditions in this period and the 
political implications of this diversity. 
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By bringing greater attention to the role of religion in the civic tradition in the 
eighteenth century, a more complete understanding of civic virtue can be developed. I 
argue that, in part, what allows those authors working within the civic tradition to unite 
their republican and liberal concerns is religion. While there is wide acceptance that 
individual liberty must be preserved, especially religious liberty, there is also an 
acceptance that religious belief should be encouraged in society because it helps to 
develop a common view of the public good and fosters virtuous behavior. I do not intend 
to suggest that all thinkers working within the civic tradition in this period believed that 
religion should be promoted as a way to foster civic virtue. Even among those who 
accepted the necessity of religion to a well-functioning republic, there is great debate 
about the type of religion that is necessary. Thus, the purpose of this dissertation is to 
examine how religion is expected to enrich the civic tradition, to understand the 
limitations of using religion to promote civic virtue while simultaneously protecting 
individual religious liberty, and to demonstrate that differing conceptions of religion 
promote different conceptions of what it means to be a good citizen.  
 To demonstrate the importance of religion to the civic tradition, I first begin with 
an overview of the literature on civic republicanism and civic virtue. In particular, I 
focus on the ways that the concept of civic virtue was transformed in the eighteenth 
century, the relationship between republicanism and liberalism, and why religion has 
largely been ignored in this literature. I then examine the civic traditions in the Scottish 
Enlightenment and the American Founding era. I explore the use of the civic tradition in 
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each of these contexts and the understanding of the relationship between religion and 
civic virtue in each.  
 
The Civic Tradition 
The debate surrounding the politics of virtue and the place of virtue in the 
eighteenth century has been driven by two concerns.4 The first is the tension that exists 
between wealth and virtue. As individuals have ever increasing responsibilities 
associated with work and family, they often sacrifice engagement in public life to meet 
the demands of their private lives. The challenges that wealth and commerce impose on 
society are not new, as the work of Gordon Wood and J.G.A. Pocock on the final 
generations of the republican tradition indicates. According to the classical republican 
thesis, industry, frugality, and moderation were seen as virtues that sustained a polity, 
whereas luxury - the love of refinement, ease, and elegance - left the populace weak and 
effeminate, incapable of the valor and honor needed to sustain the state.5 A people 
consumed by their personal interest for luxury lose their ability to be self reliant and 
independent. Whether wealth and virtue can be made compatible in the modern world is 
vigorously debated. 
The second concern raised in this debate is the tension that exists between civic 
virtue and liberalism. Civic virtue in a classical sense requires the submission of self-
interest to the public good, where selfless participation in government is the greatest 
                                                
4 For a detailed overview of these debates, see Shelley Burtt, Virtue Transformed (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992). 
5 Gordon Wood, Creation of the American Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1969), 52. 
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expression of one’s virtue. In a liberal polity, however, there is no requirement to 
sacrifice personal interest for the public good, nor is there a duty to participate in 
government or accept the idea of a common morality. Is it possible to develop a sense of 
common purpose and public spirit without the state imposing on individuals a particular 
conception of the good life? Several scholars have expressed doubt that these political 
aims are compatible, arguing that liberalism and republicanism are distinct and 
competing political projects. Pocock and Wood have specifically argued that the liberal 
tradition supplants the republican tradition during the late eighteenth century, a 
transformation that culminates in the American founding.6 
Recent scholarship has disputed the claim that liberalism and republicanism are 
wholly incompatible. Paul Rahe has argued that the republican and liberal traditions 
actually share many overlapping concerns. In particular, he challenges Pocock’s thesis 
by arguing that modern republicanism was not adverse to capitalism or self-interest, and 
furthermore, that the influence of John Locke, who is completely discounted by Pocock, 
is important in shaping not only the liberal but also the republican tradition.7 Similarly, 
Vickie Sullivan’s work on the influence of Machiavelli’s republicanism and Hobbes’ 
liberalism (though the degree to which Hobbes can rightly be considered a liberal is 
debatable) provides evidence of a synthesis of the republican and liberal traditions 
                                                
6 J.G.A Pocock, “Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 3 
(1972): 119-34; J.G.A Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, 
and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985); Wood, Creation; and Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
7 Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern, 3 vols. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1994); Paul A. Rahe, ed. Machiavelli’s Liberal Republican Legacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
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throughout the English commonwealth period.8 In a complementary vein, Maurizio 
Viroli has argued that liberalism is actually a derivation of, not an alternative to, 
republicanism.9 From a contemporary, normative stance, Richard Dagger has argued that 
the promotion of civic virtue is not hostile to the protection of individual rights, and that 
a theory of republican liberalism is both plausible and attractive.10 Whether a civic 
tradition can successfully cultivate a sense of community and bring renewed attention to 
the shared responsibilities of citizens without injury to personal liberties is a matter of 
scholarly debate, but the work of these scholars suggests that the two traditions are more 
compatible that has traditionally been assumed. 
In this dissertation, I am less concerned with civic republicanism than I am with 
the broader civic tradition. Although the most common term in reference to the 
republican tradition is “civic virtue,” it is somewhat of an anachronism in regard to the 
eighteenth century. More frequently, civic virtue was spoken of in terms of public virtue, 
private virtue, the public spirit, or patriotism.11 I purposefully choose the phrase “civic 
tradition” because it has a broader conceptual basis. As John Robertson argues, the civic 
tradition has an institutional basis in a regular constitution of balanced powers where 
citizens have the opportunity to participate in government. Furthermore, it requires a 
virtuous citizenry who are willing to forego their self-interest in order to fulfill their duty 
                                                
8 Vickie B. Sullivan, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the Formation of a Liberal Republicanism in England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
9 Maurizio Viroli, Republicanism, trans. Antony Shugaar (New York: Hill and Wang, 2002). 
10 Richard Dagger, Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997).  
11 Burtt, Virtues Transformed, 4.  
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to participate in government.12 The civic tradition broadly construed allows for the 
possibility of a conception of civic virtue that does not eschew self-interest, as does the 
classical conception; rather, it offers the possibility that our understanding of virtue can 
be transformed such that self-interest and virtue are no longer seen to be fundamentally 
at odds with one another. 
 While the “republican revivalism” scholarship, as it has come to be known, has 
drawn significant attention to the place of civic virtue in the republican tradition, civic 
virtue is routinely treated as a secular form of virtue. In fact, the role of religion in this 
tradition has often been explicitly rejected. As such, civic humanism and the republican 
tradition are most often treated as a rejection of religious influence in the political 
sphere. In his seminal work on civic humanism in the political culture of Renaissance 
Florence, Han Baron argues that civic republicanism was revived due to a crisis in 
Florentine thought.13 This crisis pitted the contemplative, philosophical, and religious 
life against the active, political life. For him, the Florentine republican tradition was a 
rediscovery and revival of classical political ideas of republicanism and active 
citizenship. This culminated, in Baron’s view, in the triumph of secular civic humanism 
over the religiously driven system of hierarchy and passivity associated with the Middle 
Ages.  
 Drawing directly from Baron’s work, Pocock charges that the eighteenth-century 
civic republican tradition is also rooted in a wholly secular language. The problem he 
                                                
12 John Robertson, “The Scottish Enlightenment at the Limits of the Civic Tradition,” in Wealth and 
Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Istvan Hont and Michael 
Ignatieff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 137-178. 
13 Hans Baron, The Crisis of Early Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanism and Republican Liberty in an 
Age of Classicism and Tyranny, rev. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). 
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identifies with the revival of civic humanism is its effort to balance an Aristotelian idea 
of man as zoon politikon with the Christian idea of man as homo religiosus. The conflict 
revolves around the historical understanding of time, in which the temporal, secular 
republic is in conflict with the universal and transcendent Christian time-scheme. In the 
eighteenth century, this debate was settled, according to Pocock, by the acceptance that 
civic virtue was secular:  
Montesquieu could reiterate Machiavelli’s acknowledgment that civic virtue was 
self-contained and secular, identical neither with the Christian communion nor 
with a social morality founded on purely Christian values. But as the citizen 
became less like the saint, his civic personality required a virtù less like his soul’s 
capacity for redemption and more like the autonomy of Aristotle’s 
megalopsychic man or – in the period that concerns us – the amour de soi-même 
of Rousseau; and this morality required a foundation less spiritual and more 
social and even material.14 
In his most recent work, Pocock continues to explain the project of modern enlightened 
Europe as an effort to describe the triumph of commerce over classical virtue and 
religion.15 In so doing, he denies that religious thought played a role in shaping the 
republican tradition, especially the modern understanding of civic virtue, that emerged in 
the late eighteenth century.  
Although many scholars of the civic tradition do not draw the sharp distinction 
between the secular, republican and Christian understandings of history, it is common 
                                                
14 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 463. 
15 J.G.A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1: 111-113. 
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for scholarship to discount the influence of religion more generally. For instance, in his 
seminal work Wood examines the role of virtue in the American revolutionary and 
constitutional eras, yet only dedicates a few paragraphs to the role of religion.16 
Likewise, Richard Dagger’s recent work on the place of civic virtue in modern society 
only briefly mentions the connection of civil religion to the idea of civic virtue, and only 
in regards to the work of Rousseau.17 Even Rahe and Sullivan, who explicitly recognize 
that there is far less tension between liberalism and republicanism than is often assumed, 
fail to appreciate that for many political authors, religion is what helps them to unite 
these two traditions.18 In fact, Rahe directly argues that the modern Enlightenment 
project “taught men to look down, not up” and reject the “‘inhumane wisdom’ of the 
ancients and their Christian successors.”19 Despite numerous historical studies on the 
ways in which debates over religion influenced political thought and life in this period, 
scholars have generally maintained that religion did little to mold the debate over the 
politics of civic virtue and civic republicanism; rather, religion was seen to be important 
in shaping liberal political thought, especially regarding issues such as toleration, 
pluralism, and individual liberty.20 
 Even when the role of religion in the civic tradition is given scholarly treatment, 
as Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner do in their book In Search of the Republic, religion 
                                                
16 Wood, Creation, 427-29. 
17 Dagger, Civic Virtues, 94-95. 
18 Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern; Sullivan, Machiavelli. 
19 Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern, 207. While he concedes that the Americans were more accepting 
of religion on the whole than their European counterparts, he argues the American founders were “less 
wedded to Christianity,” than is often accepted. See Republics Ancient and Modern, 209. 
20 See especially Michael P. Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1996); and John Rawls, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993).  
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is reduced to the broad category of the Judeo-Christian tradition with little 
acknowledgement of differences between religious traditions.21 The differences among 
religious traditions are not without consequence. For example, it is reasonable to expect 
a different conception of what it means to be a good citizen from the Puritan tradition 
with its emphasis on industry, frugality, and original sin, than from a more universalistic 
or deistic tradition that emphasizes the wisdom, charity, and benevolence. By examining 
the influence of religion on the civic tradition, a more complete understanding can be 
developed as to why it continued to thrive in some areas and intellectual traditions and 
not in others. Furthermore, we can better account for variations in the civic tradition 
expressed by its proponents.  
In the next two sections, I examine specifically the literature on the civic 
traditions in both the Scottish enlightenment and American founding periods. It is clear 
that the language of civic humanism was abundant and influential in each of these 
contexts. Moreover, in both periods the problems posed by both liberalism and the rise 
of commercial economies created practical and theoretical difficulties for those who 
questioned the appropriate relationship between the government and its citizens. Of 
course, discussions surrounding these tensions were evident throughout the 
Enlightenment period and occurred across Europe. I focus, in particular, on the Scottish 
and American examples because of the diversity they offer both in approaches to the 
civic tradition and the diversity of religious interpretation offered by those responding to 
                                                
21 Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner, In Search of the Republic: Public Virtue and the Roots of American 
Government (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987); see also Robert Bellah, whose work is 
discussed in greater detail below, The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial, 2nd ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).  
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civic concerns. Despite the intense civic and religious debates characteristic of both 
examples, religion has played a scant role in the research on the civic tradition in both of 
these localities. In both contexts, I focus on how the civic tradition was employed, how 
scholars have thus far viewed religion as fitting into that tradition, and the limitations in 
our current understanding of how religious thought shaped ideas of civic virtue.  
 
The Scottish Enlightenment 
The Scottish Enlightenment provided many philosophical contributions to the 
civic tradition, which can be attributed to the distinctive political, economic, and 
religious context of Scotland in the eighteenth century. The study of the Scottish 
Enlightenment has proven particularly fruitful because of the large number of 
philosophers who were writing during this period and who worked closely with one 
another, beginning most prominently with Francis Hutcheson and including quite 
famously David Hume and Adam Smith.22 Adam Ferguson enjoyed immense popularity 
among his contemporaries but has since held less academic interest than either Hume or 
Smith. Although the role of the civic tradition in the Scottish Enlightenment has received 
scholarly attention, this scholarship has been overwhelmingly concerned with the civic 
republican response to the economic development of Scotland. This focus on how 
economic factors shaped the civic tradition has underplayed the role of religion in 
                                                
22 Other important Scottish Enlightenment figures include Lord Kames (1695-1782); Thomas Reid (1710-
96); Hugh Blair (1718-1800); William Robertson (1721-1793); John Millar (1735-1801); and Duglad 
Stewart (1753-1828). 
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understanding how the problems associated with commercial advancement could be 
ameliorated.  
Until its union with England in 1707, Scotland was a relatively weak state, both 
politically and economically. Even then, it continued to struggle to reach a level of 
development comparable to other states. In choosing to unite with England, Scotland 
consciously traded is own political power in order to advance its economic interest. 
Beginning as early as 1698, the government had been seriously engaged in developing 
foreign policies that would allow the country to participate in international commerce.23 
By developing a viable commercial economy, the country had the potential to reach a 
level of power, wealth, and comfort similar to that of other states. Consequently, it 
seems apparent that the government saw greater advantages for the country in 
commercialization than in maintaining small, local bases of economic and political 
power. In addition to the prominence of economics in Scottish political thought, the 
Scottish Enlightenment is also marked by its religious diversity. Although there was a 
strong Calvinist tradition within the country, a moderate party influenced by 
Enlightenment ideas also existed.24 Both the economic and religious diversity of the 
country spurred Scot thinkers to address questions on how best to balance the fact of 
pluralism with their civic concerns.  
In particular, it is in response to questions of economic progress that the Scot 
thinkers provide the richest treatment of and response to the civic tradition, especially 
                                                
23 John Robertson, “The Enlightenment above National Context,” The Historical Journal 40 (1997): 667-
97. 
24 Daniel Walker Howe, “Why the Scottish Enlightenment Was Useful to the Framers of the American 
Constitution,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 31 (1989): 572-87. 
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regarding the tension that exists between wealth and virtue. The union of 1707 brought 
together Scotland and England for the purposes of both defense and commerce, but it 
was an unusual example of a state freely trading its sovereignty in order to achieve 
economic progress. Certainly, the transformation of Scottish culture began prior to the 
union, but as Nicholas Phillipson has argued, the national concern with economic 
development spearheaded the movement toward union and shaped the philosophical 
agenda of the Scottish literati thereafter.25  
The decision to seek union with England is often seen as a rejection of the civic 
republican tradition. The sacrifice of self-government made Scotland dependent on 
England, trading sovereignty for the promise of economic development. Nicholas 
Phillipson has argued that the Act of Union spurred “the Scots inquiry into the Science 
of Man as a critique of the classical language of civic morality.”26  The intellectual 
project of many Scottish thinkers attempted to explain how this voluntary transfer of 
authority was not an abandonment of the civic tradition’s ideals, but in doing so, they 
modified the understanding of civic virtue. As John Robertson has described, this 
process focused on developing an understanding of political citizenship that could 
account for both the civic duties of individuals as well as provide for economic progress: 
“For the Scots, it was precisely this interdependence of the social and moral with the 
                                                
25 Nicholas Phillipson, “The Scottish Enlightenment,” in The Enlightenment in National Context, ed. Roy 
S. Porter and Mikulás Teich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 19-40. 
26 Phillipson, “Scottish Enlightenment,” 22. In contrast, Anand C. Chitnis has argued that Scottish 
preoccupation with civic morality can be traced back to the seventeenth century, not simply the Act of 
Union. Regardless, the language of the civic tradition did continue to shape the political debates into the 
eighteenth century. See Anand C. Chitnis, “The Eighteenth-Century Scottish Intellectual Inquiry: Context 
and Continuities versus Civic Virtue,” in Aberdeen and the Enlightenment, ed. Jennifer J. Carter and Joan 
H. Pittock (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), 77-94. 
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institutional dimensions of citizenship in a political community that made the concepts 
of the civic tradition so applicable when they sought to relate the demands of material 
improvement to the continuing institutional requirements of government.”27 
Overwhelmingly, the Scots do move away from the classical civic ideal that 
treats civic participation in political life as the greatest expression of virtue. Instead, they 
emphasize social virtues, particularly the ways in which men of polite society could 
improve the manners, economy, and politics of the modern age. The intersection of 
political, social, and economic theory is what makes the Scottish contributions to the 
civic tradition so useful to later theorists who struggled to understand how a liberal 
concern for individual rights could be combined with a republican concern for virtue. 
To understand the foundations and implications of the transformation of Scotland 
and of the rapid growth of commerce in the world, the Scottish intellectual tradition 
vigorously pursued a science of politics, and more broadly as Hume described it, the 
“science of man.” Inquiries about the origins of morality, religion, and society were key 
to understanding the social and political development of states. What became clear is 
that the classical civic tradition had placed so much emphasis on the way in which 
political life shapes individuals that it had obfuscated the ways in which cultural, 
economic, and religious factors influence the moral perceptions of individuals and the 
political arrangements of their societies.  
What distinguished the Scottish Enlightenment, as Hugh Trevor-Roper has 
argued, is the attention given to the scientific study of “the social behavior of 
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mankind.”28 The scientific study of social relations moved away from the classical 
republican focus on politics and civic virtue. Perhaps because Scotland had freely traded 
sovereignty for economic progress, the Scottish study of politics rejected the classical 
argument that commercialization would lead to the corruption of society. Rather, as Oz-
Salzberger has argued, the Scots instead focused on “accounting for non-virtuous, yet 
socially beneficial, behaviour.”29 In this way, they aimed to explain how non-political 
activities could prevent corruption.  
In developing scientific theories of social behavior, the Scots particularly used 
and developed ideas of spontaneous order and unintended consequences. Drawing 
especially from the work of Bernard Mandeville, they examined the ways that 
individual’s self-interest could promote collective goods. As Ronald Hamowy has 
succinctly summarized the Scots’ theory of spontaneous order, they argued that “society 
is not the product of calculation but arises spontaneously, and its institutions are not the 
result of intentional design but of men’s actions which have as their purpose an array of 
short-term private objectives.”30 In this way, they had determined a way to overcome the 
classical dependence on the virtue of citizens as the bedrock of political success. Instead, 
they explained that viable social and political institutions arise from actions that are 
beyond human design. This did not suggest that individuals need not be virtuous, but 
rather, that virtue alone would not make nor undermine a society. By scientifically 
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studying the laws of human nature, the history of political societies and institutions, and 
the natural order of the world, the Scots aimed to move beyond the classical civic 
tradition and integrate an understanding of social and economic causes into their theories 
of politics. 
Though the Scottish Enlightenment is marked by its scientific approach to the 
study of politics, there was disagreement over the purpose of doing this kind of work. 
For example, whereas Hume approaches the study of politics from a purely scientific 
perspective, Ferguson argues that the science of politics should serve to enrich the 
practice of politics. Drawing from the classical republican tradition, as Oz-Salzberger 
argues, Ferguson seeks to elevate the scientific study of politics to “the level of self-
conscious and well-informed practice.”31  
This difference between Hume and Ferguson over engaging the science of 
politics is also reflective more broadly of the place of the civic tradition in the Scottish 
Enlightenment. While concerns over the corrupting effects of commercialization and 
questions of self-government shaped Scottish thought, the work of some of the most 
notable Scottish philosophers, Hume and Smith included, lies beyond the scope of civic 
republican concerns. For instance, Hume’s social and political philosophy, as John 
Robertson describes it, lies at the “limits of the civic tradition.”32 Hume’s new science of 
politics may be largely shaped by the concerns of that tradition, but as James Moore has 
suggested, his claim that classical theories had ignored both the influence of society and 
economics on human behavior and political institutions represents the end of classical 
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republicanism.33 Similarly, Edwin Harpham has persuasively argued that Smith’s work 
does not fit within the language or assumptions of civic humanist discourse, especially 
given his unequivocal acceptance of the modern commercial order.34 By contrast, 
Hutcheson and Ferguson work within the civic tradition adopting the language of virtue 
and corruption. Moreover, they assume a philosophy that emphasizes the scientific study 
of morality and politics so as to better understand how to prevent corruption, encourage 
civic engagement, and cultivate the virtue of the people through activity in both societal 
and political institutions.   
The question facing advocates of the civic tradition like Hutcheson and Ferguson 
was how to make men moral. While they did accept theories of spontaneous order and 
the idea that self-interest was not necessarily in conflict with the common good, they 
also argued that virtue was necessary for both personal happiness and societal progress. 
They believed that all individuals have the capacity for virtue, and even a natural 
inclination toward virtuous behavior, but they contended moral education was necessary 
to ensure that those behaviors were properly cultivated. Moreover, this moral education 
has a distinctly religious foundation that is aimed at producing civic and political goods. 
There is a general consensus that religion played an important role in the Scottish 
Enlightenment. While in some areas, such as France, Enlightenment philosophies grew 
out of an opposition to religious power and influence, as Richard Sher has argued, the 
“Enlightenment in Scotland…was largely an ecclesiastical and academic 
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phenomenon.”35 In fact, there was tremendous overlap between the Scottish clerics and 
the university professors; hence, there is little surprise that the moral philosophy that 
developed in the Scottish universities was religiously driven.36 This connection between 
religious and moral thought is particularly evident in the works of Hutcheson and 
Ferguson: 
Hutcheson and Ferguson were both moral Newtonians of a sort, striving to 
discover nature’s secret laws about man and society in order to reveal the majesty 
of God’s handiwork…To be sure, [they] did not always agree on particular 
ethical and political issues, but they both believed that the primary purpose of 
instruction in moral philosophy was to prepare young men for practicing ‘virtue’ 
in all spheres of life, religious as well as secular, public as well as private.”37 
Although it is accepted that religion played an important role in the Scottish 
Enlightenment, that there was a close connection between religious and moral 
philosophy, and that moral philosophy could be used to promote virtuous behavior, 
surprisingly little work has been done to explain how religion influenced the civic 
tradition in particular. As Sher suggests, both Hutcheson and Ferguson believed religion 
could be used to instill virtue in individuals, but the connection between their views on 
virtue and their political thought is less clear. For instance, it is unclear from the 
literature whether religious belief is necessary to being a good citizen, if religious virtues 
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like piety are important to an individual’s civic activities, and whether certain political 
forms and institutions are more conducive than others to instilling virtue in citizens.  
In the case of Hutcheson, most of the scholarship on his writings has focused on 
his moral philosophy, specifically his moral sense theory.38 As Alasdair MacIntyre has 
correctly described, Hutcheson’s philosophical project was so attractive to Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers because he “provided a secular counterpart to the appeal to 
inward feelings” to ground his theory of justice.39 In essence, Hutcheson argued that 
humanity is naturally inclined toward virtue and capable of moral knowledge, apart from 
religious knowledge or ability to reason about moral issues. From this theory, Hutcheson 
argued that the supreme virtue is benevolence, and though he began from purely secular 
grounds, he emphasizes humanity’s duties to God and obligations to one another.  
Nevertheless, scholars rarely or only cursorily connect Hutcheson’s moral theory 
to his political thought, especially his discussion of the necessity of civic virtue in 
sustaining government. Although Caroline Robbins, Gary Wills, and T.D. Campbell 
have provided extensive treatments of Hutcheson’s political thought, and especially his 
influence on the American Revolution, his work is most often treated as either derivate 
or as an unsuccessful project in terms of his attempt to synthesize multiple traditions of 
thought.40 Though I agree that his political work is not especially innovative, he does 
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provide an interesting example of the struggle to synthesize liberal and republican 
concerns in his political thought. This is especially intriguing given Hutcheson’s 
contention that civil authority should protect individual religious liberty while also 
promoting religious belief. Moreover, he goes so far as to argue that religious belief is 
necessary to be a good citizen and piety is a civic as well as private virtue.  
In contrast, Ferguson shares much in common with Hutcheson’s moral and 
theological perspective but reaches different conclusions concerning civic virtue. 
Ferguson agrees that the state should protect individual liberty as well as foster a 
dedication to the common good; however, he does not treat piety as a civic virtue. 
Rather, he insists that individuals must exhibit the virtues of honor and charity and must 
be actively engaged in civic and political life in order to be good citizens. While some 
work has been done specifically on the influence of religion on Ferguson’s political 
thought, this scholarship does not address how his religious views shape his 
understanding of civic virtue.41 By examining the religious and political thought of 
Hutcheson and Ferguson, it is clear that they both argue for a form of liberal 
republicanism that will protect individual liberty and encourage civic virtue. They both 
emphasize the role of religion in inspiring individuals to exercise private and public 
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virtue, but they differ over which specific virtues are necessary to sustain republican 
government. Hence, their writings demonstrate that not only does religion influence 
republican ideas of civic virtue but also that different religious perspectives result in 
different conceptions of what is required of good citizens.  
 
The American Founding Era 
 The role of religion in the American Founding era has been a subject of great 
scholarly interest, both in terms of the personal religious beliefs of individual Founders 42 
and the role of religion in the revolutionary period.43 Many of America’s Founders 
attended religious services, spoke of their religious faith, and openly discussed the ways 
in which their religious values influenced their political thinking.44 Nevertheless, the 
most important works of scholarship on American republican thought, and especially on 
civic virtue, have largely ignored the role of religion in shaping this tradition. To some 
extent, this has been driven by the seemingly endless debate over the shape and character 
of republicanism in America, especially in defending it against liberalism. Scholars such 
as Louis Hartz, Thomas Pangle, John Diggins, and Michael Zuckert have stressed the 
influence of the Lockean tradition, with its emphasis on natural rights, self-interest, and 
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property.45 Others, such as Gordon Wood, J.G.A. Pocock, and Gary Wills, have 
emphasized the influence of the civic republican tradition especially as expressed in the 
American adoption of English opposition thought and the Scottish Enlightenment.46 Too 
often, these have been treated as exclusive and competing paradigms of influence with 
little overlap. As Bernard Bailyn has persuasively argued, the American revolutionary 
period was influenced by many sources, including classical thought, Enlightenment 
rationalism, the common law tradition, and Puritanism. In fact, it was common for 
authors to draw from each of these traditions without reconciling the tensions that 
existed between them.47  
Recent scholarship has sought to provide a more nuanced view of the traditions 
of American political thought. In particular, Paul Rahe has made great strides to remedy 
this dichotomous approach, demonstrating that political thinkers in the American 
founding era did not view these two traditions as incompatible; rather, they embraced the 
theories of Sidney, Harrington, Trenchard and Gordon as well as Locke, viewing them 
as complimentary approaches.48 In short, authors throughout the American founding era 
championed both the power of self-interest and civic virtue to sustain and enrich civil 
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life and government. This produced a synthetic tradition, a liberal republicanism that 
emphasized both individual rights and the public good.  
Rather than arguing for a synthesis of liberalism and republicanism, Rogers 
Smith has defended a multiple traditions approach, with political actors blending 
republican, liberal, democratic, and inegalitarian ascriptive elements to form civic 
ideologies.49 For Smith, ascriptive inegalitarianism is based on the assignment of 
political identities according to natural or ascriptive characteristics, such as race, gender, 
religion, or national origin. More than simply evidence of past prejudices, Smith argues 
that this type of inegalitarianism is an intellectual tradition that existed alongside 
republican, liberal, and democratic traditions. The civic identities that were developed, 
along with the laws and political institutions that supported them, represented “none too 
coherent compromises among the distinct mixes of civic conceptions advanced by the 
more powerful actors in different eras.”50  
Part of the reason that these traditions have so often been blended, according to 
Smith, is that inegalitarianism is able to sustain the civic myth of exceptionalism where 
republicanism and liberalism cannot. In particular, liberalism asserts that all humans are 
of equal worth, making any exclusions suspect. Likewise, the classical republican 
emphasis on civic virtue requires a good citizen to prefer the good of the republic over 
his own personal or even familial interests.51 These ideologies place high demands on 
citizens, whereas inegalitarian ascriptive ideologies appeal to civic conceptions that treat 
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one group as the unique and special bearers of rights and responsibilities. Moreover, this 
civic vision is attractive because it resists radical changes in the social and political 
structure that are associated with the egalitarian demands of liberal and republican 
ideologies.52  
Smith successfully moves scholarship beyond the liberal-republican debate, and 
his focus on citizenship laws and judicial decisions makes a valuable contribution to our 
understanding of the legal dimension of citizenship. Nevertheless, Smith’s work misses 
some of the complexity of the republican and liberal traditions within the American 
tradition. For example, Smith is largely unconcerned with the role of civic virtue or 
religion in either the republican or liberal traditions. This dissertation aims to build on 
Smith’s insights and explore how religion is used to reinforce inegalitarian ascriptive 
ideologies with both republican and liberal arguments, as well as to combat them. By 
examining how many American thinkers wanted to use religion to build community, 
cultivate virtue, and also – for some – protect individual liberty, we can better 
understand how religion helps to shape our understanding of what it means to be a good 
citizen, especially a virtuous citizen, in ways that are not captured by Smith’s focus on 
the legal dimensions of citizenship. 
Not only has the role of religion often been ignored in American republican 
thought, but one of the biggest points of scholarly contention is the degree to which civic 
virtue played a prominent role in the political thought of the American founding era. The 
language of civic virtue reached a zenith during and immediately following the 
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Revolution, but it continued to be a subject that shaped the debate surrounding the fate 
of the nation through the end of the eighteenth century. Despite expressing a 
commitment to the civic tradition, the myriad problems that plagued the nascent republic 
challenged the idea that a virtuous people could provide the foundation for a healthy 
government. The period of rule under the Articles of Confederation is often 
characterized by scholars as a time in which the politics of interest supplant the politics 
of virtue. Wood, Pocock, and Diggins, among others, have argued that the commitment 
to civic virtue had ended by 1787.53 According to this reading of the American founding, 
a politics of virtue was never entirely repudiated; rather, as Wood has described it, the 
Constitutional Convention demonstrated an effort to establish a republican regime 
“which did not require a virtuous people for its sustenance.”54 Although during the 
revolutionary period virtue was considered to be both a necessary and sufficient 
condition to establish a working republican government, the period following the end of 
the war proved that virtue alone was not sufficient. 
Other scholars have contested this point, however, arguing that there was not a 
departure from virtue because Americans never actually held a classical conception of 
virtue.  For example, Rahe contends that the civic humanistic tradition in America is 
only a “figment of the scholarly imagination.”55 The classical concern for virtue, he 
argues, was replaced with modern concerns for commerce, wealth, and the science of 
politics. Although those writing during the constitutional era did reject notions of 
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classical virtue, this was by no means as radical a break with the civic tradition as it is 
often presented. Scholars including Lance Banning, Shelley Burtt, Jean Yarbrough, and 
Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner have all argued that the conception of civic virtue was 
transformed such that self-interest was no longer viewed as being fundamentally at odds 
with virtue.56  
Whereas the classical conception of civic virtue emphasized the sacrifice of self-
interest for the common good, the modern republican conception of virtue taught that 
self-interest and the common good were not fundamentally opposed to one another. 
Dedication to the common good would require some sacrifice on the part of the 
individual, but as Banning has explained, “the sacrifice of self was to occur primarily in 
an individual’s submission to community decision or in taking time from personal 
enjoyments and pursuits in order to attend to public business.”57 Serving the public good 
requires the sacrifice of personal time in order to participate in government, but 
individuals are expected to reflect their own interests when making political decisions. 
As such, virtue is expected to play an important role in civil society, and political leaders 
and decisions are evaluated in terms of their contribution to the public good. It is not 
considered necessary for individuals to abdicate their personal interests in order to 
ensure the foundation of republican government. Political institutions were constructed 
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to account for the fact that individuals would not be entirely virtuous, but this did not 
indicate that virtue was considered irrelevant. 
If civic virtue was still viewed as important, but the primary aim of government 
was no longer to make men virtuous, by what means would virtue be ensured? Religion, 
education, and, especially, religious education are the answers most often given, though 
the particulars are a matter of great debate. The influence of religion on republican 
thought in the American context especially regarding civic virtue has been largely 
overlooked and underemphasized for at least three reasons. First, advocates of the 
republican revisionist thesis have generally treated civic virtue as secular. Although it is 
acknowledged that religion was prevalent in American society, religion is seen as 
primarily playing a role in individuals’ private lives. Second, even when it is 
acknowledged that religion influenced republican thought, distinctions in religious 
thought are overlooked. Third, the focus on the creation of the federal government has 
overlooked the role religion played at the state level. I briefly address each of these 
limitations below. 
Since Wood penned Creation of the American Republic, virtue has been one of 
the primary concepts around which all studies of the American Revolution and 
Constitution revolve. Despite his lengthy examination of the role of virtue in the 
American founding era, Wood dedicates only a few pages to the issue of religion.58 
Though he acknowledges that some, especially the clergy, believed that religion could 
help thwart corruption, he argues that Americans ultimately favored a system in which 
                                                
58 Wood, Creation, 427-29.  
 29 
republican institutions would not be dependent upon virtuous men, thus largely 
eliminating a public need for religion. Rather than trying to reform “men’s hearts,” 
Wood argues that the new form of republicanism “looked to mechanical devices and 
institutional contrivances as the only lasting solution for America’s ills.”59 In contrast, 
Paul Rahe dedicates an entire chapter of his study of the American republic to the issues 
of religion and virtue in the founding era, concluding that religion did play an important 
role in shaping the American politeia, although it had its greatest influence outside of the 
legal realm. Nevertheless, Rahe largely supports Wood’s overall conclusion, arguing that 
the advocates of republican government were “intent on devising institutions which 
would neither presuppose any great virtue on the part of the citizens nor directly and 
systematically foster it in them.”60 Hence, the political importance of virtue, at least in 
terms of the national political order, primarily became a matter addressed within the 
private sphere.  
Even those who argue that the type of virtue adopted by the American Founders 
was inherently modern and even liberal often deny that religion played a great role in 
shaping the debates over virtue. Emphasizing the liberal character of the American 
republic, Sinopoli argues that the Founders adopted a less demanding view of civic 
virtue than classical republicans. In his view, the Founders, especially the Federalists, 
blended liberalism with a form of weak republicanism, whereby they understood virtue 
primarily in terms of duty and civic participation. Nevertheless, Sinopoli largely agrees 
with Wood that the influence of religion on virtue became a private matter. In this 
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Madisonian system, according to Sinopoli, religion is relegated to the private sphere, 
noting that Madison believed it “crude, even cynical” to use religion to direct civil 
policies.61  
Similar to Sinopoli, Pangle has argued that the form of virtue advocated by the 
Founders is distinctly modern and secular in character when compared to classical 
republican virtue. In fact, Pangle goes so far as to argue that the Founders adopted a 
distinctly modern philosophical perspective which treats the classical approach to 
teaching civic virtue as dubious or even dangerous given its emphasis on “aristocratic 
pride, religious devotion, and an elevated or pious image of the philosophic life.”62 
Hence, Pangle contends that the classical devotion to religious and philosophical 
conceptions of virtue was replaced with a new, scientific approach to politics. 
 Despite the general trend in this research, there are some scholars who have 
argued that religion played an important role not only in the private sphere but also in 
the public debates surrounding republican government and values. Even when the role of 
religion in the civic tradition is given scholarly treatment, religion is often reduced to the 
broad category of the Judeo-Christian tradition with little acknowledgement of 
differences between religious traditions. Most often, the points of consensus among 
religion are taken to represent an overarching civil religion that defines and shapes 
American political culture. Vetterli and Bryner have defended this position in their 
treatment of virtue in the American founding era. They argue that a general “Hebraic-
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Christian-Puritan ethic…was the primary ingredient in developing and sustaining that 
morality which promoted unity, harmony and cooperation in the American 
community.”63 Non-political institutions, including family, schools, and churches, 
primarily support this form of civil religion. Although the authors are correct to note the 
role of the private sphere in supporting republican virtue, they completely ignore the 
religious divisions that existed within American colonies, instead asserting that a general 
Christian consensus existed concerning morality and virtue.  
 The concept of civil religion used by Vetterli and Bryner is drawn from the 
scholarship of Robert Bellah. Perhaps more forcefully than any scholar, Bellah has 
argued that the church serves at “the real school of republican virtue in America.”64 The 
civil religion that Bellah identifies in the American founding is not an established 
religion, but rather “is expressed in a set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals with respect to 
sacred things.”65 He argues that it is primarily through the blending of Montesquieu’s 
republicanism with Puritan covenant theology that the role of virtue in the new 
American political order was ensured. Though he correctly identifies the contributions of 
New England civil millennialism and Virginian republicanism, Bellah is guilty of 
ignoring the contentious points of dispute between religious sects over the best way to 
organize republican institutions and ensure morality among the masses. Although the 
Great Awakening did serve as a unifying factor in several regards, national agreement 
was not reached on several important issues, including the necessity of piety, the 
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inclusion of non-sectarians and non-religious individuals as citizens, and the type of 
public worship that was appropriate in a republic that embraced individual rights. These 
differences among religious traditions are not without theoretical and political 
consequence; unfortunately, the emphasis on an all-encompassing civil religion has 
obfuscated these important distinctions. Because Bellah does not distinguish between the 
differences among religious sects, he glosses over the issue of plurality, a driving force 
of tension but also innovation for liberalism. This causes him to overemphasize the 
influence of republican and biblical traditions on American political thought. 
Though their scholarship overlooks distinctions between religious sects, Bellah 
as well as Vetterli and Bryner have drawn scholarly attention to the role of private 
institutions in supporting civic virtue. This is an important advance in studies on civic 
virtue and republican thought because so much of the scholarship on the American 
founding era has focused exclusively on national level politics. Since most of the 
national level debates concerning religion focused on the issue of religious liberty, 
scholars have taken the absence of any religious content in the Constitution and the 
general absence of religious discussion within the Constitutional Convention as evidence 
that religion did not play an important role in the political thought of the era.66  
This focus on the federal government overlooks the enormous role religion 
continued to play, and was expected to play, at the state and local levels. Historical 
scholarship has repeatedly emphasized the place of religion in the states, though few 
scholars of republicanism or the civic tradition have carefully integrated these findings 
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into understanding the dynamics between federal and state institutions and politics.67 In 
fact, most states maintained a state-sponsored church and religious tests for political 
office into the early nineteenth century. Even among more tolerant states, such as 
Pennsylvania and Virginia, religion played an important role in education and in the 
municipal governments. Although some scholars have suggested that the Founders 
assumed moral instruction in civil virtue would be addressed at the state and local levels, 
little evidence has been produced to support this assertion.68 Because scholarship has 
focused primarily on religion at the national level rather than examining the state or local 
level, the role of religion in the civic tradition has generally been undervalued. Although 
it is clear that religion did have some role to play in shaping the civic tradition, even if 
the primary locus of influence was at the state and local levels and within the private 
sphere, it remains unclear precisely how religion influenced political leaders’ views on 
republicanism and the civic tradition.  
 In undertaking an examination of the religious and political thought of the 
Founders, my primary interest is in examining the way in which these political figures 
thought religion could assist and support the civic tradition. A great deal of attention has 
been paid in recent years to the personal religious convictions of the Founders.69 
                                                
67 Stephen Botein, “Religious Dimensions of the Early American State,” in Beyond Confederation, ed. 
Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward C. Carter II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
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Although this approach has provided useful insights, it is not my intention to discover 
the true beliefs of these individuals. The focus of this work is to concentrate on the role 
they saw religion playing in public life, not necessarily in their own. Incongruities do 
exist at times between the role religion plays in the personal lives of the founders and the 
role they thought religion should play at large. This has led some scholars to conclude 
that the founders were cynical or disingenuous when they advocated a role for religion in 
political life and civil society. I do not take this to be the case and argue instead that such 
tensions in their thought can be explained without assuming that they were devoid of any 
faith or that their inconsistencies make it impossible to understand their view of religion. 
By approaching the writings of these thinkers in this way, I demonstrate that each of 
these founders saw a political utility in encouraging religious belief and worship among 
the public, but the character of the religion and the implications for individual religious 
liberty vary widely.   
 
Conclusion 
Although the role of religion in shaping the civic tradition has generally been 
ignored, rejected, or reduced to the broad category of Judeo-Christian values, religion 
did in fact shape ideas of civic virtue and citizenship in both the Scottish Enlightenment 
and the American Founding. In the following chapters, I contend that religion influenced 
this tradition and also that different conceptions of religion produce different 
understandings of what it means to be a good citizen.  Within the Scottish 
Enlightenment, I contrast the influence of moral sense philosophy with providential 
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theology. In Chapter II, I address the role of religion in the work of Francis Hutcheson, 
whose moral sense theory treats benevolence as central to a well-functioning society. He 
argues that piety is a civic virtue and that civil government should encourage religious 
belief as a means to producing virtuous citizens. In Chapter III, I explore Adam 
Ferguson’s providential theology, which views societal progress as rooted in the virtue 
of the people. This virtue is given its greatest expression in the pursuit of the common 
good, which Ferguson believes is commensurate with service to God. Ferguson’s 
approach emphasizes the classical virtues of courage and civic engagement as necessary 
for individuals to fulfill their civic and religious duties. Although their religious 
perspectives are complimentary, Hutcheson and Ferguson ultimately emphasize different 
civic virtues. 
In the American Founding, I contrast two different religious approaches, the 
Puritan New England tradition and a public religious tradition. In Chapter IV, I focus on 
the political works of John Adams and John Witherspoon, who were both influenced by 
the Puritan religious tradition and advocate a strong role for civil government in 
promoting religion as a means to ensure virtue. They both argue that individuals must be 
pious in order to be good citizens. In Chapter V, I examine the works of Benjamin 
Franklin, Thomas Paine, and Thomas Jefferson, who each advocate a form of public 
religion that emphasizes the cultivation of virtue among the public, but focus especially 
on non-religious virtues including benevolence, industry, and justice. This work 
demonstrates the nuances of these competing, though at times complimentary, religious 
approaches. Although each chapter highlights a different understanding of civic virtue, 
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the role of religion in promoting that virtue, and conception of what it means to be a 
good citizen, it is clear that each of these thinkers believes religion can and should be 
used for political ends.   
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CHAPTER II 
FRANCIS HUTCHESON: THE MORAL SENSE OF CIVIC VIRTUE 
 
 Often considered the “father of the Scottish Enlightenment,” Francis Hutcheson 
is best known for his moral philosophy. As the chair of moral philosophy at the 
University of Glasgow, he influenced generations of students as well as the moral 
theories of David Hume and Adam Smith. Drawing upon the work of Shaftesbury, 
Hutcheson countered theories of egoism to argue that humanity is endowed with a moral 
sense, and consequently individuals are naturally inclined towards benevolent behavior. 
His moral sense theory had direct implications for political philosophy, both in terms of 
influencing his arguments on natural rights and the centrality of virtue to a well-
functioning government. 
 While Hutcheson’s political thought on individual rights and the right to 
revolution has received primary attention, his republican thought has been generally 
underplayed.1 Although his writings on republican government are not particularly 
novel, his effort to combine a concern for individual liberty with the necessity of 
cultivating civic virtue represents an early attempt in the eighteenth century to develop a 
theory of liberal republicanism. Religion plays a central role in Hutcheson’s political 
                                                
1 For a discussion Hutcheson’s theory of rights see Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral 
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work, as it inspires individuals to behave virtuously, to be civically engaged, and to 
serve the public good. The protection of individual rights is essential to protecting the 
public interest and promoting public happiness, and religion serves the ends of 
government by encouraging individuals to respect the rights of others. Hutcheson 
believes that it is in the interest of the civil authority to promote religion and civic virtue, 
and more specifically, he argues that piety is the foremost civic virtue. In order to 
demonstrate the centrality of religion to Hutcheson’s political thought, I begin with an 
examination of his moral sense theory. I then describe his efforts to combine liberal and 
republican concerns in his political thought. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the 
role of religion in promoting civic virtue and the place of religious liberty within 
republican government. Overall, I argue that Hutcheson’s moral theory demonstrates the 
connection between religious and civic virtue in supporting a government that is 
dedicated to the common good.  
  
Moral Sense Theory 
 Before examining Hutcheson’s moral sense theory, it is useful first briefly to 
describe the historical and philosophical context of his work. To this end, I first situate 
his political thought within the Scottish enlightenment tradition and then discuss his 
moral theory as a response to theories of psychological egoism. Born to an Irish 
Presbyterian family, Hutcheson studied at Glasgow, and was ordained in the 
Presbyterian Church before returning to Dublin to begin his academic career. 
Hutcheson’s writings were driven by many of the philosophical, theological, and 
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political controversies that defined early eighteenth-century Scotland. Drawing from 
both conservative and moderate sources within the Presbyterian tradition, as well as 
from liberal and republican political thinkers, his work represents an amalgamation of 
several disparate and often competing traditions. William Scott has concluded that 
Hutcheson’s thought as a whole is unsystematic and is characterized by four distinct 
phases that correspond to the composition of his major works: moral sense theory, 
naturalism, teleology, and stoicism.2 In contrast, James Moore has argued that 
Hutcheson’s thought is more systematic than is often accepted and can be divided into a 
public philosophy intended to engage fellow members of the Scottish literati, and an 
academic philosophy used specifically to orient his teachings at the University of 
Glasgow.3  Despite debates over whether Hutcheson’s use of various sources produces 
an unsystematic philosophy, as Alasdair MacIntyre has described, on the whole this 
diversity strengthens his thought, even if it does pose some limitations: 
It is part of Hutcheson’s genuine greatness that when we understand his 
philosophy in this perspective, we also come to understand the extraordinary way 
in which he summoned up all the available resources relevant for his work. What 
has appeared to some commentators as mere eclecticism was in fact a 
remarkable, even if unsuccessful, project of synthesis.4 
                                                
2 William Scott, Francis Hutcheson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1900).  
3 James Moore, “The Two Systems of Francis Hutcheson: On the Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment,” 
in Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. M.A. Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990): 37-60. 
4 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1988), 259. 
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Hutcheson’s moral philosophy earned him international recognition during his 
own lifetime and remains the primary focus of contemporary scholarship on his work. In 
particular, scholars have focused on Hutcheson’s influence on Scottish moral 
philosophy, especially on the works of Hume and Smith,5 as well as the relationship 
between his aesthetic and moral philosophy.6 Hutcheson’s main philosophical project, 
first articulated in his Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue 
(1725), was to develop Shaftesbury’s moral sense theory to provide a theory of justice 
that did not rely solely on individual interests.7 One of Hutcheson’s primary motivations 
in developing his moral sense theory was to counter arguments made by Hobbes and 
Mandeville that humans are primarily motivated by self-love. Working from the theory 
that human nature is driven by passions and interests, Hobbes and especially Mandeville 
argued that humans are essentially selfish, working principally towards their own 
interests. Even when we perceive what appears to be altruistic behavior, this is actually a 
sophisticated form of egoism, whereby individuals help others only to further their own 
interests or satiate their own emotions. Individuals are able to cooperate, as they are able 
to form social contracts, but even such contracts involve a self-interested tradeoff which 
sacrifices immediate interests for the security of long-term stability.  
                                                
5 See especially Luigi Turco, “Moral Sense and the Foundations of Morals,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Alexander Broadie (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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In contrast to theories of egoism, Hutcheson contends that individuals are 
capable of “the desire of, or delight in, the Good of others.”8 This pleasure is not simply 
a reflection of self-interest but is an independent and genuine response that humans have 
to one another. As T.D. Campbell rightly argues, Hutcheson’s main point of contrast 
with Hobbes is to demonstrate that public affection “cannot ultimately be for the 
pleasure the benevolent person gets from seeing others happy, since such pleasure 
presupposes a prior desire that they be happy.”9 In essence, Hutcheson argues that when 
we see others being happy, we experience pleasure from their happiness. This feeling of 
pleasure is often instantaneous, and as such, it is not derived from a calculation of how 
the other person’s happiness will benefit one’s own interest. As Broadie succinctly 
summarizes Hutcheson’s critique of both Hobbes and Mandeville, Hutcheson argues “to 
will the happiness of others and to do so for their sake is to be benevolent. If we can act 
benevolently then the doctrine of psychological egoism…must be false.”10  
In rejecting arguments for self-love, Hutcheson also confronted competing 
theories that grounded humanity’s knowledge of morality on religion or reason. For 
instance, Hutcheson rejected the view of theologians, especially Archibald Campbell, 
who argued that moral knowledge is grounded in religion and that self-love, understood 
in terms of the promise of eternal happiness, is what propels Christians to obey God’s 
laws. Moreover, he also confronts the idea that reason alone can provide individuals with 
a clear understanding of moral behavior. In this light, the moral sense refers to an 
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10 Broadie, A History of Scottish Philosophy, 134.  
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individual’s ability to perceive virtue and vice, both in one’s own actions and in the 
actions of others. The moral sense exists alongside other external and internal senses and 
allows individuals to make judgments about aesthetics, to observe pubic happiness, and 
to recognize virtuous and vicious behavior. Most importantly, these internal senses, 
especially the moral sense, are not derived from reason alone, because, as Campbell 
explains, “reason can only tell us about the existence of causal relations between actions 
and can never establish their amiableness or odiousness.”11 
Hence, the moral sense provides the foundation for knowledge of morality, and it 
enables individuals to make moral judgments without the assistance of revelation or 
reason. Hutcheson never suggests that the moral sense alone provides perfect moral 
knowledge; religion and reason provide moral guidance in this regard. Furthermore, the 
moral sense does not prevent all selfish behavior. Hutcheson never necessarily denies 
Mandeville’s main point, that selfish behavior may result in public benefits, but he does 
deny that purely selfish behavior can be defined as virtuous. What matters are not the 
outcomes of our actions but rather the intentions underlying our actions. As Broadie 
explains, “It is precisely on the motive that the moral status of the act depends, and the 
only motive that can ground virtue is benevolence. Self-interest cannot serve as such a 
ground.”12 In fact, Broadie contends that Hutcheson’s most substantial objection to 
theories of egoism is that “it leaves no room for virtue, since it leaves no room for 
benevolence, and for Hutcheson benevolence is the moral motive.”13 
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Although Hutcheson believes that everyone is equipped with a moral sense, and 
is naturally inclined toward benevolence, he does not argue that the moral sense alone is 
enough to motivate individuals toward virtuous actions. Indeed, competing passions and 
emotions, including self-interest, influence the behavior of individuals. As such, the 
moral sense works alongside more selfish interests to produce public goods: 
Tis made so certain from the divine government of the world, the state of 
mankind, who cannot subsist without society, from universal experience and 
consent, from inward consciousness of the pleasure of kind affections, and self-
approbation, and of the torments of malice, or hatred, or envy, or anger, that no 
man who considers those things, can ever imagine he can have any possible 
interest in opposing the public good, or in checking his kind affections, nay if he 
had no kind affections, his very self-love and regard to his private good might 
excite him to publicly useful actions, and dissuade him from the contrary.14 
Hence, the moral sense only provides a basis for individuals to discern virtuous and 
vicious behaviors; it does not ensure action based on those perceptions. Because he 
wants individuals to have the right motives and intentions, Hutcheson faces a problem of 
how to promote virtue. His answer to this problem receives its most thorough treatment 
in his posthumously published A System of Moral Philosophy (1755). Connecting his 
moral, religious, and political thought, Hutcheson examines ways in which virtue can be 
cultivated and what systems of government are most conducive to that end. In the next 
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section, I examine the relationship between Hutcheson’s moral sense theory and his 
political thought, especially his reflections on civic virtue.  
 
Hutcheson’s Political Thought 
Although Hutcheson’s fame as the father of the Scottish Enlightenment is mostly 
grounded in his moral theory, his political thought provides insight into efforts to 
combine liberal and republican concerns. Hutcheson’s political work is particularly 
known for his theory of rights, especially the right to revolution. In fact, his work was 
widely discussed and cited within the American revolutionary movement and was used 
to justify the rebellion of the colonies.15 While natural rights theory, property rights, and 
social contract theory all play a fundamental role in Hutcheson’s writings, he also draws 
from the civic republican tradition in emphasizing the necessity of representative and 
balanced government that treats the promotion of virtue and public happiness as its end. 
Drawing from the implications of his moral theory, it is clear that for Hutcheson virtue is 
necessary for individual and public happiness and that the state must play a role in 
cultivating the virtue of its citizens. To explain this balance of liberal and republican 
concerns, I first examine Hutcheson’s use of the liberal tradition, especially regarding 
his exposition of the state of nature and theory of rights. I then follow with a discussion 
of the best form of government and the role of civic virtue in supporting government.  
 Beginning from his rather favorable view of human nature, Hutcheson expects 
that human interaction is generally inclined to be peaceable. Drawing a sharp distinction 
                                                
15 See especially, Robbins, The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthman, 185-96; and Wills, Inventing 
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between himself and Hobbes, he believes that this benevolent nature exists not only 
within the realm of political life but in pre-political life as well: 
The whole system of the mind, especially our moral faculty, shews that we are all 
under natural bonds of beneficence and humanity toward all, and under many 
more special ties to some of our fellows, binding us to many services of an 
higher kind, than what the rest can claim: nor need we other proofs here that this 
first state founded by nature is so far from being that of war and enmity, that it is 
a state where we are all obliged by the natural feelings of our hearts, and by 
many tender affections, to innocence and beneficences towards all.16  
Despite these peaceable tendencies, individuals do have conflicts, and government is the 
mechanism used to solve these problems. Though Hutcheson does not have a well-
developed social contract theory, he does argue that consent forms the only basis of 
legitimate government: “Violence can never provide a legitimate foundation for 
government. The only natural method of constituting civil power must arise from the 
consent and contract of a whole people.”17 
 One of the major functions of a legitimate government for Hutcheson is to 
protect individual’s natural rights, and moreover, to ensure that rights are equally 
protected. Though he recognizes that natural inequality does exist, Hutcheson is adamant 
that humans are equal regarding their rights: “Men differ from each other in wisdom, 
virtue, beauty, and strength,” but “all men have strong desires of liberty and property, 
                                                
16 Francis Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy, reprint ed. (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1968), 
1: 281.  
17 Hutcheson, System, 2: 226. 
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have notions of right, and strong impulses to marriage, families, offspring and earnest 
desires for their safety.”18 As T.D. Campbell rightly notes, Hutcheson’s moral theory 
produces a liberal political philosophy insofar as he staunchly defends natural rights, 
especially regarding the rights of the least powerful members of society.19 His 
endorsement of the equal protection of rights leads him to a number of progressive 
stances, including more expansive rights for women, children, and animals. In addition, 
he also opposed slavery on the grounds of equal rights, because the principal rights that 
must be protected are life and liberty, and slavery undermines both of these. He also 
“embraced a right to property” as fundamental, but as Gary Wills has explained, for 
Hutcheson “it was subordinate to life and liberty, not the foundation and model of all 
rights.”20 Taken together, his defenses of the importance of consent to legitimating 
government and of the equal protection of individual rights demonstrate Hutcheson’s 
prominent use of liberal arguments in applying his moral philosophy to his political 
thought. 
 In addition to his use of liberal sources, Hutcheson also uses the republican 
language of civic virtue and the common good to enrich his political theory. Though it 
has been widely acknowledged that Hutcheson drew philosophical support from the 
civic humanist tradition, this aspect of his political philosophy is often underplayed in 
comparison to his liberal political thought. Even among scholars who emphasize his debt 
to the republican tradition, especially Robbins and Miller, there is a general consensus 
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that Hutcheson modifies the classical tradition to fit modern political concerns. For 
instance, Miller argues that Hutcheson places less importance on direct political 
participation for the cultivation of civic virtue than on “developing a science of politics,” 
and encouraging active participation in  “the republic of letters.”21 Although I agree that 
Hutcheson modifies the classical republican tradition, I contend that he seeks a balance 
between having government protect individual rights encourage civic virtue. 
Hutcheson’s use of the civic tradition is most evident in the way he defines the end of 
government and the role of civic virtue in supporting that end. 
 Appealing directly to the classical republican tradition, especially in his System, 
Hutcheson defines the ends of the state, as well as the ability of the state to meet those 
ends, in terms of the happiness of the people and their virtue: “As the end of all laws 
should be the general good and happiness of a people, which chiefly depends on their 
virtue: it must be the business of legislators to promote, by all just and effectual 
methods, true principles of virtue, such as shall lead men to piety to God, and all just, 
peaceable, and kind dispositions towards their fellows.”22 By defining the end of 
government in terms of the happiness of the people, and the role of government to 
promote the virtue of the people, it is clear that Hutcheson is not drawing exclusively 
from theories of liberalism. 
In particular, Hutcheson’s views on civil authority, as Caroline Robbins has 
suggested, indicate that he “thought in republican terms.”23 This is made especially clear 
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in his discussion of the best form of government as laid out in his System. Drawing 
especially from Harrington’s Oceana, Hutcheson defends a legislative system that would 
balance a popularly elected assembly against a senate, both of which would be term 
limited. The senate would hold “the whole right of deliberating, concerting, and 
proposing laws or decrees to the popular assembly,” while the latter would “have the 
chief power of enacting.”24 Both assemblies, he suggests, should be balanced by a regal 
power charged with the execution and enforcement of laws. This power could be 
bestowed upon either a hereditary monarch or to a small executive council elected by the 
senate. As Robbins duly notes, Hutcheson never suggests that the regal power should be 
popularly elected.25 As such, he endorses a balanced form of constitutional monarchy as 
the best form of government because it is able to represent the interests of the people, 
ensure their happiness, and promote and cultivate virtue among citizens. 
Obedience to government is highly contingent, however, on how well it is able to 
protect the interests of the citizens and ensure their overall well being. When the state 
fails to do this, individuals have a right to withdraw from the social contract and separate 
from their government. Hutcheson never treats obedience to government as trivial, but 
rather conditional: “The constituting of civil power is the most important transaction in 
worldly affairs, and hence the obligations to fidelity in it are very high and sacred. But 
this consideration shews rather more the high obligation on rulers to a faithful 
administration, than that on subjects to obedience.”26  
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So long as rulers further the interests and protect the rights of their citizens, then 
government is legitimate. It is up to the public to decide when the government is no 
longer acting for the public good. This argument had particularly important ramifications 
for the American Revolution, as Hutcheson specifically argued that it is the right of 
colonies to decide when their rights and liberties are no longer being sufficiently 
protected: “Large numbers of men cannot be bound to sacrifice their own and their 
posterity’s liberty and happiness, to the ambitious views of their mother-country, while it 
can enjoy all rational happiness without subjection to it.”27  
As Wills has noted, Thomas Jefferson especially drew from Hutcheson’s writings 
to provide support for the revolutionary cause on the grounds that the colonies had a 
right to determine when Britain was no longer acting in their best interest.28 As such, 
Hutcheson earned a reputation for his revolutionary and liberal thought, but he was 
concerned that government should serve a dual function, both protecting rights and 
promoting virtue. Drawing from his moral sense theory, Hutcheson argues that 
benevolence is the most important virtue, not only in individuals’ private lives but also 
in public life, but he specifically extends the list of civic virtues that he believes are 
necessary to support a well-functioning government. First and foremost, citizens must be 
pious, a topic discussed in further detail in the next section, but “the virtues most 
necessary to a state next to piety, which excites to and confirms all the rest, are sobriety, 
industry, justice, and fortitude.”29  
                                                
27 Hutcheson, System, 2: 309. 
28 Wills, Inventing America, 193-255. 
29 Hutcheson, System, 2: 317. 
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Hutcheson is careful in laying out these civic virtues to confront many of the 
contemporary arguments concerning the tensions that exist between virtue and self-
interest. While he did reject Mandeville’s argument that humans are exclusively driven 
by self-interest, he never denies that selfishness motivates many human behaviors. 
Nevertheless, he argues that virtue can be used to temper selfishness and even concedes 
that all selfish behavior is not necessarily inimical to the common good. For example, in 
his discussion of civic virtue, he insists that there is less of a tension than is often 
accepted between virtue and wealth. While the accumulation of wealth is frequently 
driven by self-interest, he argues that “it is plain there is no necessary vice in the 
consuming of the finest products, or the wearing of the dearest manufactures by persons 
whose fortunes can allow it consistently with all the duties of life.”30 Moreover, 
individual wealth can bolster the national economy and help support the common good 
by encouraging trade with other countries. Additionally, he offers that when tempered by 
virtue, individuals of wealth will have more opportunities to practice benevolence by 
being generous to those who are less fortunate. 
 Imperative to his argument is that citizens receive a proper education in civic 
virtue. As Knud Haakonssen correctly notes, for Hutcheson, 
Civil society exists not just to maximize happiness but to inculcate the 
benevolent of beatific motivation of the citizenry. Thus morality and its 
extension in religion must be taught, partly by instruction, not least instruction of 
public-minded teachers and writers like Hutcheson himself, partly by the practice 
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of participation by the citizens at large in the civil, the military, and the 
productive life on the commonwealth.31  
Moreover, Hutcheson argues that in addition to ensuring proper instruction, virtue is best 
promoted when public teachers and representatives lead by an example of virtue. This is 
accomplished through the free election of virtuous men who will lead by example, and 
who will demonstrate the contemptibleness of vicious actions. He claims, “Virtue ever 
was and will be popular, where men can vote freely.”32 He does recognize that citizens 
will make errors of judgment at times when evaluating the character of representatives, 
but free and frequent elections will allow the opportunity to remove quickly those 
individuals from office. Hence, Hutcheson’s political thought draws from the republican 
tradition to emphasize the importance of the free election of representatives, the careful 
balance of power in institutions, and the cultivation of virtue in its citizens, so that they 
behave in the public interest and can accordingly judge the actions of their 
representatives.  
 
Religion 
Although Hutcheson believes that virtue can be promoted through government 
and a proper education, he does not believe that this alone is enough to ensure that 
citizens will be virtuous. He contends that religious belief is necessary to inspire 
individuals not only to practice private virtue but civic virtue as well. Religion provides 
motivation for good behavior in a way that self-interest or the moral sense alone cannot 
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accomplish. Unlike many Presbyterian preachers of his era, he never uses the fiery 
imagery and language of eternal damnation to explain why belief in God inspires 
individuals to virtuous behavior, but he does emphasize that a belief in an eternal state of 
rewards and punishments is necessary to inspire virtue. He claims, “This belief of a 
Deity, a Providence, and a future state are the only sure Supports to a good Mind.”33   
As James Moore has described, one of Hutcheson’s goals was to articulate a 
system of theodicy, “in which Divine Providence is shown to have made provision for 
the happiness of the human race. Such provision is evident… in the constitution of 
human nature, where the various appetites, affections, senses, and powers of human 
nature conspire and work together to promote human happiness.”34 Although it is widely 
acknowledged that Hutcheson argues that individuals have moral obligations to God and 
to one another, and that God has provided for the happiness of humanity, there has been 
little scholarship that directly connects Hutcheson’s religious thought to his political 
work. While Moore does suggest that Hutcheson’s religious and political thought are 
connected, his primary focus is explaining the place of the System in Hutcheson’s overall 
corpus of work, not specifying how religion should be used to support the ends of civil 
government. I extend Moore’s insight and argue that religion plays a critical role in 
Hutcheson’s political thought because of the role of religion in promoting both private 
and civic virtue. To demonstrate the importance of religion to these ends, I begin with a 
discussion of the relationship between religion and virtue in Hutcheson’s political 
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thought and the importance of piety as a civic virtue. I then follow by examining 
Hutcheson’s argument that government should protect religious liberty while promoting 
religious belief.  
For Hutcheson, religion provides motivation to virtue, through a belief in a future 
state of rewards and punishments. He never argues, however, that virtue requires an 
external reward; quite the opposite, he contends that virtuous behavior is its own reward 
and will produce happiness regardless of the outcome of such behavior. Virtue depends 
on the intention and will of an individual. As described above, his moral sense theory 
dictates that it is the motivation behind an action that determines whether that act is 
virtuous, not the results of an action. For Hutcheson, good intentions matter more than 
good results. As Richard Sher has described, this effort to blend the internal value of 
virtue with a future state of rewards and punishments is best described as Christian 
Stoicism.35 Hutcheson replaces the Stoic conception of fate with the Christian 
conception of God to explain that individuals have a duty to behave virtuously, even 
under the worst circumstances: 
When we despair of glory, and even of executing all the good we intend, ‘tis a 
sublime exercise to the soul to persist in acting the rational and social part as it 
can; discharging its duty well, and committing the rest to God….Thus the most 
heroick excellence, and its consequent happiness and inward joy, may be attained 
                                                
35 Richard Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1985), 177.  
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under the worst circumstances of fortune; nor is any station of life excluded from 
the enjoyment of the supreme good.36 
In his religious thought, Hutcheson always emphasizes the benevolent nature of 
humanity, the necessity of virtue, and the insistence that God will reward those who are 
virtuous, whether in this life or in a future state. The optimistic tone of his religious 
thought and moral sense theory contrasts deeply with the Calvinist tradition that was 
prevalent in Scotland in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. This brand 
of Calvinism places special emphasis on the Fall and subsequently the sinfulness of 
human nature. As Broadie notes, this focus on the depravity of humanity affects the 
image individuals have of one another. By focusing on their sinful nature, individuals are 
more likely to treat one another with skepticism and reservation.37 Hutcheson feared that 
this would become a self-fulfilling prophecy where the assumption that humanity is 
wicked would lead people to behave in vicious ways. Hence, he was concerned that this 
theological perspective would do little to promote virtuous, benevolent behavior; rather, 
it would emphasize self-interest and disengagement. 
In order to combat the tendencies towards self-interest and vicious behavior, 
Hutcheson offers a view of religion generally, and Christianity specifically, that focuses 
on the benevolent nature of humanity and the call to act lovingly towards others.38 He 
believed that benevolence and religious belief were deeply intertwined, with piety being 
the foundation of individual happiness: “A pious disposition toward God, a firm 
                                                
36 Hutcheson, System, 2: 225-26. 
37 Broadie, History, 140. 
38 Hutcheson, System, 1: 228. 
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persuasion of his goodness, and of his providence governing the world, and 
administering justice in a future state…are the sources of the most sublime happiness.”39  
Piety is not only related to private happiness, it also produces public happiness 
by encouraging individuals to care for one another. Hutcheson does not think that virtue 
and self-interest are necessarily at odds, as classical republicans do, but he does believe 
that individuals must be willing to care for one another in order to ensure the common 
good. Pious individuals, he contends, are more likely to exercise both private and public 
virtues because of their belief that virtuous behavior will ensure their happiness, both in 
this life and in the next. Consequently, Hutcheson argues that it is in the state’s interest 
to promote religious belief through education: “The civil power should take care that the 
people be well instructed in these points, and have all arguments presented to their 
understandings…The magistrate should therefore provide proper instruction for all, 
especially for young minds, about the existence, goodness, and providence of God, and 
all the social duties of life, and the motives to them.”40 By providing religious 
instruction, the civil authority is more likely to cultivate citizens who will support the 
common good, behave virtuously, and insist upon virtuous behavior from their elected 
representatives. 
Interestingly, in addition to arguing that it is necessary for the state to promote 
religion as a way to cultivate civic virtue, Hutcheson is also one of the most adamant 
defenders of religious liberty. He lists liberty of conscience as “not only an essential but 
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an unalienable branch”41 of natural liberty which must be treated as a sacred right in 
order to ensure the happiness of the people. Not only does he defend religious liberty on 
the grounds of natural rights but he also argues that it is against the interest of the state to 
engage in religious persecution because it will punish productive members of society: 
“Such persecution is the most horrid iniquity and cruelty, and may often dispeople a 
country of its most useful hands, upon which its wealth and strength [depend].”42 As 
V.M. Hope has argued, Hutcheson is even willing to extend religious toleration beyond 
Christianity because religion generally inspires virtue in believers. Even “pagans can be 
good in spite of not being Christians and can even enjoy moral satisfaction,”43 which is 
Hutcheson’s main concern regarding what is required to be a good citizen.  
 Although Hutcheson defends freedom of religion, he is unwilling to extend a 
right of religious liberty to atheists. While most forms of religion encourage virtue and 
emphasize the importance of individual’s obligations and duties to one another, in his 
view, atheists do not experience any obligations to behave virtuously: 
As to direct Atheism, or denial of a moral providence, or of the obligations of the 
moral or social virtues, these indeed directly tend to hurt the state in its most 
important interests: and the persons who directly publish such tenets cannot well 
pretend any obligation in conscience to do so. The magistrate may therefore 
justly restrain them by force, as he might any deluded fool or enthusiasts who 
pretended conscience in invading the rights or properties of others.”44 
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43 Hope, Virtue by Consensus, 23. 
44 Hutcheson, System, 2: 313. 
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As MacIntyre argues, atheism is a problem for Hutcheson because it is a denial of 
conscience, and conscience is equated with the moral sense. The moral sense provides 
knowledge of the existence of God not through rational argument but through an 
understanding that as a perfect being God is morally venerable and worthy of worship. 
As a result, MacIntyre concludes that for Hutcheson “plain persons do not need to be 
skilled in rational argument in order to judge that they ought to venerate God.”45 Hence, 
atheism is detrimental and should be restrained by civil authorities because it 
undermines obligations to act virtuously and has a corrupting effect on the religious faith 
of others by denying the existence of conscience or the moral sense.  
 Because of the threat atheism poses to the common good, Hutcheson is willing to 
impose limits on individual religious liberty. Moreover, his insistence that it is in the 
interest of the civil government to encourage and promote religious belief and 
instruction also demonstrates his willingness to place the common good over individual 
liberty. Although he is willing to defend a rather extensive view of religious toleration, 
religious belief is still required in order to be a good citizen. By encouraging religion, the 
civil authority promotes virtuous behavior and consequently ensures that the proper end 
of government, namely, public happiness, is protected.  
 
Conclusion 
In his writings, Hutcheson weaves together his moral, political, and religious 
thought to emphasize that public happiness is the proper end of government. Although 
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he is primarily known for his work on individual rights, especially the right to 
revolution, his political thought demonstrates an effort to blend liberal and republican 
concerns. For Hutcheson, the promotion of virtue outweighs competing concerns over 
liberty because virtue is necessary to ensure that government is dedicated to the public 
good. Only under representative government, where citizens have the ability to 
frequently and freely vote, is the public interest protected. Moreover, citizens must 
receive proper instruction in virtue in order to support the public good and correctly 
judge the efforts of their elected officials. 
Religion plays a key element in Hutcheson’s political thought as it provides an 
unrivaled motivation to be virtuous. Religious belief inspires not only private virtue but 
public virtue as well. Hutcheson counts piety among the civic virtues that are necessary 
to a well-functioning republican government and argues that individuals must have 
religious faith in order to be good citizens. Nevertheless, he insists that a plurality of 
religious beliefs should be tolerated and individual religious freedom protected by the 
state. Hutcheson’s moral and political thought inspired the works of Scottish 
Enlightenment figures including David Hume, Adam Smith, and Adam Ferguson, but 
his thought also carried across the Atlantic and was particularly influential for both John 
Witherspoon and Thomas Jefferson. While almost everyone who drew upon 
Hutcheson’s thought accepted the centrality of the virtue of benevolence, there is much 
less agreement about the place of piety in a republican form of government. Whereas 
Witherspoon endorses Hutcheson’s religious and political scheme with very little 
modification, Jefferson rejects the necessity of the virtue of piety as central to supporting 
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the public good. Even Ferguson deemphasizes the importance of piety and instead insists 
that honor and civic engagement are more central to supporting republican government. 
Nevertheless, it will become clear that Hutcheson’s insistence on the benevolent nature 
of humanity and the centrality of religion to promoting civic virtue influenced and 
shaped the political concerns of the Scottish Enlightenment and the American founding.
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CHAPTER III 
 
ADAM FERGUSON: PROVIDENTIAL ORDER AND THE CIVIC TRADITION 
 
Though his work places him at the nexus between the republican and liberal 
traditions, Adam Ferguson is undoubtedly the figure most dedicated to the civic tradition 
within the Scottish Enlightenment. Widely popular during the late eighteenth century, 
his thought on civil society, economics, and liberty subsequently influenced prominent 
figures including Hegel, Marx, and J.S. Mill. Ferguson’s contributions to the history of 
political thought, however, were largely overlooked until the latter half of the twentieth 
century, with no new English edition of his renowned Essay on the History of Civil 
Society appearing between 1814 and 1966.1 The Essay, which draws directly upon the 
work of Montesquieu in an effort to provide a historical context for the rise of states in 
the modern era, appeals to the civic tradition while being sensitive to the challenges of 
modern commercial society. More so than any of his contemporaries, including Hume 
and Smith, Ferguson recognizes the dangers of commercialism, and fears it could lead to 
tyranny if left unchecked. To avoid such a decline, he wanted to reinvigorate the modern 
era with the public-spiritedness of antiquity. 
In recent scholarship on the Scottish Enlightenment, Ferguson’s political thought 
has received increased attention.2 Most often, Ferguson’s work is read as an attempt to 
                                                
1 Gary L. McDowell, “Commerce, Virtue, and Politics: Adam Ferguson’s Constitutionalism,” The Review 
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following recent edited volumes: Eugene Heath and Vincenzo Merolle, eds., Adam Ferguson: History, 
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balance civic humanist concerns of public virtue with the fear of increased self-interest 
in the modern economic era. Although he recognized the dangers posed by 
commercialization, he also viewed the development of commercial societies as an 
opportunity to use institutions to cultivate both individual virtue and peace among states. 
In this chapter, I argue that Ferguson’s religious thought informs and shapes his 
commitment to the civic tradition. I contend that Ferguson’s commitment to civic virtue, 
specifically, the virtues of honor, courage, and active engagement, comes from his 
understanding of providential order. While Ferguson believes that providence guarantees 
progress in universal terms, he contends that national progress is contingent upon the 
virtue of the people. Religious faith is important for Ferguson, but in terms of the interest 
of the state, virtuous actions are more important than faith, though the two are mutually 
reinforcing. In order to thwart corruption and ensure progress, Ferguson argues that 
citizens must be active and vigilant and that they have a civic and religious duty to be 
engaged. In particular, he emphasizes the importance of recovering the virtues most 
associated with savage and barbaric nations as a way to ensure progress. 
To demonstrate the role of providential theology in Ferguson’s approach to civic 
virtue, I begin by surveying his work on the development of civil society and its 
meaning for his social and political thought. Next I discuss Ferguson’s treatment of 
savage and barbaric nations, the virtues that associated with these stages of society, and 
the relationship between forms of government and societal progress. I conclude by 
demonstrating how his understanding of spontaneous order and providence drives his 
concern for recovering classical republican virtues in modern, polished societies.  
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Adam Ferguson 
 Renowned as a highland minister and scholar, a leading contributor to modern 
sociology, and a philosopher of history and constitutional theory, Ferguson’s social and 
political thought is simultaneously transitional and modern. In one of the earliest 
treatments of Ferguson’s work in American scholarship, David Kettler has noted that 
what makes Ferguson’s work appealing is “the excitement it generated at the time of its 
publication among a few significant people, and the recurrent sense of timeliness which 
presents itself even to a modern reader if he should stumble on the books in a patiently 
receptive mood.” 3 Kettler argues that Ferguson must be read in the context of the works 
of both David Hume and Adam Smith to understand his efforts to bridge republican and 
liberal concerns. Whereas Hume and Smith emphasize the power of self-interest to 
sustain society, Ferguson expresses deep ambivalence. Instead, he focuses on the role of 
both individual liberty and virtue in government. Ferguson cannot, however, “be simply 
classed with civic humanist pessimists or with historical progressivists.”4 Indeed, he 
attempts to bring both civic republican and liberal concerns to bear on the relationship 
between the modern state and its citizens. Although Ferguson embraces the progress that 
modern commercial society offers, as Kettler correctly notes, “Ferguson’s concerns 
clearly foreshadow the problems of over-rationalization, dehumanization, atomization, 
alienation, and bureaucratization.”5  
                                                
3 David Kettler, The Social and Political Thought of Adam Ferguson (Columbus, OH: Ohio State 
University Press, 1965), 4; see also, David Kettler, “History and Theory in Ferguson’s Essay on the 
History of Civil Society: A Reconsideration,” Political Theory 5 (1977): 437-60. 
4 Kettler, “History and Theory,” 439. 
5 Kettler, Social and Political Thought, 8. 
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Perhaps more than any other Scottish Enlightenment philosopher, Ferguson is 
deeply ambivalent about the rise of modern commercial societies, and particularly 
laments that the progress of polished societies lends itself to the demise of active 
citizenship. Fania Oz-Salzberger takes Ferguson’s emphasis on the importance of active 
participation of citizens as evidence of his attachment to classical republicanism.6 
Ferguson appears deeply skeptical that the modern commercial society can sustain itself 
without the interest and participation of its citizens, and he uses the Essay as “a bid to 
reclaim the idea of civic virtue on behalf of the modern commercial state.”7 Furthermore, 
his interest in using institutions as a means of encouraging active citizenship also 
represents a strong theme of republicanism which runs throughout Ferguson’s works. 
Given his emphasis on the importance of active citizenship, John Pocock has 
characterized Ferguson’s Essay as “perhaps the most Machiavellian of the Scottish 
disquisitions,” for its emphasis on ambition, passion, and civic virtue as the instruments 
of societal progress.8  
Though active citizenship and civic virtue are critical to understanding 
Ferguson’s thought, he was also a forerunner of modern liberal thought. As Andreas 
Kalyvas and Ira Katznelson have argued, Ferguson’s attempt to wed together republican 
and liberal concerns provides a better understanding of the development of liberalism 
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itself.9 They argue that Ferguson offers several conceptual innovations to liberalism, 
including a broad understanding of pluralism, a distinction between friend and enemy, 
the importance of conflict, and the ability of institutions to mediate conflicts. These 
contributions are indicative of Ferguson’s overall concern of joining together republican 
arguments for the importance of public virtue with liberal arguments for the diversity of 
interests in modern society. By emphasizing the utility of institutions as a way to 
cultivate virtue and mediate conflicts in a pluralistic society, Ferguson successfully 
draws upon and contributes to both republican and liberal traditions.  
As much as Ferguson contributed to political theory, he also shaped the modern 
study of sociology. Among his most important contributions is his consideration of the 
benefits of both war and conflict. As Lisa Hill argues, Ferguson recognizes that both 
individual conflict and war are the result of outside influences and the human passions. 
The arousal of such passions plays an important role in strengthening social groups. 
Additionally, Ferguson recognizes the part that war and conflict play in inspiring 
productivity and creativity within a state.10 Certainly, he appreciates the damage wrought 
by war, but he also recognizes that conflict is a primary source of progress in the 
development of civil society. 
 Ferguson’s sociological understanding of conflict is deeply wedded to his 
argument on societal progress. He contends that political conflicts spur progress, at least 
when conflict occurs within well-structured political institutions. Moreover, he argues 
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that conflict promotes participation, which is the supreme civic virtue for Ferguson.  To 
illustrate his arguments regarding the role of conflict in fomenting societal progress, I 
first focus on Ferguson’s treatment of savage nations, which he considers to be the most 
rudimentary form of society. I then examine his arguments on societal progress in 
polished societies. Ferguson’s emphasis on conflict reveals his dedication to the classical 
virtues of honor, courage, and active engagement in sustaining a well-functioning 
government. 
 
History of Civil Society 
 Ferguson’s interest in progress, both at the individual and societal levels, 
animated much of his social and political thought. Drawing upon theories of historical 
stages, which were prevalent during Scottish Enlightenment, Ferguson developed an 
account of how societies progress over time. Particularly in his influential Essay, 
Ferguson traces the development of civil society and the “species itself from rudeness to 
civilization.”11  Beginning with society’s origins in human nature, through the 
establishment of “rude” nations, the rise of modern commercial societies, and the 
eventual decline of nations, Ferguson draws upon numerous sources, including classical 
examples of empire, the modern state, and accounts of the savage cultures found in 
America. He focuses primarily on how societies have historically advanced from small 
collections of individuals living communally to great powers. His analysis reveals 
corruption as the greatest danger to civil society. Once a society becomes corrupt, 
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political enslavement and despotism almost always follow. Nevertheless, nations are not 
left facing the inevitable threat of decline; rather, Ferguson argues that the cultivation of 
public virtue through active citizenship can save societies from failure. 
 Although Ferguson draws upon the theory of historical stages to support his ideas 
of progress, he significantly modifies this tradition. Whereas many Scots, including 
Adam Smith, Lord Kames, and John Millar, argued from a theory of four stages based 
on economic distinctions – hunting, pasturage, farming, and commerce -  Ferguson 
instead develops a three-tiered classification of societies: rude, barbarous, and polished. 
Even though some have asserted that Ferguson either embraces or only slightly modifies 
the four-stage theory, John Brewer compellingly argues that Ferguson completely 
modifies this type of theorizing by basing the classifications on social structure rather 
than economic systems.12 Essentially, Ferguson was interested in explaining the 
normative elements that create bonds among individuals. As Brewer rightly notes, 
Ferguson moves the republican discourse on virtue beyond “describing the type of 
personal character required for the virtuous person” towards a more complete 
understanding of “civic culture.”13 Ferguson intends for his analysis of the normative 
structures of society to be empirically and scientifically sound, and therefore he draws 
his conclusions from travel accounts that provide observations from a variety of 
societies. Such accounts are used to describe the development of society as well as 
explain the causal mechanisms that result in progress.  
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 In undertaking this type of study of societies, Ferguson closely follows the work 
of Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws (1748). In fact, Ferguson was so impressed by 
Montesquieu’s work that he referred to his own as simply imitation: 
When I recollect what the President Montesquieu has written, I am at a 
loss to tell, why I should treat of human affairs; but I too am instigated by 
my reflections, and my sentiments; and I may utter them more to the 
comprehension of ordinary capacities, because I am more on the level of 
ordinary men….In his writings will be found, not only the original of 
what I am now, for the sake of order, to copy from him, but likewise 
probably the source of many observations, which, in different places, I 
may, under the belief of invention, have repeated, without quoting their 
author.14 
But to accept his appraisal of Montesquieu’s work would ignore the important 
innovations Ferguson offers to the study of societies. For instance, the three-stage 
scheme Ferguson uses to describe the categories of society, namely, savage, barbarian, 
and polished society, comes from Montesquieu’s own consideration of the affects of 
climate, soil, and geography upon the development of constitutions.15 As Richard Sher 
has explained, however, “Montesquieu’s emphasis…was indicative of an approach that 
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gave more attention to the spatial than to the temporal dimension in accounting for 
cultural diversity.”16 
 Ferguson’s analysis of savage and barbaric societies explores how social 
structures give rise to particular normative systems and how these systems progress over 
time.  Following Montesquieu rather closely, Ferguson argues that differences in 
climates produce variations in manners among the inhabitants of the earth. These 
distinctions ultimately culminate in a variety of ways of living. It is important for 
Ferguson, however, not to confuse a simple means of living with dullness or indolence.17 
A harsh climate may in fact require a simple life, but this does not indicate that those 
inhabitants are inferior in nature or in their capabilities.  
 An understanding of life in a “rude” state can be divided into two categories: 
“that of the savage, who is not yet acquainted with property; and that of the barbarian, to 
whom it is, although not ascertained by laws, a principal object of care and desire.”18 As 
societies develop a more complex concept of property, they demonstrate greater levels of 
progress. Progress is evidenced by advances in both mechanical and commercial arts.19 
Savages held everything including labor and its spoils in common. This means that the 
community shares food and shelter, and women take a collective responsibility for child 
rearing. 
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 Ferguson has in mind primarily a hunter-gatherer society in the case of savages, 
and a society that cultivates at least some food in the instance of barbarians. His 
understanding of hunter-gather societies derives from accounts of the natives of both 
North and South America. Many of these accounts report findings that Ferguson believes 
are unusual but explicable. When property remains held in common by members of a 
society, Ferguson reports that divisions of rank among the men do not exist.20 This 
arrangement is of particular interest because it affirms the equality of individuals within 
the savage society. As such, the members of the tribe share a fair level of equality 
because each member is able to contribute to the tribe’s needs.  
Although Ferguson accepts this account, it requires the reader to accept that 
warriors or those especially skilled in hunting hold no higher esteem than mediocre tribe 
members. Ferguson does note, however, that distinctions among individuals within a 
savage society also vary according to the climate of the region. In temperate regions that 
do not face as many challenges in obtaining food or shelter, for example, he expects that 
the differentiation of ranks is unnecessary. In harsh climates, however, he notes that 
these distinctions do exist. He offers natives of the Caribbean as an example of a society 
that is subjected to a warmer climate and therefore requires divisions of rank. Therefore 
these nations have an unequal distribution of property and power.21  
 While Ferguson notes it would be easy to assume that rude nations are inherently 
backward nations, necessarily focused on maintaining a subsistence-level existence, he 
concludes that the opposite is true: 
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Directed in this particular by the desires of nature, men, in their simplest 
state, attend to the object of appetite no further than appetite requires; and 
their desires of fortune extend no further than the meal which gratifies 
their hunger: they apprehend no superiority of rank in the possession of 
wealth, such as might inspire any habitual principle of covetousness, 
vanity, or ambition: they can apply to no task that engages no immediate 
passion, and take pleasure in no occupation that affords no dangers to be 
braved, and no honours to be won.22 
A spirit of hazard animates the savage. Nevertheless, hazard should not be understood as 
sheer recklessness. In contrast with European soldiers who consider death on the 
battlefield honorable, the savage considers such a fate a disgrace.23 Honor is measured 
instead by fortitude and cunning.  
 What is of particular interest is Ferguson’s conclusion concerning the nature of 
savage life and his reverence for the virtues it breeds. In fact, he argues that within the 
rudest states one finds “the love of society, friendship, and public affection, penetration, 
eloquence, and courage.”24 The cultivation of virtue that occurs as societies progress is 
not the discovery of new virtues, for they have always existed even in the rudest states. 
Rather, virtue involves a mastery over the passions that exist within human nature, such 
as seeking out hazard. Ferguson lauds the virtues found in both the ancient republics and 
in rude societies, especially for the active and vigorous spirit they breed among citizens: 
                                                
22 Ferguson, Essay, 91-92. 
23 Ferguson, Essay, 90. 
24 Ferguson, Essay, 93. 
 71 
“To the benevolent, the satisfaction of others is a ground of enjoyment; and existence 
itself, in a world that is governed by the wisdom of God, is a blessing. The mind, freed 
from cares that lead to pusillanimity and meanness, becomes calm, active, fearless, and 
bold; capable of every enterprise, and vigorous in the exercise of every talent, by which 
the nature of man is adorned.”25 Only in learning to overcome our passions do humans 
become virtuous. 
The progress of societies hinges not only on technological and commercial 
developments, but also and most importantly on the advancement of public virtue. Not 
every government, however, can equally cultivate virtue among its citizens. 
Furthermore, whenever a society becomes corrupt, it will almost surely fall to despotism, 
which Ferguson considers the worst form of government.26 Nevertheless, Ferguson must 
maintain some sense of relativism because he holds that not all locations are equally 
capable of establishing a form of government that can prevent corruption. Indeed, 
Ferguson argues that “forms of government must be varied, in order to suit the extent, 
the way of subsistence, the character, and the manners of different nations.”27 
Even so, Ferguson closely follows Montesquieu in the Essay by holding 
constitutional monarchy as the best government for developed societies. He argues that 
whereas other governments often become corrupt when the merit of citizens stems 
entirely from their wealth, constitutional monarchies have as part of their foundations 
“the reputation of courage, courtly manners, and a certain elevation of the mind.”28 
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Consequently, even if wealth and self-interest are found within this form of government, 
these virtues help to prevent the government from descending into self-enslavement or 
despotism.  
The problem of corruption is typically associated with a love of luxury and 
general intemperance, but Ferguson contends that this is less of a concern than is often 
asserted. Ferguson understands luxury as “the accumulation of wealth, and that 
refinement of the ways of enjoying it, which are the objects of industry, or the fruits of 
mechanic and commercial arts,” whereas he understands corruption as “a real weakness, 
or depravity of human character.”29 Because corruption is not necessarily associated 
with wealth, it can occur under any system of government. Nevertheless, the 
accumulation of wealth is often treated as though it were the equivalent of the 
accumulation of merit. When this occurs, those individuals with poor characters can 
achieve individual success and perhaps even assume political power. For this reason, 
whenever a society has in place a system of merit distinct from wealth, such as respect 
for honor or courage, it is less likely that the accumulation of luxury will be mistaken for 
good character. Hence, nations can prevent both individual corruption as well as the risk 
of despotic government by encouraging the virtues of honor and courage. 
In his later works, especially Principles of Moral and Political Science (1792),30 
Ferguson places more emphasis on the value of liberal government than constitutional 
monarchy. As Kalyvas and Katznelson have argued, Ferguson focuses on the “priority of 
a neutral, liberal state that protects private property, secures existing economic and 
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social inequalities, and limits democratic rights to political participation.”31 He distrusts 
democracy for its capricious nature. Because democracies do not have a tradition of 
public virtue and no way to inspire virtue in their citizens, Ferguson considers them to be 
as corrupt as tyrannies.  
Although he never asserts that any particular form of government is best for all 
societies, Ferguson does offer tests for determining whether or not a government is good. 
Similar to Montesquieu, Ferguson argues that the growth of a national population 
indicates a general happiness on the part of the people.32 When individuals find it in their 
interest to have larger families, this can be interpreted as evidence that the people 
support their government. Additionally, he argues that national resources can be seen as 
an indicator of good government. However, he never specifies whether an abundance of 
resources directly causes the success of a government or if good governments are more 
successful in acquiring and utilizing their assets.  
Ferguson also argues that the success of a government can be judged by the 
prosperity of a society. Although he never argues that wealth directly produces national 
felicity, he does claim wealth is a “symptom” of national happiness insofar as it 
demonstrates that citizens are dedicated to the virtues of industry and frugality.33 Though 
Ferguson shares the classical republican sentiment that luxury has a corrupting effect on 
citizens, he argues that if individuals become affluent by practicing the moderating 
virtues of industry and frugality, financial prosperity will not have a deleterious effect on 
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32 Ferguson, Essay, 60. 
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virtue. In this way, Ferguson maintains many of his civic republican concerns 
surrounding the cultivation of public virtue while at the same time emphasizing the need 
for liberal values, including the protection of property, and the development of a 
commercial economy. 
Ferguson insists that commercial progress must be earned through the exercise of 
virtue in order to produce happiness. He warns that the acquisition of wealth through 
force and the expansion of empire is a contributing factor to the corruption of once 
successful societies. Ferguson even calls it foolish to consider the size of a nation’s 
territory, the number of conquests it has undertaken, or its abundance of wealth as 
indicators of its advantages.34 Although a nation may consider empire-building a way to 
gain strength and subsequently stability, this activity actually undermines any security 
the nation may gain.  
Empire-building is dangerous because every instance of expansion creates 
enemies among those who are conquered. Given that a nation may mount a formidable 
defense in response, the potential gains do not outweigh the potential losses. Ferguson 
also strongly emphasizes the contingency of history. Even when assured of triumph, “the 
risk of misfortune” to a nation remains great.35 As a result, the pursuit of any war other 
than one of self-defense is unwise. Furthermore, the pursuit of empire also corrupts 
citizens. Wars of aggression teach citizens that moderation holds little value and that 
wealth alone can ensure the success of the state.  
                                                
34 Ferguson, Principles, 2:501. 
35 Ferguson, Principles, 2:501. 
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This is not to suggest that Ferguson is dovish on war. He readily acknowledges 
the necessity of war when the security of the nation is at stake. Even so, the pursuit of 
military activity requires extreme caution. Wisdom, which he considers a virtue, always 
dictates peace whenever possible: “The wise do not recur to war as the means of 
acquisition, but as the means of preservation of safety.”36 Although Ferguson 
recommends that disputes should be settled peaceably, he does not believe that war is 
necessarily at odds with virtue. In fact, his description of savage and barbaric societies 
reveals that he believes conflict provides an opportunity to cultivate virtue. Much as the 
classical republican tradition valued martial abilities, courage, and honor, in the Essay, 
Ferguson describes the martial prowess of the savages with great esteem. He argues that 
whereas modern societies glorify the death of soldiers, savages see greater value in the 
preservation of life. Additionally, savage nations see greater honor in acts of “patience 
more than valor.”37 Savage nations avoid war, but they also consider honor in wars that 
are directed towards the maintenance of peace. For this reason, Ferguson considers one 
of the greatest expressions of both human nature and virtue demonstrated by savage 
nations and argues that these virtues should be reinvigorated in polished societies. 
  
Providential Progress 
Of particular interest to Ferguson is the issue of progress, namely, understanding 
how societies transition from one stage to another. He states that in each stage certain 
virtues are more prevalent than others, such as the virtue of courage in savage societies. 
                                                
36 Ferguson, Principles, 2:502. 
37 Ferguson, Essay, 90.  
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Ferguson wants polished societies to recover the virtues found in rude societies in order 
to help prevent corruption. Despite his focus on progress, Ferguson avoids many of the 
oversimplifications of his fellow Enlightenment writers. For him, the application of 
human reason and knowledge does not inevitably yield progress, nor are certain societies 
providentially designed to progress beyond others.  In fact, he spends the last two 
sections of the Essay discussing the decline and corruption of nations. Societal progress 
hinges upon the virtue of the people, and to do good is to be in the service of God. The 
benevolence of God ultimately guarantees human progress, but progress also depends on 
the spirit of the people. Deeply influenced by Montesquieu, he accepts that commerce 
leads to wisdom and in turn produces good laws and liberty. Nevertheless, this is not 
enough to ensure progress because responsible, virtuous action and spirited activity 
among citizens are needed to ensure that society does not slip into decline. I argue that 
Ferguson’s belief in providence and particularly in providential progress explains his 
emphasis on the virtues of honor, courage, and active engagement in preventing 
corruption and ensuring progress. 
In spite of his theological training and early work as chaplain to the Highland 
Black Watch Regiment, scholars often treat Ferguson as a secular thinker. David Kettler 
in his noteworthy study of Ferguson’s political thought characterizes him as 
“fundamentally secular – and certainly not Christian.”38 Kettler emphasizes that though 
Ferguson embraces a teleological view of history and knowledge, his teleology centers 
on humanity, not providence: “Ferguson’s progressive teleology eventuates in a 
                                                
38 Kettler, Social and Political Thought, 131. 
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thorough-going anthropocentrism. Man, in short, is urged to govern his actions and 
judgments by the goal of realizing his own higher potentialities, and progress consists in 
giving ever greater play to his own faculties.”39 
In contrast with Kettler, Lisa Hill has argued that Ferguson’s teleology is driven 
by his belief in providence and therefore must be understood in religious terms. Hence, it 
is Ferguson’s belief in God and a divine order that drives his understanding of human 
progress. In her view, Ferguson develops a theology that entails “a vision of human 
affairs as harmonious, orderly, progressive, and perfectibilitist.”40 Underlying this 
theology is Ferguson’s acceptance of a theory of a divinely constructed spontaneous 
order by which social and political institutions arise apart from conscious human effort.41 
This is not to say that humans are incapable of instigating progress; rather, Ferguson 
insists that much of societal progress originates outside of the means of human design: 
Like the winds, that come we know not whence, and blow whithersoever they 
list, the forms of society are derived from an obscure and distant origin; they 
arise, long before the date of philosophy, from the instincts, not from the 
speculations, of men…. Every step and every movement of the multitude, even in 
what are termed enlightened ages, are made with equal blindness to the future; 
and nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human 
action, but not the execution of any human design.42 
                                                
39 Kettler, Social and Political Thought, 130. 
40 Lisa Hill, “Adam Ferguson and the Paradox of Progress and Decline,” History of Political Thought 18 
(1997): 243.  
41 See Ronald Hamowy, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Theory of Spontaneous Order (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press 1987). 
42 Ferguson, Essay, 119. 
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As Richard Sher has argued, Ferguson shares with Francis Hutcheson a brand of 
Christian Stoicism, which emphasizes that individuals have a moral duty to obey God, 
that actions must be judged by the intentions that motivate them, and that the 
benevolence is the supreme religious and political virtue.43 Hence, Ferguson argues that 
God has provided a providential plan for progress and that humanity has a duty to 
behave virtuously as part of their obligation to God. 
 Though Ferguson consistently argues that societies progress through his tri-
stadial thesis, from savage, barbarous, and polished societies according to the will of 
Providence, he also gives great attention to the danger of decline. He specifically warns 
that progress is not inevitable: 
Every thing human indeed is subject to perish, and in the same race of men, 
knowledge gives way to ignorance. The light of science is no more in corners 
where it formerly shone: but this is rather the removal than the extinction of light. 
It passes from one race of men to another, and, when it seemed to be 
extinguished, is perhaps about to be restored with additional force.44   
Ferguson’s insistence on the progress guaranteed by the theory of spontaneous order 
seems at odds with his obsessive discussion of corruption and decline, as Lisa Hill has 
convincingly argued. 45 Whereas his theory of spontaneous order guarantees progress, he 
warns that all societies are in danger of being corrupted. Ferguson is particularly 
concerned with the potential retrogression of polished societies. He worries that if a 
                                                
43 Richard Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati of Edinburgh 
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44 Ferguson, Principles of Morals, 1:282. 
45 Hill, “Progress and Decline,” 681. 
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polished nation gives in to the influence of power and wealth that comes with 
commercialism, its populace will become effeminate and unengaged and will succumb 
to despotism.  
 To explain how Ferguson reconciles his belief in progress with his incessant 
concern about corruption, Lisa Hill and Jeng-Guo S. Chen offer two different but 
complementary answers, both pointing to the role of providence in Ferguson’s thought to 
solve this paradox. Hill argues that Ferguson’s understanding of providence provides 
that humans are guaranteed to progress but also that there is room for human error due to 
free will: “Providence…provides an immutable framework (the three-stage schema and 
whatever is to come after it) which constrains and impels us to progress lineally and 
infinitely, and then endows the species with the raw materials of will, choice, judgment 
and the progressive instinct of ‘ambition.’”46 Chen broadens this argument, emphasizing 
that Ferguson makes a distinction between universal history and national history. While 
the Creator guarantees the progress of universal history, the progress of particular 
nations is contingent.47 Certainly Ferguson accepts that God has a providential role to 
play in history, but as Chen has rightly noted, Ferguson’s “understanding of providential 
order, as God’s benevolent design for his rational creatures, should not be confused with 
either miracles or divine intervention in human history.”48  
                                                
46 Hill, “Progress and Decline,” 695. 
47 Jeng-Guo S. Chen, “Providence and Progress: The Religious Dimension in Ferguson’s Discussion of 
Civil Society,” in Adam Ferguson: History, Progress and Human Nature, ed. Eugene Heath and Vincenzo 
Merolle (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2008), 172. 
48 Chen, “Providence and Progress,” 176. For a contrasting view of providence influenced by the Scottish 
tradition, see the discussion in Chapter IV of John Witherspoon’s religious thought. Witherspoon argues 
that God directly intervenes in human history based upon the virtue of the people and their active appeals 
to him through public worship and prayer. 
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Providence establishes a universal order that guides societal progress but is not 
involved in directing the daily affairs of human life. Even though Ferguson claims that 
the Creator does not dictate human affairs, he maintains that religion does and should 
play an important role in individuals’ lives. For Ferguson,  
Religion is the sentiment of the mind relating to God. The transaction of religion 
is its tendency to influence men’s conduct. This tendency is of two kinds. The 
first is, to make men love wisdom and beneficence, as being the characteristics of 
the Supreme Being, whom they adore; and to make them love their situations and 
their duties, as being appointed by providence.49  
Religion connects individuals to an understanding of God and their earthly roles in his 
providential plan. To do good for Ferguson is to fulfill the duties given to us by our 
Creator, and to do otherwise is to act against our nature: “It is happy to have continually 
in view…that we are instruments in the hand of God for the good of his creatures; that if 
we are ill members of society, or unwilling instruments in the hand of God, we do our 
utmost to counteract our nature, to quit our station, and to undo ourselves.”50 Part of our 
duty to God is to serve our community. Ferguson posits that humans are naturally social 
creatures, that it is part of God’s plan for humans to live and work together, and that we 
have an obligation, as part of God’s providential order, to sacrifice our own self-interest 
for our community: 
                                                
49 Adam Ferguson, Institutes of Moral Philosophy: For the Use of Students in the College of Edinburgh, 
2nd ed. (Edinburgh: A. Kincaid & W. Creech, and J. Bell, 1773), 215. 
50 Ferguson, Institutes, 158. 
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Man is, by nature, the member of a community; and when considered in this 
capacity, the individual appears to be no longer made for himself. He must 
forego his happiness and his freedom, where these interfere with the good of 
society. He is only part of a whole; and the praise we think due to virtue, is but a 
branch of that more general commendation we bestow on the member of a body, 
on the part of a fabric or engine, for being well fitted to occupy its place and to 
produce its effect.51  
While Ferguson largely shares Hutcheson’s conception of Christian Stoicism and 
insistence that it is the religious and political duty of individuals to support their 
community, Ferguson departs from Hutcheson’s understanding of the virtue of piety. 
Whereas Hutcheson argues that piety is the foremost civic virtue following benevolence 
and the civil authority should encourage religious faith in order to encourage citizens to 
be pious, Ferguson places less emphasis on piety. In the Principles, he does argue, 
“Among the modifications of benevolence, piety to Almighty God, is justly entitled to 
the first, and the highest place.”52 Nevertheless, he significantly modifies the meaning of 
piety. Rather than treating piety as an outward expression of reverence for God and 
evidence of religious faith, Ferguson instead contends: “Although piety in its proper 
acceptation is a sentiment of religion, the term is nevertheless…employed to signify any 
high measure of veneration or love which we pay any of our fellow creatures who are 
raised above the ordinary rank of men in our veneration or esteem.53 Hence, Ferguson 
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concludes that to be pious is to demonstrate respect for those who are worthy of 
admiration, which includes respect for magistrates and government generally. As such, 
Ferguson places less emphasis on religious faith and more on the consequences of faith, 
including respect for government, active engagement, and support for the community. 
Although Ferguson fully accepts the classical republican ideal of the common 
good, and that civic virtue requires the citizen to place the community’s interest before 
his own, he also recognizes that a diversity of interests exist in society. Identifying the 
common good may not always be easy or even possible. Ferguson takes seriously the 
issue of pluralism in modern society and acknowledges that it is natural to the human 
condition. His conception of pluralism extends beyond the scope of religious differences 
to include all modes of living. In this regard, he sees pluralism as a fact of modern 
society. These differences stem from our passions, according to Ferguson, and therefore 
cannot be resolved by any simple process of restraint or regulation. As we cannot be 
made to share the same interests or preferences, it is necessary to adapt the classical 
tradition to the modern, plural world. 
Differences of means of living often result in conflict, but according to Ferguson, 
political conflict serves as the hallmark of civilized nations. The struggles that take place 
within a pluralistic society produce virtue and promote political innovation. Ferguson 
argues that in order to limit the destabilizing effects of political disagreement, the people 
must accept their political institutions as legitimate, which is accomplished through the 
establishment of a constitution and a legislative design that allows for debate and 
disagreement. Ferguson does not consider general consent a requirement; rather, the 
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process must produce a sense of fairness through establishing institutions that preserve 
order by protecting individual rights. 54 Participation in these societal debates provides 
the opportunity for the cultivation of virtue necessary to sustain the state. In essence, the 
political process is designed such that people can define the good life for themselves, 
rather than asserting that the civic life is the good life. Citizens promote civic virtue 
through the active work of debating the common good and conceptions of the good life. 
 Ferguson adamantly insisted upon the necessity of the political life, and as Oz-
Salzberger has persuasively argued, he remained committed to the idea of classical 
political virtue throughout his life.55 The essence of Ferguson’s understanding of human 
nature rests on the idea “that man is not made for repose. In him, every amiable and 
respectable quality is an active power and every subject of commendation an effort. If 
his errors and his crimes are the movements of an active being, his virtues and his 
happiness consist likewise in the employment of his mind.”56 Our activity and our 
willingness to engage in conflict peacefully with one another allow us to progress and 
thwart corruption. Hence, the recovery of the virtues of honor and courage proves so 
important to recover within polished societies. Although modern man does not face the 
harsh circumstances of rude societies or the threat of war common to ancient republics, 
political conflict still demands an active spirit in order to protect against corruption.  
While scholars widely agree that Ferguson emphasizes the importance of active 
engagement and is one of the last proponents of the classical virtues, this is most often 
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attributed to his endorsement of the classical republican tradition. Although I agree that 
Ferguson upholds the model of antiquity, I argue that the reason he champions the 
classical virtues of active engagement, honor, and courage is rooted as much in his 
providential theology as in his classical republicanism. Because Ferguson believes that 
the Creator has provided a universal plan for history, and that nations progress by 
adhering to that natural order, it is of the utmost importance for individuals to fulfill their 
roles in God’s plan in order to facilitate progress. Thus, Ferguson argues that Providence 
explicitly requires the exercise of the active virtues for individuals to fulfill their 
religious and civic duties: 
Providence has fitted mankind for the higher engagements which they are 
sometimes obliged to fulfill; and it is in the midst of such engagements that they 
are most likely to acquire or to preserve their virtues. The habits of a vigorous 
mind are formed in contending with difficulties, not in enjoying the repose of a 
pacific state; penetration and wisdom are the fruits, not the gifts of reflection or 
knowledge.57 
Hence, Ferguson argues that Providence requires citizens to be actively engaged 
as part of their religious duty. In confronting difficulties, especially political conflicts, 
individuals cultivate the other virtues that are necessary to secure individual happiness 
and support a well-functioning government, including wisdom, justice, temperance, and 
fortitude.58 While honor and courage were necessary in savage and barbaric societies to 
prepare citizens to engage in violent conflict, these virtues are still necessary to prepare 
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citizens in polished societies to engage in political conflicts that pit individual’s interests 
and passions against one another. By emphasizing that Providence has ordered society to 
allow for peaceful conflict that is mediated by the practice and cultivation of civic virtue, 
Ferguson has two aims. First, he wants to nurture individuals’ religious faith by 
educating them in the role of Providence in providing order to social and political life. 
Second, he encourages citizens to practice and cultivate the habit of civic virtue in order 
to fulfill their duties to God and to support their social and political communities. 
Although Ferguson clearly draws on the classical republican tradition to support his 
argument that the active political life is necessary to being a good citizen, his arguments 
equally derive from his providential theology. Only in the active life do individuals 
fulfill their duty to God, which is to support the common good and encourage societal 
progress.  
 
Conclusion 
 The work of Adam Ferguson can best be viewed as an attempt to save modern 
society from corruption. In doing so, he attempts to join together liberal and republican 
arguments. As a result, his work focuses on both the issues of public virtue and the 
potential of modern economic society to promote classical and liberal values. Ferguson 
turns to savage and barbaric societies for examples of active citizenship, where citizens 
are valued for their honor, courage, and vigorous participation in society. His 
understanding of the relationship between virtue and conflict in these societies provides 
a model for the kind of participation necessary to ensure societal progress. Certainly, 
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Ferguson would not praise conflict, and especially not war, as intrinsically valuable, but 
he did believe it was important in promoting virtues such as honor, courage, and active 
engagement. Even more profitable is the ability of those virtues to moderate desires for 
wealth, empire, and glory. In this way, Ferguson argued that modern society could learn 
from savage nations important values that would thwart corruption and lead to the 
success of modern governments. 
Ferguson’s belief in providential theology drives his understanding of societal 
progress. He is not simply committed to the importance of active citizenship because of 
his attachment to classical republican thought. Though deeply influenced by this 
tradition, Ferguson emphasizes the necessity of the active political life, and the particular 
virtues of honor, temperance, and fortitude, because of his belief in Providence and 
societal progress. Because he accepts that the creator has guaranteed universal progress, 
and that individuals can further this progress by serving both God and their 
communities, Ferguson believes than an active political life is a civic, moral, and 
religious duty. As such, Ferguson’s religious worldview shapes his commitment to the 
civic tradition, especially the importance of cultivating civic virtue. By establishing 
institutions that facilitate active engagement, and ensuring that the diversity of interests 
in society is protected through those institutions, Ferguson aimed to protect individual 
rights and to encourage a dedication to the common good. It is his faith in the 
providential ordering of the universe that makes his simultaneous dedication to these 
liberal and republican concerns possible. 
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CHAPTER IV 
A PIOUS REPUBLIC? 
 
“I do not know whether all Americans have a sincere faith in their religion – for who can 
search the human heart? – but I am certain that they hold it to be indispensable to the 
maintenance of republican institutions.” – Alexis de Tocqueville1  
 
 
Although much work has been recently done on the pervasiveness of religion in 
the American founding era, and on the personal beliefs of America’s founders, far less 
attention has been paid to the role religion was expected to play in supporting republican 
government.2 As Tocqueville correctly noted, however, many of America’s foremost 
political thinkers viewed religion as essential to republican government, especially in 
cultivating virtue among the people and developing a sense of the common good. 
Despite general agreement that religion was necessary for the republic to flourish, 
differences did exist among the founders as to the appropriate role of religion in civil and 
political life and the character of that religion.  
To understand how religion influenced the American understanding of civic 
virtue, I contrast two different religious approaches, the Puritan New England tradition 
and a public religious tradition. In this chapter I focus on the work of John Adams and 
John Witherspoon, and in the next I examine the work of Franklin, Paine, and Jefferson 
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the Early American Republic (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003); Jon Meacham, American Gospel 
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 88 
to demonstrate the nuances of these competing, though at times complimentary, religious 
approaches and their application to discussions surrounding civic virtue. Although each 
of these figures sought to balance both republican and liberal concerns, each offers a 
different understanding of how religion should be used to make individuals into better 
citizens, what type of religion is necessary, and which virtues are most important.   
The work of Witherspoon and Adams demonstrates a commitment to values of 
the Puritan religious tradition, especially the values of industry, order, and moderation. 
Moreover, they are both clear that religion is necessary to sustain republican 
governments. In particular, they note the importance of religion in providing a moral 
foundation for the republic, one that helps them overcome personal vices and develop 
virtues that will support the common good. To this end, they stress the virtue of piety for 
its ability to encourage citizens to sacrifice their self-interest for the common good. 
Although both think liberty is essential to republican governments, especially religious 
liberty, they argue that the state should promote religion and that citizens should be 
religious. Their work offers insight into how the concerns of classical republicanism are 
translated into a system that is grappling with issues of individual liberty, the rapid 
expansion of commerce, and the role of virtue in a system that emphasizes religious 
toleration.  
 
John Witherspoon 
As one of America’s notable statesmen, John Witherspoon played a unique role 
in the American founding, working at the nexus of politics, religion, and university life. 
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Despite playing a central role in the American founding era, especially in the 
revolutionary debates, the political thought of John Witherspoon has remained largely 
unexplored by scholars. Witherspoon is an especially notable figure for the American 
republican tradition because of the central role he believed religion could and should 
play in the nascent republic. 
Witherspoon’s political thought is useful in understanding the American 
founding because of his effort to bring together republican and liberal principles. His 
emphasis on the necessity of virtue for the maintenance of republican government, 
especially the virtue of piety, makes his dedication to civil liberty, particularly religious 
liberty, uneasy. Though he fails to reconcile this tension between emphasizing religious 
virtues and civil liberties, his work does offer important insights into the development of 
republican thought in the American founding era. Moreover, his work clearly 
demonstrates the importance of religious thought in shaping his understanding of what it 
means to be a good citizen.  To understand Witherspoon’s political thought, I focus 
specifically on three aspects of his work: his understanding of providence, the public 
interest of religion, and the importance of civil liberty. I demonstrate not only that 
religion influenced Witherspoon’s approach to republicanism, but also how he believed 
religion could be used to cultivate the virtues necessary to support the public good.  
Despite the increased attention to religion in the American founding era, 
America’s preeminent political parson has received scant scholarly attention. Trained in 
Edinburgh as a Presbyterian minister, Witherspoon was recruited from Scotland to 
assume the presidency at the College of New Jersey (now Princeton University). Not 
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only did his presidency serve to ease disputes between the Old and New Lights, but he 
also restructured the curriculum of the college. In this role, he educated some of the 
colonies most formative political leaders, including mostly notably James Madison and 
Aaron Burr as well as twelve members of the Continental Congress, five delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention, and a host of U.S. Representatives, Senators, and federal 
justices.3 In his classroom, Witherspoon drew upon classical and modern texts, bringing 
together strands of republican, liberal, and Scottish Common Sense thought. His 
“Lectures on Moral Philosophy” was one of the most popular works on moral 
philosophy produced in the American colonies.  In addition to his work as an educator, 
Witherspoon was also a clergyman, a pamphleteer writing in support of the cause of the 
American Revolution, and a delegate to the Second Continental Congress. He signed the 
Declaration of Independence and was also involved in the creation of the Articles of 
Confederation and the U.S. Constitution.  
In spite of his accomplishments as a pastor, politician, and professor, few works 
have thoroughly addressed Witherspoon’s political thought. In fact, most of the attention 
paid to Witherspoon has focused on his theology, his contributions to the Presbyterian 
church in the late eighteenth century, or his influence on schools of rhetoric.4 One recent 
exception has been the work of Jeffry Morrison, who has attempted to rescue 
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Witherspoon from scholarly oblivion and place him alongside the ranks of America’s 
more recognizable founders. Morrison’s focus on Witherspoon’s achievements leads 
him to overemphasize the consistency of Witherspoon’s arguments and perhaps also his 
influence on other founders, including Madison. In particular, Morrison is interested in 
the political and religious overlap in Witherspoon’s thought. He argues that for 
Witherspoon, the relationship between religion and republicanism was seamless: “no 
republic without liberty, no liberty without virtue, and no virtue without religion.”5 
Morrison argues that Witherspoon champions a public religion, one that supports 
republican government but that also emphasizes religious liberty. In this regard, I 
contend that Morrison overemphasizes Witherspoon’s ability to reconcile republican and 
liberal principles. Nevertheless, Morrison has done a great service in drawing attention 
to the importance and influence of Witherspoon’s religious and political thought.  
 Though Witherspoon had served as a clergyman in Scotland for twenty years 
before immigrating to America in 1768, it was not until he arrived in the colonies that he 
used his religious sermons to address explicitly political concerns.6 Witherspoon’s 
observations and involvement with the American struggle for independence influenced 
not only his political thought but also his understanding of God’s role in earthly affairs. 
As Gordon Tait has aptly described, Witherspoon’s transition to America precipitated a 
shift in his understanding of providence: “[Witherspoon’s] understanding about the 
divine presence and activity in the world shifted from an almost exclusive focus on God 
                                                
5 Morrison, Witherspoon, 31. 
6 Especially notable in this regard is his sermon, “Dominion of Providence over the Passions of Men,” 
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as Redeemer to the same God as Creator, Sustainer, and Governor of all things, events, 
and persons. In America, Witherspoon’s doctrine of God expanded to encompass a vital 
belief in God as Providence as well as Redeemer.”7   
Among the most important influences on Witherspoon’s view of Providence was 
his understanding of covenant theology. Found most prominently within Puritan and 
Presbyterian theology, covenant theology emphasizes the agreement made between God 
and his people, whereby the people must obey God’s law in order to receive God’s 
favor.  If they break the terms of the covenant, God is no longer obligated to ensure the 
security or blessings of the people.8 As his understanding of Providence evolved, 
Witherspoon believed that the blessings of Providence were evident in the American 
struggle for independence. In his sermon on the “Dominion of Providence over the 
Passions of Men,” he specifically outlines the blessings of Providence the colonies had 
received, including protection from British troops and the sparing of American soldiers’ 
lives.9  
Though God’s favor had been granted in this struggle, Witherspoon believed it 
was necessary for the American people to acknowledge those blessings and to appeal to 
his grace in order to achieve continued success. Witherspoon was called upon by the 
Continental Congress to help draft a Thanksgiving proclamation directed towards these 
points. In fact, he assisted in writing three of these during his tenure in the Congress. The 
first of the three was issued early in the revolutionary struggle and directly implored the 
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1794  (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965), xx-xxv. 
 93 
people to recognize the role of Providence in the success of the war: “That it be 
recommended to all the United States, as soon as possible, to appoint a day of solemn 
fasting and humiliation; to implore of Almighty God the forgiveness of the many sins 
prevailing among all ranks, and to beg the countenance and assistance of his Providence 
in the prosecution of the present just and necessary war.”10 It is clear from this 
proclamation that Witherspoon not only believed God was directly involved in the 
struggle for liberty, but also that it was incumbent on the American people to appeal to 
God’s grace through their personal actions, including fasting and prayer. 
 Although Witherspoon argued it was necessary to appeal to Providence in order 
to achieve success in the war, he maintained that religion served a much larger role in 
the foundations of government. In fact, Witherspoon went so far as to say that dedication 
to religion, and more particularly true religion, was necessary in order to ensure national 
prosperity and happiness. He argued it is necessary for the people “to testify their 
gratitude to God for his goodness, by a cheerful obedience to his laws, and by 
promoting, each in his station, and by his influence, the practice of true and undefiled 
religion, which is the great foundation of public prosperity and national happiness.”11  
 True religion for Witherspoon is both a private and a public matter. In many 
ways, true religion serves the function of a civil religion, uniting individuals around a 
common set of beliefs and customs, aimed at fostering a dedication to the common good, 
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Ford (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906), 1022. 
11 John Witherspoon, “Thanksgiving Proclamation, October 11, 1782,” in The Journals of the Continental 
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or national happiness. As Morrison has convincingly argued, however, this is not a civil 
religion in the way conceived by Rousseau, which requires implementation through a 
rigorous system of civic education dedicated to the dogmas of the civil religion; nor is it 
a political religion in the sense that is later developed by Abraham Lincoln, which 
requires unquestioning loyalty to and reverence of the laws of the nation.12 Morrison 
prefers the term public religion when addressing Witherspoon’s religion; however, it 
appears that Witherspoon had something more specific in mind when referring to true 
religion. There can be no mistaking that Witherspoon’s true religion is Christianity, and 
it requires the acceptance of Christ and the repentance of sins: “There can be no true 
religion, till there be a discovery of your lost state by nature and practice, and an 
unfeigned acceptance of Christ Jesus, as he is offered in the gospel.”13  
There is nothing apparent in Witherspoon’s writings, however, to suggest that his 
conception of true religion involves the acceptance of a particular set of doctrines or 
dogmas within Christianity. In fact, he goes so far in his sermon on the “Dominion of 
Providence” as to disavow the notion that he is interested in exacerbating conflicts 
between religious sects: “Do not suppose, my brethren, that I mean to recommend a 
furious and angry zeal for the circumstantials of religion, or the contentions of one sect 
with another about their peculiar distinctions. I do not wish you to oppose any body’s 
religion, but every body’s wickedness.”14 Hence, Witherspoon’s true religion is 
                                                
12 Morrison, John Witherspoon, 24. 
13 Witherspoon, “Dominion of Providence,” 137. 
14 Witherspoon, “Dominion of Providence,” 144. 
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Christian, but it is ecumenical insofar as it does not privilege certain doctrinal 
interpretations.  
 In order to understand Witherspoon’s ideas on the public interest of religion, it is 
necessary to consider how he understood the relationship between religion and 
government. Though Witherspoon was not a political theorist proper, his writings do 
reflect a careful consideration of the best form of political institutions, the role of 
citizens in supporting those institutions, and the best means by which to cultivate virtue 
in citizens. For Witherspoon, “The public good and universal justice is the end of all 
government.”15 The question for Witherspoon is how the public good can best be 
achieved. 
 In his political writings, Witherspoon works largely within traditional republican 
discourse, reflecting a concern for virtue, liberty, and the tensions that exist between the 
two. As with most classical republican theory, Witherspoon argues that the virtue of the 
people serves as the surest foundation for republican forms of government. For him, the 
source of individual virtue is found in the truth of religion: “and if we go the history of 
mankind, we shall find that knowledge in general, and more particularly the knowledge 
of divine truth, which certainly is the way to virtue, has been spread by liberty…. ”16 
Religion instructs us in which virtues are necessary to be not only a good person, but 
also a good citizen. 
 He is quick to dismiss the idea that governments must be either wholly good or 
wholly corrupt; rather, he sees governments existing on a continuum based on their 
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dedication to the public good. The maintenance of government, particularly of 
republican government, is absolutely dependent on the virtue of its citizens, especially 
the virtues revealed by true religion:  
A good form of government may hold the rotten materials together for some 
time, but beyond a certain pitch, even the best constitution will be ineffectual, 
and slavery must ensue. On the other hand, when the manners of a nation are 
pure, when true religion and internal principles maintain their vigour, the 
attempts of the most powerful enemies to oppress them are commonly baffled 
and disappointed.17 
The internal principles that are most vital to achieving a just government 
dedicated to the public good are found in the principles of true religion. Most important 
among these principles, for Witherspoon, is the virtue of piety. Piety is not simply a 
personal, private matter that is necessary for individual salvation; it is an expressly 
political virtue as well: “so in times of difficulty and trial, it is in the man of piety and 
inward principle, that we may expect to find the uncorrupted patriot, the useful citizen, 
and the invincible soldier.”18  
In some ways, Witherspoon seems to echo the concerns of more utilitarian 
thinkers like Franklin when suggesting that piety can be used to produce a “useful 
citizen.” In fact, Witherspoon’s understanding of the virtues necessary to support 
republican government resemble the laundry list of virtues most often associated with 
the puritan work ethic, but Witherspoon takes these virtues one step further insisting that 
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they are necessary not only to secure individual happiness or salvation but also that they 
are indispensable to supporting the public good and just government: 
Let us cherish a love of piety, order, industry, frugality. Let us check every 
disposition to luxury, effeminacy, and the pleasures of a dissipated life….that 
whatsoever State among us shall continue to make piety and virtue the standard 
of public honour, will enjoy the greatest inward peace, the greatest national 
happiness, and in every outward conflict will discover the greatest constitutional 
strength.19 
The personal vices Witherspoon reacts against are also those vices most 
frequently cited by classical republican theorists: luxury and effeminacy. He moves 
beyond the classical republican tradition, however, in an attempt to blend together 
republican, liberal, and religious concerns. Most often, the virtues of industry and 
frugality are considered self-interested virtues that aim at increasing personal wealth and 
fortune. Yet Witherspoon lists them among the virtues that can be used to combat more 
vicious vices, including luxury. Piety, for Witherspoon, plays an important role in 
tempering the tension so often found in classical republican thought between self-
interested behavior aimed at increasing personal wealth and more public-spirited 
behavior aimed at supporting the common good. Witherspoon posits that piety can serve 
as a cornerstone of republican government in that it tempers passions towards self-
interest and encourages citizens to support the common good. 
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Witherspoon fits comfortably within the classical republican tradition in terms of 
his emphasis on virtue, the common good, and his insistence on the necessity of piety to 
produce useful citizens; nevertheless, his emphasis on civil liberty underscores his 
attempt to bridge the republican and liberal traditions. For Witherspoon, liberty is vital to 
just governments: “By liberty I mean, and every body ought to mean, a completely 
ordered and well balanced plan of civil government, where justice and equal laws take 
place, and are well supported.”20 He is quick to distinguish civil liberty from license or 
the unencumbered personal liberty he associates with savage nations. Though license 
provides the illusion of perfect individual freedom, the risks to one’s personal property 
and life are so great that liberty serves no benefit. Civil liberty, however, offers the 
opportunity for the improvement of the individual and society as a whole: “I take the 
essential benefit of civil liberty…to be, its tendency to put in motion and encourage the 
exertion of all the human powers. It must therefore evidently improve the human mind, 
and bring with it, in highest perfection, all the advantages of the social state. It is the 
parent or the nurse of industry, opulence, knowledge, virtue, and heroism.”21 
The preservation of liberty, however, is absolutely dependent upon the virtue of 
the people. Without a virtuous and vigilant citizenry, a republic is destined to slip into a 
degraded form of government or into a state of revolution: “So true is this, that civil 
liberty cannot be long preserved without virtue. A monarchy may subsist for ages, and 
be better or worse under a good or bad prince; but a republic once equally poised, must 
either preserve its virtue or lose its liberty, and by some tumultuous revolution, either 
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return to its first principles, or assume a more unhappy form.”22 Liberty does not depend 
so much on good laws or properly ordered institutions, for Witherspoon; rather, it is the 
virtue of the people that is of the utmost importance to securing civil liberty. To that end, 
virtue, and especially virtue founded on true religion, is the surest basis for government. 
This is especially true, Witherspoon believes, for America during the revolutionary 
conflict: “That he is the best friend to American liberty, who is most sincere and active 
in promoting true and undefiled religion, and who sets himself with the greatest firmness 
to bear down profanity and immorality of every kind.”23 It is the duty of each citizen to 
exercise not only virtue but also to promote religion and fight against immorality. 
Of course, the modern reader of Witherspoon will recognize something of a 
contradiction in his understanding of the relationship between civil liberty and virtue. A 
nation founded on the principle of civil liberty, especially religious liberty, must allow 
for religious dissent, but Witherspoon contends that it is the duty of the good citizen to 
promote religion. Witherspoon maintains, however, that he supports religious liberty and 
that civil liberty and religious liberty are inextricably linked: “There is not a single 
instance in history in which civil liberty was lost, and religious liberty preserved entire. 
If therefore we yield up our temporal property, we at the same time deliver the 
conscience into bondage.”24 If the state impedes upon individual conscience, it appears 
that Witherspoon believes that civil liberty, broadly speaking, will suffer. It is less clear, 
however, what exactly would constitute a breach of conscience for Witherspoon. 
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Although he does not support having an established church, Witherspoon 
certainly sees a public role for religion. Moreover, he believes that civil authorities have 
a role to play in supporting religion. In his sermon on the “Dominion of Providence,” 
Witherspoon expressly argues that for civil magistrates, “It is therefore your duty in this 
important and critical season to exert yourselves, every one in his proper sphere, to stem 
the tide of prevailing vice, to promote the knowledge of God, the reverence of his name 
and worship, and obedience to his laws.”25 He maintains and repeats this position near 
the close of the war: “Those who are bested with civil authority ought also, with much 
care, to promote religion and good morals among all under their government.”26 In fact, 
Witherspoon goes on to argue that it is the duty of civil magistrates to “reform or restrain 
that impiety towards God, which is the true and proper cause of every disorder among 
men.”27 
If it is the role of the civil magistrate to reform or restrain impiety, then is it 
possible for individuals to have the liberty to dissent from Witherspoon’s true religion? 
The answer is simply unclear from his writings. In closing his “Dominion of 
Providence” speech, he implores that “God grant that in America true religion and civil 
liberty may be inseparable, and that the unjust attempts to destroy the one, may in the 
issue tend to the support and establishment of both.”28 To the extent that Witherspoon 
supports civil liberty, it is clear that he likely does not have a modern notion of religious 
liberty in mind. In a system in which civil magistrates are admonished to restrain 
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impiety, and where true religion and civil liberty are inseparable, it is difficult to see how 
a religious dissenter would be truly free to express his or her views without being treated 
as an enemy of liberty. Though it does appear true that Witherspoon is willing to support 
separation of church and state in terms of an established church, his theory of civil 
liberty is more problematic in terms of the free exercise of religion, or especially of non-
religion. So long as piety is enforced by the magistrates, those who disagree with the 
particular form of piety that is required or with the very virtue of piety are likely to 
suffer encroachments on their own liberty of conscience. Witherspoon, however, does 
not address, nor even necessarily recognize, this tension within his own thought. 
Ultimately, religious and republican concerns are of the greatest interest to 
Witherspoon. While he supports individual’s civil liberties, he does not think those 
individual rights extend so far as to prevent the state from promoting religious belief and 
encouraging individuals to observe religious holidays. Although he never explicitly 
acknowledges the tension between his republican, religious, and liberal commitments, 
his willingness to call upon civil magistrates to enforce piety certainly puts him at odds 
with more liberal thinkers of his time, including Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, and 
even his own student, James Madison. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily render 
Witherspoon’s thought useless or unintelligible; rather, it demonstrates the struggles to 
wed together the republican and liberal traditions in combining concerns for virtue with 
concerns for individual liberty. Overall, Witherspoon’s thought clearly demonstrates that 
he viewed religion as vital to the maintenance of republican institutions and the 
development of good republican citizens.  
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John Adams 
Similarly situated at the nexus of the republican and liberal traditions, John 
Adams seeks to join together a republican concern for the common good with a 
dedication to individual liberty. Whereas Witherspoon argued that liberty is dependent 
upon the virtue of the people, Adams contends that both virtue and liberty are dependent 
upon good laws and well-ordered constitutions.  This drives Adams to focus the bulk of 
his political writings on the subject of constitutions, matters of institutional design, and 
understanding how laws can shape and promote the better side of human nature.  
Strongly influenced by Puritan thought, Adams holds a much more dismal view 
of human nature than Witherspoon, or virtually any other of America’s founders, but he 
does argue that cultivating the virtue of the people is the highest end of government. 
Although Adams rejects a classical understanding of virtue, he argues that virtue is 
necessary to secure the common good, the happiness of the people, and that religious 
belief provides the surest foundation for virtue. Adams looked to institutional 
mechanisms to thwart corruption, but also held that religion and virtue are necessary for 
republican governments to function well. In order to understand Adams’s political 
thought and how he viewed the role of religion and virtue in republican government, I 
address Adams’s rejection of classical republicanism, his understanding of the natural 
orders of society, and religion as the moral foundation of republics. I argue that Adams 
views virtue as an end of government, that religion is necessary to provide a moral 
foundation for government, and that piety is necessary to make citizens support the 
common good over their own self interest.  
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 Adams is perhaps the most careful and thorough student of politics to emerge 
from the American founding era. Whereas the political thought of many of America’s 
founding figures must be garnered from their political speeches, public addresses, or 
personal correspondence, Adams published several works in the tradition of political 
analysis. His three major works of political thought, Thoughts on Government, A 
Defence of the Constitutions of the United States of America, and Discourses on Davila, 
demonstrate his dedication to the scientific study of politics. Adams was not only 
interested in the theoretical study of political principles and constitutions, but also 
drafted the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution. Balancing both theoretical and practical 
political concerns, Adams’s work demonstrates a mastery of classical and modern 
political thought, drawing from the republican, liberal, and religious traditions.  
 Despite the volumes of material he published, Adams has received relatively 
little scholarly attention in comparison to several of America’s other leading founders, 
including James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. This can be explained, in part, by the 
tenor of Adam’s later political writings. Although he was an ardent supporter and 
leading figure in the American revolutionary movement, Adam’s political thought seems 
to have lost popular currency by the Constitutional Convention in 1787. His political 
reputation suffered particularly during the election of 1800, and his contemporary 
political critics charged him with being a monarchist.29 Later critics have struggled to 
reconcile his commitment to liberal principles with his endorsement of classical 
republicanism.  
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Adams is often described as an adherent to classical republican thought, and it is 
frequently argued that his attachment to this tradition led to his political demise. As 
J.G.A. Pocock has quite famously noted, Adams’s Defence of the American 
constitutional order is “a defense of the republic upon principles which the republic itself 
had abandoned. Such was the ironic-but, given its author’s personality, appropriate-fate 
of perhaps the last major work of political theory written within the unmodified tradition 
of classical republicanism.”30 Bruce Miroff has similarly appraised Adams as a thinker 
who “shares most, if not all, of the concerns of classical republicanism.” 31 This includes 
both an appraisal of classical political institutions as well as the desire to recruit 
members of the natural aristocracy into public service. 
It was precisely because of his attachment to classical republicanism, according 
to Gordon Wood, that Adams was unable to understand the shifts in political thought 
that were occurring among the newly formed states, noting that “Adams never really 
comprehended what was happening to the fundamentals of political thought in the years 
after 1776.”32 Adams’s failure to understand the shifts that were occurring in the 
American understanding of sovereignty, and his continued insistence on the importance 
of both the democratic and aristocratic elements of American society, pointed to the 
“obsolescence of Adams’s political theory.”33 Similarly, Lance Banning has claimed that 
Adams did not understand the democratic impulse that underlined the constitutional 
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convention, noting that Adams “saw no difference worth fighting for between a 
commonwealth and a mixed monarchy.”34  
More recent treatments of Adams’s political thought, however, have 
deemphasized his classical republican roots. John Diggins, for instance, has emphasized 
the influence of Calvinism on Adams’s political thought, which he argues undermines 
his republican commitments, especially to classical virtue: “Adams’s three-volume work 
[the Defence] not only modified classical republicanism; it did much to undermine it by 
denying the validity of its central concept of ‘virtue.’”35 In a similar vein, C. Bradley 
Thompson has rejected the argument that Adams is classical republican: “It is true that 
Adams defended a version of the classical theory of mixed government, but he was also 
the first major American theorist to reject classical republicanism explicitly. The 
distance that separates Adams from the classical-republican and civic-humanist 
traditions is most clearly seen in his devastating critique of their central organizing 
principle: the concept of virtue.”36 Likewise, Paul Rahe has argued that Adams has little 
debt to the ancients, especially regarding his acceptance of the type of civic virtue that is 
necessary to sustain the public good. Rahe notes that Adams was deeply suspicious that 
many of the classical virtues, such as pride, strength, and courage, were actually inimical 
to the survival of republics. 37  
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Despite this suspicion and even rejection of the classical virtues, Adams was still 
deeply interested in the role of virtue in supporting republican institutions. In fact, what 
makes Adams’s thought difficult to characterize is that he drew freely from the 
republican, Calvinist, and liberal traditions. John Charles Evans has argued that this 
willingness to draw from multiple traditions actually contributes to the sophistication of 
Adams’s thought. By combining a concern for individual liberty with a republican 
concern for the common good, Adams moves beyond the classical notion of virtue and 
pushes towards a distinctly modern understanding of republican government:  
The liberal portrait of Adams correctly notes his repeated and forceful critique of 
the efficacy of virtue as an independent means to be relied upon by political and 
constitutional institutions. Yet, the liberal portrait fails to appreciate Adam’s 
equally forceful emphasis on the continued centrality of virtue and the common 
good as ends to which the state and civil society must remain committed.38  
Evans provides the most nuanced and convincing appraisal of the role of virtue in 
Adams’s political thought, treating it as a political end. In order to better understand 
Adams’s view of virtue, and how religion can and should be used to encourage virtue, it 
is necessary to first examine Adams’s understanding of republican government and 
institutions.  
Adams is one of the most careful students of republican thought to emerge from 
the American founding generation. He thought the term “republic” was one of the most 
misused and poorly defined in political discourse. This was no trifling matter, as Adams 
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was deeply interested in developing a science of politics that would contribute to a 
“regular course of progressive improvement,” in the “theory and practice of 
government.”39 His Defence of the Constitutions of the United States is addressed to 
providing a clear definition of republics, comparing and contrasting different modes of 
republican government, and examining the degree to which the constitutions of the states 
establish a well-ordered republic. 
Following Montesquieu, Adams took the essence of a republican government to 
be one in which sovereignty is located in more than one person or body. Accordingly, 
different forms of republics could exist, including democratic, aristocratic, and 
monarchical species, so long as sovereignty was not held by a single entity. This view 
differed, however, from the majority viewpoint held at the time of the American 
founding, which understood the people as entirely sovereign. In a rather notable 
exchange with his cousin Samuel, Adams articulated his views on sovereignty within a 
republic: “Whenever I use the word ‘republic’ with approbation, I mean a government in 
which the people have…an essential share in the sovereignty.”40 The more 
democratically minded Samuel Adams responded with confusion and perhaps even 
admonishment: “Is not the whole sovereignty, my friend, essentially in the people?”41  
Driving Adams’s idea of sovereignty was his understanding of society as being 
naturally ordered, a view for which he was widely criticized. Adams fully accepted that 
society was divided into three classes: the one, the few, and the many. Although these 
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divisions were not officially established in American society, he argued these classes 
existed as natural orders. Moreover, he believed that the interests of each group are 
permanently in competition with one another. Balancing these competing interests 
requires a carefully crafted system in which the powers of government are divided 
among separate branches based on the natural orders. 42  
Most important, in Adams’s view, was ensuring that the supreme power of the 
legislature was balanced so that the interests of the few do not dominate the interests of 
the many. To this end, he thought a bicameral legislature, with an upper and lower 
house, was vital. Of particular concern was the threat represented by unicameral 
legislatures.43 Specifically, Adams feared that in a unicameral system the natural 
aristocracy would be elected and would ultimately only represent its own interests. In 
having the power to appoint political positions, especially the judiciary, the rule of law 
would cave to the will of the minority, thus undermining the balance of interests and the 
republic itself: “Whether the assembly consists of a larger or a smaller number, of nobles 
or commons, of great people or little, of rich or poor, of substantial men or the rabble, 
the effects are all the same,-No order, no safety, no liberty, because no government of 
law.”44 Adams sees bicameralism as necessary because it gives power to the naturally 
talented members of society, but offsets them with a democratic branch that represents 
the majority; hence, the interests of all orders receive balanced representation. 
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Among the most important classifications that Adams was interested in was 
distinguishing between free and un-free republics, for it appeared to him that regardless 
of the particular form a republic took, there could be wide variations in the degree to 
which a republic is able to ensure the freedom of its citizens. As Thompson has argued, 
Adams adds two primary features that distinguish a free republic.45 First, it had to obey 
the rule of law, not the rule of man, particularized interests, or the will of the majority. 
Second, it must be governed for the public good. This meant that all citizens must be 
treated as equals before the law, and specifically, they must share equal rights and 
liberties. 
For Adams, the preservation of a free republic is dependent on the virtue of the 
citizens in that republic. Liberty and virtue are intimately and necessarily linked. Adams 
explained his understanding of the relationship between the two in a letter to Thomas 
Jefferson: “Have you ever found in history one single example of a Nation thoroughly 
Corrupted, that was afterwards resorted to Virtue, and without Virtue, there can be no 
political Liberty.”46 Even though Adams believed that virtue is necessary for a well 
functioning republic, he was perpetually pessimistic about the probability that the 
American people could be made or kept virtuous. Although Adams was thoroughly 
convinced of and impressed by the virtue of the American colonists during the 
revolutionary period, he became much less sanguine about the prospects of virtue alone 
to sustain the republic in the years following the war. As Wood has noted, Adams 
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thought that Americans were particularly challenged in terms of their ability to be 
virtuous precisely because of the widespread freedoms they enjoyed.47 Adams argues 
that because Americans are free, they have the ability to advance their social standing. 
Driven by envy and avarice, and equipped with the means to advance their own fortunes, 
Adams thought that Americans were unlikely to feel the self-restraint of moderation, 
frugality, and temperance.  
Adams’s skepticism about the ability of American citizens to be virtuous does 
not indicate, however, that he thought virtue was unimportant or unattainable. It is clear 
from his writings that he was deeply skeptical of classical virtues, but not necessarily of 
the project of cultivating virtue generally. He opposed the classical virtues on two 
grounds. First, he argued that the classical virtues required a “celestial” spirit that was 
beyond the capacity of human nature.48 He believed that individuals cannot be free from 
self-interest, and that our political institutions must be designed to accommodate for this 
fact. The classical conception of the common good, which insists that good citizens must 
transcend their self-interest, provides an unsatisfactory account of human nature and 
human abilities. Second, he argued that self-interest is not necessarily inimical to the 
interests of the republic, especially concerning broad commercial interests.49 Classical 
republics were small and opposed commerce because of its tendency to promote wealth, 
effeminacy, and corruption. Adams thought commerce could enrich modern republics, 
by creating stability and healthy competition. Though he acknowledged that commerce 
                                                
47 Wood, Creation, 574. 
48 Adams, Political Writings, 302. 
49 Adams, Works, 6:95-99. 
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could increase avarice, he believed it could be tempered by a spirit of industry and
moderation.  
 Despite his rejection of classical virtue, Adams did find that the classical 
republican tradition had much to offer in terms of understanding human nature. Fully 
accepting that the natural aristocracy needed to be in positions of political power, Miroff 
argues that Adams drew from the classical tradition an understanding of how to 
encourage elites into public service: “Adams’s republican vision…came to depend upon 
finding political means to encourage the love of fame, to provide it with ample 
gratifications, and to enlist it on behalf of the public good.”50 Adams’s republicanism 
included not only a republican system of institutions, but also a system for recruiting the 
best and most talented citizens into public service. By appealing to their natural passions 
for fame, honor, and glory, Adams believed “the republic could both contain and exploit 
the passions” of the best citizens. 51  
 In order to appeal to these passions, Adams made several proposals to that end, 
including bestowing titles, honors, and symbolic rewards. Diggins has argued that 
Adams’s appeal to the passions is one of the clearest indications of his movement away 
from the classical emphasis on virtue: “Thus did Adams devise a way to both exploit 
talent and control power through the Christian sin of pride, utilizing the love of praise as 
a surrogate for reason and virtue.”52  
                                                
50 Miroff, “John Adams,” 121. 
51 Miroff, “John Adams, 122. 
52 Diggins, Lost Soul, 71. 
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Adams’s emphasis on utilizing the passions of men to recruit the most talented 
into public service, however, does not indicate that he thought virtue was irrelevant for 
republican governance. In fact, in his Thoughts on Government, he argues that the end of 
government must be the happiness of the people, and that their happiness depends on 
their virtue:  
All sober inquirers after truth, ancient and modern, pagan and Christian, have 
declared that the happiness of man, as well as his dignity, consists in virtue….If 
there is a form of government, then whose principle and foundation is virtue, will 
not every sober man acknowledge it better calculated to promote the general 
happiness than any other form?53  
The question, for Adams, was how best to encourage and cultivate virtue among 
the people. The firmest foundation, he argued, was the formation of good laws that 
would constrain natural vices and encourage virtuous behavior: “The best republics will 
be virtuous, and have been so, but we may hazard a conjecture, that the virtues have 
been the effect of the well ordered constitution, rather than the cause.”54  
A well-ordered constitution, for Adams, encourages virtue by balancing the 
natural orders of society, securing the liberties of the people, and ensuring that 
fundamental principles are observed. Drawing from both the liberal and republican 
traditions, Adams’s constitutional thought combines an interest in natural rights with a 
dedication to the common good. Whereas contemporary critics see an obvious tension 
between these two, Adams treated rights and responsibilities as complimentary elements 
                                                
53 Adams, Political Writings, 483. 
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that should be included in laws in order to establish and cultivate a moral foundation for 
republican government. Moreover, he believed that religion provided the necessary basis 
for developing that foundation.  
Adams’s ideal form of constitution is evident not only from his theoretical 
arguments in the Defence, but also from his involvement in drafting the Massachusetts 
constitution in 1780. Working as part of an elected body charged with writing a new 
constitution for the state, Adams was nominated by the committee to compose the initial 
draft. His draft of the constitution reveals his interest in promoting virtue, securing 
liberty, and especially emphasizing the role of religion in helping to secure both.  
 Similar to the Virginia and Pennsylvania constitutions, Adams’s draft provides a 
frame of government as well as a declaration of rights. Drawing directly from 
Jefferson’s language in the Declaration of Independence, Adams asserts that “all men 
are born free and independent, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable 
rights,” which include life, liberty, and property.55 Adams makes provisions for the 
protection of several individual liberties including religion, press, speech, as well as 
protections from excessive bail, quartering of troops, and unreasonable searches and 
seizures, among others.  
In addition to guaranteed rights, however, Adams emphasizes the duties and 
responsibilities of citizens. For instance, in Article XVIII Adams charges citizens not 
only to adhere to fundamental principles in their own personal lives, but also to select 
and evaluate the performance of representatives on the basis of those principles: “A 
                                                
55 Adams, Political Writings, 500-01.  
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frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of the constitution, and a constant 
adherence to those of piety, justice, moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality, are 
absolutely necessary to preserve the advantages of liberty, and to maintain a free 
government.”56  
Most notable among Adams’s list of fundamental principles is the virtue of piety. 
Whereas other state constitutions of the period included similar lists of virtues necessary 
for the preservation of good governance, Adams’s inclusion of piety is an unusual 
contribution.57 Moreover, his draft of the constitution not only encourages pious 
behavior on the part of citizens, and proclaims in Article II, “It is the duty of all men in 
society, publicly, and at stated seasons, to worship the Supreme Being.”58 In addition, 
Adams argues that it is the duty of all citizens to support religious instruction as religion 
provides the only foundation for morality. Accordingly, in Article III, he makes 
provisions for a state established religion: 
Good morals being necessary to the preservation of civil society; and the 
knowledge and belief of the being of GOD, His providential government of the 
world, and of a future state of rewards and punishment, being the only true 
foundation of morality, the legislature hath, therefore, a right, and ought to 
provide…a suitable support for the public worship of God, and of the teachers of 
                                                
56 Adams, Political Writings, 508. 
57 For example, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 calls for “a firm adherence to justice, moderation, 
temperance, industry, and frugality.” Similarly, the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 notes the 
necessity of “a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue and by frequent 
recurrence to fundamental principles.” Though it is obvious that Adams borrowed from the language of 
these constitutions, the addition of the virtue of piety is clearly his own original contribution.  
58 Adams, Political Writings, 501. 
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religion and morals; and to enjoin upon all the subjects an attendance upon their 
instructions at stated times and seasons….59 
Despite his belief that religion was necessary to provide a moral foundation, 
Adams did often note his own skepticism towards that ability of religion to restrain the 
vicious behavior of humans. In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, he explains, “I have long 
been settled in my own opinion that neither Philosophy, nor religion, nor Morality nor 
Interest, will ever govern nations or Parties, against their Vanity, their Pride, their 
Resentment or Revenge, or the Avarice or Ambition. Nothing but Force and Power and 
Strength can restrain them.”60 This does not indicate, as Diggins has argued, that Adams 
“doubted the vital importance of religion in preserving the Republic.”61 Rather, Adams 
was unwilling to entrust the foundation of the republic to virtue or religion alone: “Moral 
and Christian, and political virtue, cannot be too much beloved, practiced, or rewarded; 
but to place liberty on that foundation only would not be safe…and that form of 
government which unites all the virtue, honor, and fear of the citizens, in a reverence and 
obedience to the laws, is the only one in which liberty can be secure…”62 
 It is clear that Adams believed that religion was necessary for a well-functioning 
republic, and he hoped that religious belief and virtuous behavior would be encouraged 
and taught in both public schools as well as church meetings. In fact, Adams believed 
that it is the responsibility of members of the clergy to address civil injustice and educate 
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their congregants in matters of civic virtues: “It is the duty of the clergy to accommodate 
their discourses to the times, to preach against such sins as are most prevalent, and 
recommend such virtues as are most wanted.”63 Adams expects religion to have a 
salubrious effect on citizens, and he deeply fears what the decline of religion would spell 
for the republic as a whole. He even concludes his Discourses on Davila with a stern 
warning against the dangers of atheism, proclaiming that any religion is better than no 
religion for the maintenance of republican institutions: 
Is there a possibility that the government of nations may fall into the hands of 
men who teach the most disconsolate of all creeds, that men are but fireflies, and 
that this all is without a father?…If such a case should happen, would not one of 
these, the most credulous of all believers, have reason to pray to his eternal 
nature of his almighty chance…give us again the gods of the Greeks; give us 
again the more intelligible as well as more comfortable systems of Athanasius 
and Calvin; nay, give us again our popes and hierarchies, Benedictines and 
Jesuits, with all their superstition and fanaticism, impostures and tyranny.64 
A pagan religion, indeed even Catholicism, is preferable to atheism for Adams because 
of the treat disbelief poses to the moral foundations of republican government. Without 
religion to provide moral guidance, and inspire virtuous behavior, through the promise 
of a future state of rewards and punishment, Adams believes republican governments are 
doomed to failure. 
                                                
63 Adams, Political Writings, 56.  
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 Despite charges to the contrary, it is clear that Adams believes virtue plays an 
essential role in republican government. Virtue is a goal government should aim to 
achieve, not a means by which government should be solely supported. Republics must 
have a moral foundation, and Adams argues that religion alone can provide that 
foundation. In particular, he thinks it is necessary for citizens to hold religious beliefs, 
publicly observe religious holidays, and provide financial support for state supported 
religious education. For Adams, piety is required in order to be a good republican 
citizen. Adams does not see a conflict between this and the right to religious freedom, 
and offers no comment on how religious dissenters who do not wish to support the state 
established church should be managed. What is clear is that Adams believes religion is 
necessary to republican government, and that religious belief and religious virtues are 
necessary for being a good citizen.  
 
Conclusion 
 Although Adams and Witherspoon attempt to blend together republican, liberal, 
and religious concerns in their political thought, it is apparent that their primary interest 
remains with preserving a republican form of government. Though they both emphasize 
the importance of individual liberty and religious freedom, they see no conflict in having 
the state promote religion and encouraging, or even requiring, citizens to support 
religion. Though Witherspoon does not go so far as Adams in supporting an established 
religion, he does argue that it is essential for the state to promote religious values. His 
emphasis on the necessity of virtue, particularly the virtues of piety, order, industry, and 
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frugality, demonstrates his understanding of the ways in which individuals come to a 
shared sense of the common good. For Witherspoon, the common good has a 
particularly religious orientation, focusing not only on the salvation of the soul but also 
the role of religion in uniting citizens around common political causes and encouraging 
individual sacrifice for the sake of national happiness and prosperity. 
 More institutionally minded than Witherspoon, Adams’s political thought 
focuses primarily on the role of constitutions in ensuring the happiness of the people. 
Their happiness is entirely dependent on their virtue, however, and Adams believes that 
religion gives rise to virtue and provides the moral foundation for constitutional forms of 
government. Though Adams and Witherspoon assume that human nature is inclined 
towards self-interest and often towards vice, they both argue that religion can provide 
the necessary motivation to help individuals overcome their personal selfishness. In their 
view, piety encourages citizens to look beyond their own narrow and particularized 
interests to the common purpose provide by God. By encouraging religious belief and 
religious virtues, they expect to contribute to the development of both better individuals 
and better citizens. 
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CHAPTER V 
PUBLIC RELIGION IN THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA 
 
As was demonstrated in the works of Adams and Witherspoon, the language of 
the Protestant religious tradition was easily used to support the modern republican 
project. Despite the pervasiveness of this religious tradition, a number of America’s 
founding figures drew upon a more public form of religion to describe the relationship 
between religion and the new republic. These Founders saw more promise in a religion 
that highlights a sense of providence, dedication to the rule of law and of natural rights 
derived from the creator, as well as service to one’s nation, fellow citizens, and 
community. Among the most notable advocates of this type of public religion are 
Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Paine, and Thomas Jefferson. 
 The role of religion in American public life and particularly in the thought of the 
founding generation has been the focus of much scholarship. Invigorating a new 
approach to the study of religion, Robert Bellah quite famously identified a “civil 
religion” among the thought of the American Founders.  This religion features a God 
who champions “order, law and right,” and who transcends sectarianism.1 Although the 
existence of a widespread civil religion in the American founding period has been 
widely debated, Bellah is correct to note that a number of founders were interested in 
                                                
1 Robert Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” Daedalus 96 (1967): 7-8; Bellah further expands on his 
analysis of civil religion in the American Revolution in “The Revolution and Civil Religion,” in Religion 
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developing a set of “beliefs, symbols, and rituals” that would unite the American people 
around a common purpose.2  
 When the thought of these Founders is closely examined, however, it is clear that 
their project differs from a civil religion in a number of important ways. I contend that 
the Founder’s project of developing a non-sectarian religion can be more properly 
referred to as a public religion, one that was designed to support a modern, commercial 
republic. Bellah notes his debt to Rousseau in his choice of the term civil religion, but 
distinguishes his use of the term from the one found in Rousseau’s The Social Contract.3 
The founding generation was well acquainted with the work of Rousseau, including his 
views on civil religion, but his approach to republican religion was summarily rejected. 
Although a Rousseauian civil religion aims to develop a sense of the common good, the 
Founders believed that it requires imposing on people the same passions and opinions, a 
task that undermines individual liberty and is impossible to achieve.4 Likewise, the 
classical republican desire to develop a love of country and dedication to the common 
good through the use of a civil religion was summarily rejected. In a modern republic, 
the American Founders believed that religious liberty had to be protected even if that 
meant greater difficulty in developing a sense of common purpose.  
Even though Bellah rightly departs from Rousseau’s conception of civil religion, 
his choice of that term still does not capture the political-religious ideas of the American 
                                                
2 Robert Bellah, “Civil Religion,” 8.  
3 See Rousseau’s discussion of civil religion in Book IV, Ch 8, of The Social Contract, in Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau: Basic Political Writings, trans. and ed. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 
1987), 220-27. 
4 This argument is given its best expression by James Madison in “Federalist 10,” in The Federalist with 
Letters of “Brutus,” ed. Terence Ball (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 40-46. 
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Founders.5 In addition to being a non-sectarian civil religion, Bellah contends that the 
God featured in the Founder’s thought favors America above other nations.6 Though it is 
true that the Founders often invoke providence, they do not believe the American 
republic is unconditionally favored. Similar to Adam Ferguson, these Founders believe 
that providence aids human progress but progress is not inevitable. Progress is dependent 
on the virtue of the people, and when the common good is ignored or corrupted, God’s 
favor will be lost. Moreover, the rights and virtues envisaged by the Founders were not 
exclusively held by Americans. Natural rights are derived from a universal Creator and 
thus are inherent to individuals everywhere, not just Americans. Likewise, the virtues 
necessary to sustain the public good were prescribed as an example for all people to 
follow, not because they were good for the American republic alone, but because they 
were considered universally laudable. 
It is telling that although the term civil religion was available for the Founder’s 
use, even the most religiously universalistic among the founders never choose to 
describe their own religious program in this language. This religious dimension is better 
referred to as a public religion – the term favored by Franklin - than as a civil religion, 
for providence’s favor is contingent on the republic’s dedication to the public good.7 
                                                
5 Bellah’s analysis of civil religion in the writings of the Founders focuses primarily on Franklin, 
Jefferson, and Washington. Although Washington could easily be categorized as an advocate of public 
religion, his writings are less focused on the role of religion in developing civic virtue. Consequently, I 
have omitted Washington from this analysis.  
6 Bellah acknowledges the often used trope of envisioning America as the new Israel. He argues that the 
God depicted by the Founders has “a special concern for America….Europe is Egypt; America, the 
promised land. God has led his people to establish a new sort of social order that shall be a light until all 
the nations,” in “Civil Religion,” 7-8.  
7 Although civil religion is the generally accepted term, two previous works have departed from this norm 
and have instead chosen to use the term public religion to describe this conception of religion in the 
Founder’s thought. Both draw upon Franklin to support their choice, although the primary focus of both 
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This public religion is used to support a new and distinctly modern republic, one that 
draws from both the classical republican tradition as well as the modern liberals. As we 
will see below in the thought of Franklin, Paine, and Jefferson, each expresses a 
dedication to this type of religion and is particularly drawn to its ability to transcend 
factionalism, cultivate a dedication to the common good, and also preserve individual 
liberty. Despite these commonalities, differences exist and are helpful in understanding 
the many variants of religious and political thought in this era. As their writings make 
clear, however, there is a shared commitment to the civic virtues they advocate, 
particularly concerning the importance of participation, liberty, and benevolence. Hence, 
a public religion is distinguished from conventional Protestant religious thought in that it 
emphasizes a different set of virtues and a different conception of what it means to be a 
good republican citizen. 
 
Benjamin Franklin 
 Most prominent among the Founders who promoted the importance of both 
virtue and public religion is Benjamin Franklin. His writings in Poor Richard’s 
Almanack serve as a guide for living a virtuous and industrious life, and his 
Autobiography offers his own life as a model for civic virtue that explicitly rejects the 
idea that self-interest and the public good are necessarily in conflict with one another. He 
spoke directly to the necessity of a “public religion,” rooted in a system of Christian 
                                                                                                                                           
works is evaluating the continuity of this tradition in American culture through the present day. See James 
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morals such as industry and charity, but one that would transcend factionalism. 
Religious faith, he noted, had a salubrious effect on an individual’s character, and he 
warned that most people would succumb to vice without the restraining effect of 
religion. Societal forces, especially education, were necessary to instill virtue and help 
develop a spirit of public service.  
 In his public and private writings, Franklin took as his life long mission the 
promotion of virtue. He had long planned to publish a book on The Art of Virtue to serve 
as a guide for all those wishing to live a good and happy life. It was intended to be a 
non-sectarian primer on the virtues and their applications in everyday life. 
Unfortunately, Franklin’s numerous other endeavors prevented him from completing the 
work.  He included, however, a shortened version of the plan in his Autobiography, and 
it is perhaps the best-known section of the book. His “bold and arduous” plan for moral 
perfection was based on the simple premise that he knew the difference between right 
and wrong, he only needed to train himself to “do the one and avoid the other.”8   
 In order to ensure success in this endeavor, a detailed program for moral 
perfection was developed. Initially, Franklin chose twelve virtues that he listed by name 
and provided a short precept for each. In order to master the virtues, he proposed to 
address each individually. His method included week long devotions to each virtue, 
which would be repeated four times per year, and keeping records of the faults he 
committed. In such a manner, Franklin believed he could cultivate the habit of virtue 
which would eventually lead to moral perfection. Although his plan was demanding, it 
                                                
8 Benjamin Franklin, The Autobiography, in Franklin: The Autobiography and Other Writings on Politics, 
Economics, and Virtue, ed. Alan Houston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 68. 
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has rarely been regarded for its moral rigidity.9 Indeed, some of his virtues allow for 
permissive behavior. For example, the virtue of Sincerity requires one to “use no hurtful 
deceit,” but does not forbid deceit outright. Likewise, Franklin famously adopts a rather 
liberal understanding of the virtue of Chastity: “Rarely use venery but for health or 
offspring, never to dullness, weakness, or the injury of your own or another’s peace or 
reputation.”10  
The virtues he includes and the instructions he attaches to each reveal what some 
scholars have identified as Franklin’s utilitarianism or even his Machiavellian approach 
to virtue.11 Here it is most clear that Franklin does not busy himself with traditional 
concerns about morality, but rather his virtues are tools to achieve greater ends. 
Conspicuously absent from his list are the classical virtues of liberality, magnanimity, 
and courage. Although Franklin drew upon many sources to develop his list of virtues, 
including Christian and classical thought, he did not make a distinction between moral 
and civic virtues. Just as temperance and industry are useful in one’s personal life, he 
also expects these virtues to improve citizens. Moral and civic virtues, for Franklin, are 
mutually reinforcing.  
 The habit of virtue, for Franklin, is not meant to be undertaken for its own sake. 
Indeed, his virtues are intended to “explain and enforce [a larger] doctrine, that vicious 
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actions are not hurtful because they are forbidden, but forbidden because they are 
hurtful….”12  At its most basic level, being virtuous actually protects individuals from 
pain and suffering. But the benefits of the virtuous life are greater than simply avoiding 
pain: 
That it was, therefore, every one’s interest to be virtuous who wished to be happy 
even in this world; and I should, from this circumstance…have endeavored to 
convince young persons that no qualities were so likely to make a poor man’s 
fortune as those of probity and integrity.13 
The great benefit of living a virtuous life is happiness. Those who make no attempt to 
improve their morality are discontented and frustrated in their endeavors to improve 
their conditions; but those who make a habit of virtue will experience life’s abundance. 
 In constructing his list of virtues, Franklin had originally included only twelve, 
but at the urging of a friend who insisted that he was often thought to be proud, Franklin 
included a thirteenth virtue – Humility. He includes this as the last virtue, indicating he 
anticipated it to be the most difficult to master, and he gives it the shortest precept: 
“Imitate Jesus and Socrates.”14 His suggestion that it is even possible to perfect himself 
to the extent that he can masterfully imitate two of the western world’s greatest figures is 
at minimum boastful, and is certainly far removed from the idea of humility. 
Nevertheless, Franklin is serious in this endeavor. He acknowledges Pride as one of the 
most difficult natural vices to overcome and also as a personal weakness: “Even if I 
                                                
12 Franklin, Autobiography, 76. 
13 Franklin, Autobiography, 76. 
14 Franklin, Autobiography, 69. 
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could conceive that I had completely overcome [Pride], I should probably be proud of 
my humility.”15 In fact, he openly admits that he had little personal success in achieving 
Humility, but he did achieve the appearance of being humble. In fact, some degree of 
pride is important in using virtue to achieve what Franklin perceives as the greatest ends 
of his moral project.  
 The Art of Virtue is not meant simply to produce individual happiness; Franklin’s 
conception of virtue is intended to encourage a greater public spirit and willingness to 
engage in public service. The most prominent example Franklin provides of this larger 
project is his own life. The Autobiography is filled with examples of Franklin’s 
contributions to the common good. He demonstrates how his desire to improve his own 
happiness was also used to improve the lives of the public as well, noting the personal 
and public benefits of his many projects, including establishing the first subscription 
library, organizing the first volunteer fire department, and improving the streets of 
Philadelphia. Franklin’s appearance of Humility was, in many ways, the virtue that 
contributed the most to his success in these endeavors. Initially, Franklin approached 
others with his ideas for public services, but often found that he was met with reluctance. 
Given his difficulty in achieving success in these projects, he modified his approach of 
appealing to the community to support ideas. Rather than claiming an idea was his own, 
he would suggest that the proposal belonged to a group of friends, or some other public 
spirited gentlemen. Once his own attachment to the project was removed, he found 
others were more readily willing to support his projects.  
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 Two benefits followed from this approach. First, it was an effective means by 
which Franklin convinced people to join his causes. Second, it actually served to reward 
Franklin’s own vanity. Though this approach required an initial sacrifice, he believed 
that it would be repaid: “If it remains a while uncertain to whom the merit belongs, 
someone more vain than yourself will be encouraged to claim it, and then even envy will 
be disposed to do you justice by plucking those assumed feathers, and restoring them to 
their rightful owner.”16 The appearance of Humility actually serves to further one’s own 
vanity, but as Steven Forde duly notes,17 Franklin believed some degree of vanity and 
pride would always be necessary to motivate capable leaders to serve the public.  
 Although Franklin’s many projects serve his own interests, it is because they 
serve a larger common good that he finds value in them. It is not the size or extent of the 
project that matters as much as the project’s ability to serve the community. 
Nevertheless, Franklin rejects the classical supposition that the public good is 
necessarily in conflict with one’s self-interest. In fact, he holds up his own life as proof 
that a virtuous life dedicated to serving the public good can increase one’s personal 
fortune. Even though Franklin would never deny the importance of gaining wealth, it is 
not monetary increases that matter as much as the small, daily successes: “Human 
felicity is produced not so much by great pieces of good fortune that seldom happen as 
by little advantages that occur every day.”18 Virtue is consequently a means to produce 
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the ends of happiness, but happiness is also necessarily a function of one’s dedication to 
the common good.  
 The promotion of the common good is Franklin’s ultimate objective, and this is 
what causes him to pursue his writings on the Art of Virtue. For Franklin, human nature 
is such that individuals are inherently inclined to seek their own interests, which they 
often miscalculate. Franklin explains the need for his project of virtue in a letter to Lord 
Kames (1760): “Most people have naturally some Virtues, but none have naturally all 
the Virtues…To acquire those that are wanting, and secure what we acquire as well as 
those we have naturally, is the Subject of an Art.”19 Even if one does have the inclination 
to further develop his or her virtue, failures will likely be met with frustration. It is not 
enough to proclaim a need for virtue, but a guide is necessary to teach people how to be 
successful in this art. Most importantly, Franklin believed people were naturally inclined 
toward virtue, but that circumstances and poor education often led them toward vicious 
behavior. Given a proper education, however, individuals would learn the advantages of 
pursuing a virtuous life.  
 One difficulty of the project is that many people may not associate the practice of 
virtue with temporal happiness. For many, the practice of virtue is only associated with 
religion. Franklin worries that when virtue is strictly tied to religion, it is the fear of 
worldly and eternal retribution for vices committed that promotes virtue, and any 
rewards for virtuous action are necessarily conceived in strictly individual terms, such as 
personal salvation. Franklin does not deny the utility of religion in promoting adherence 
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to virtue; in fact, he sees religion as playing a vital role in society. For instance, when he 
was given a copy of a manuscript that argued against the existence of a God involved in 
human affairs, Franklin cautioned the author not to publish the article:  
You yourself may find it easy to live a virtuous Life without the Assistance 
afforded by Religion; you having a clear Perception of the Advantages of Virtue 
and the Disadvantages of Vice, and possessing a Strength of Resolution 
sufficient to enable you to resist common Temptations. But think how great a 
Proportion of Mankind consists of weak and ignorant Men and Women, and of 
inexperienc’d and inconsiderate Youth of both Sexes, who have need of the 
Motives of Religion to restrain them from Vice, to support their Virtue, and 
retain them in the Practice of it till it becomes habitual, which is the great Point 
for its Security….20  
 Although Franklin thought that religion was important in encouraging virtuous 
behavior, he believed that many religious traditions focused only on faith; few focused 
on the importance of works inspired by faith. Faith, however, holds little value, 
according to Franklin, if it does not encourage good works: “Morality or Virtue is the 
End, Faith only a Means to obtain that End: And if the End be obtained, it is no matter 
by what Means.”21 This does not mean that Franklin was wholly indifferent toward 
religion, but rather that he wanted faith and works to be united in order to promote the 
common good. 
                                                
20 Franklin to _____, 13 December 1757, Autobiography and Other Writings, 272. 
21 Benjamin Franklin, “Dialogue Between Two Presbyterians,” Autobiography and Other Writings, 168. 
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 Even so, Franklin knew that even with the threat of eternal punishment, religion 
alone was not enough to inspire everyone to a virtuous life. Franklin notes there will 
always be those individuals who simply do not believe or who have a weak faith.22 The 
dangers of those who feel no restraint were well known to Franklin. During his first stay 
in England, he published a short metaphysical argument, Dissertation on Liberty and 
Necessity, Pleasure and Pain, which dismissed both the idea of an immortal soul and 
free will.23 This argument was convincing to several of his friends, who in turn saw no 
need to practice moral restraint. Franklin quickly realized that his Dissertation supported 
immoral behavior, and he declared its publication one of his life’s great “erratum.” 
Consequently, he decided that even if his argument were correct, it was not useful. 
Except for the most remarkable individuals, Franklin feared that those who did not feel 
the restraint of religion would fall into the traps of vice unless properly instructed 
otherwise. This is not to say that Franklin wanted to restrict religious liberty in order to 
prevent atheism, only that he feared that for the average person, the effects of irreligion 
would be a neglect of the public spirit and a failure to supporting the common good.  
Because most people were not naturally inclined toward the perfection of virtue, 
and religion alone could not ensure virtuous behavior, Franklin believed it was 
paramount to educate the public in the art of virtue. Religion played an important role in 
                                                
22 Franklin to Lord Kames, 3 May 1760, Autobiography and Other Writings, 274-76. 
23 Benjamin Franklin, “Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain,” The Papers of Benjamin 
Franklin, ed. Leonard W. Labaree, Whitfield J. Bell, Helen C. Boatfield, and Helene H. Fineman (New 
Haven: Yale University Press 1959-), 1: 57-71. Jerry Weinberger has recently argued that the Dissertation 
actually represents the most accurate summary of Franklin’s religious thought. He concludes that Franklin 
was a lifelong atheist who dismissed moral principles as irrational desires of the human psyche and was 
forced to use esoteric writing to protect his public reputation. Based on an impressive array of speculation 
and conjecture, Weinberger’s imaginative analysis provides an alarmingly ahistorical reading of Franklin’s 
writings. See Benjamin Franklin Unmasked: On the Unity of His Moral, Religious, and Political Thought 
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005). 
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his overall educational scheme, though an expansive, non-sectarian version of religion. 
In his proposal to establish an academy for the education of Pennsylvania’s youth, 
Franklin specifically calls for the curriculum to include lessons in the matter of public 
religion: “History will also afford frequent Opportunities of showing the Necessity of a 
Public Religion, from its Usefulness to the Publick; the Advantage of a Religious 
Character among private Persons; the Mischiefs of Superstition, & c. and the Excellency 
of the Christian Religion above all others antient [sic.] or modern.”24 Franklin is 
typically given credit for the introducing the term public religion into the American 
lexicon, but he drew the term and much of his educational theory from the work of 
Scotland’s George Turnbull. In his work on Observations Upon Liberal Education, 
Turnbull stressed the importance of instructing students in public religion, understood as 
a religion that was founded on the Christian principle of benevolence. By emphasizing 
love of God and love of one’s neighbor, Turnbull believed individuals would find the 
necessary incitements to virtue.25  
Franklin embraced Turnbull’s endorsement of a public religion as an important 
feature of an education in virtue and further emphasized the importance of the virtues of 
temperance, order, frugality, industry, and perseverance in building a foundation for 
public spirited behavior.26 Of course, these virtues were championed by most of the 
advocates of republican government in the American founding. In fact, the list of virtues 
Franklin includes in his plan for education almost perfectly mirrors those virtues 
                                                
24 Benjamin Franklin, “Proposals Relating to the Education of Youth in Pennsylvania,” Autobiography and 
Other Writings 210. 
25 George Turnbull, Observations upon Liberal Education, in All its Branches, ed. Terrence O. Moore, Jr. 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Press, 2003), 354. 
26 Franklin, “Education of Youth,” 210. 
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endorsed by Witherspoon, with one glaring exception: piety. What distinguishes 
Franklin’s public religion from the Christian republicanism of Witherspoon and Adams 
is the way in which he envisions religion shaping individuals’ lives, especially their civic 
capacity.  
Compared to other Founders, Franklin’s political thought has received 
remarkably little attention. In fact, Franklin has rarely been featured in the republican 
revisionist literature and is generally dismissed by the proponents of the liberal 
paradigm. As Alan Houston avers, this is likely due to the depiction of Franklin as the 
quintessential American thinker.27 But even Houston, who places Franklin within the 
broader Atlantic context, acknowledges that his thought is unsystematic. Though it is 
true that Franklin was a pragmatic thinker, this does not indicate that his thought lacks 
either theory or rigor. Houston compellingly argues that Franklin espoused a “politics of 
improvement,” by which he hoped to bring about change for the better by always asking 
what useful improvements could be made, by what means, and at what cost.28 This 
ranged from the smallest of projects, such as hiring street sweepers and installing street 
lamps, to grander projects, including establishing public education and reforming 
political institutions. 
                                                
27 Alan Houston, Benjamin Franklin and the Politics of Improvement (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2008), 4-7. For recent work on Franklin as an American thinker, see H.W. Brands, The First American: 
The Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin (New York: Doubleday, 2000); Gordon S. Wood, The 
Americanization o f Benjamin Franklin and the Pursuit of Genius (New York: Penguin Press, 2004); and 
Steven Forde, “Benjamin Franklin: A Model American and an American Model,” in History of American 
Political Thought, ed. Bryan-Paul Frost and Jeffrey Sikkenga (New York: Lexington Books, 2003), 80-94. 
28 Houston, Benjamin Franklin, 12-18. Houston acknowledges that Franklin sees great utility in religion, 
but his views on religion receive only marginal treatment in Houston’s overall analysis of Franklin’s 
politics of improvement (38-40).  
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As is the case with Paine and Jefferson, Franklin was more interested in the 
character of citizens in a republic than the form of a republican government. 
Nevertheless, his proposal for a unified government, presented to the Continental 
Congress in July 1775, gives some indication as to his preferred system of government. 
His plan called for a division of power between the states and a strong central 
government. A unicameral Congress, based on each state’s population, would have 
expansive legislative power. Rather than a single president or monarch, he proposed an 
executive council of twelve members that would be appointed by Congress and would 
serve three-year terms, whereby one third of the council would be replaced annually.29 In 
fact, the scope of power he proposed for the central government was more expansive 
than he knew his fellow delegates would accept, so he never brought his plan to a vote. 
Though he was a man of ideals, and strongly advocated a responsive government that 
would preserve the liberty of the people, he was also a pragmatist, preferring an 
imperfect union to no union at all; hence, Franklin offered his endorsement of the 
Constitution near the end of the Convention in 1787, characteristically conceding his 
willingness to accept “this Constitution because I expect no better, and because I am not 
sure that it is not the best.”30  
Even with this endorsement, however, Franklin cautioned that the ultimate 
security of the government resides not in the form of the institutions but in the character 
                                                
29 Benjamin Franklin, “Proposed Articles of Confederation,” Autobiography and Other Writings, 313-316. 
30 Benjamin Franklin, “Speech in the Convention at the Conclusion of its Deliberations,” Autobiography 
and Other Writings, 362. 
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of the people.31 Hence, it is little surprise that Franklin made the improvement of citizens 
a life long project. Working within the republican tradition, Franklin accepted that 
individuals needed to be moral in order to be good citizens, and he viewed the 
cultivation of virtue as part of his overall political project. As discussed above, 
education, and even religious education, was the primary means for instilling virtue in 
citizens, but Franklin differed from other republican thinkers of the era. Whereas a 
number of founding figures believed it was necessary to cultivate piety and at least 
publicly encourage, if not require, religious worship, Franklin believed that the religious 
establishment would only undermine the salutary effects of religion.  
Although an unwavering proponent of religious toleration, Franklin did not 
ground his arguments in the language of natural rights. Characteristically, he defended 
religious toleration on pragmatic grounds. He contended that a true and good religion 
needed no assistance from a civil power, and that when a plurality of confessions are 
allowed to flourish, they are more likely to focus on persuading individuals to live good 
lives rather than simply encouraging them to ascribe to a particular set of doctrines.32 
Lorraine Pangle has suggested that despite Franklin’s expressed commitment to the 
“utility of religion, his actions at times seem to suggest a surprising indifference to it – 
indifference as to whether religion should thrive or wither away, indifference as to 
                                                
31 “I believe farther that this [government] is likely to be well administered for a Course of Years, and can 
only end in Despotism as other Forms have done before it, when the People shall become so corrupted as 
to need Despotic Government, being incapable of any other.” “Speech in the Convention,” 362. 
32 Franklin laments this trend toward doctrinal teachings in his Autobiography when he describes the 
sermons of one the Philadelphia ministers as “dry, uninteresting and unedifying, since not a single moral 
Principle was inculcated or enforc’d, their Aim seeming to be rather to make us Presbyterians than good 
Citizens.” Autobiography, 67.  
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whether it was indeed true or false.”33 It is true that in comparison to those who thought 
piety was necessary for the civic health of the republic, Franklin may appear indifferent 
to religion. Franklin, however, was deeply concerned with promoting a non-traditional 
approach to religion – a religion that is dedicated to works above faith and religious 
toleration, even including the toleration of non-religious individuals. 
Although Franklin was opposed to the civil establishment of religion, he 
nevertheless believed that religion could and should play an important role in shaping 
good citizens. Religion offers incitements to virtue that, for most people, cannot be 
rivaled by political or societal influences alone. Franklin offers a vision of civic life that 
embraces religion but that is not exclusively dependent on religion to make individuals 
good citizens. Nor, for that matter, can political institutions be exclusively entrusted in 
the moral and political education of citizens. Through his own writings and works, 
Franklin developed a model for encouraging virtue, one that departed significantly from 
much of the religious rhetoric of the time. By removing piety and focusing on virtues 
like frugality, order, and industry, Franklin risks appearing as an advocate of unbridled 
self-interest devoid of the restraining effects of religion.34 Nevertheless, Franklin always 
positions his discussions of these virtues within the larger context of developing a public 
spirit dedicated to the common good.  
                                                
33 Lorraine Pangle, The Political Philosophy of Benjamin Franklin (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 2007), 192.  
34 This critique of Franklin is most famously associated with Max Weber, who argued that Franklin 
embodied the spirit of capitalism, the endless and systematic pursuit of profit. Weber’s analysis of 
Franklin has been widely dismissed as relying on only a sparse selection of unrepresentative quotes from 
the Autobiography. See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott 
Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958). For critiques of Weber’s analysis, see Thomas 
Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 16-21; Pangle, 
Political Philosophy of Benjamin Franklin, 16-18; and Houston, Benjamin Franklin, 225-29. 
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Following along the line of Ferguson, Franklin believes that to be virtuous is to 
serve the common good, and to serve the common good is to be in the service of God. 
Franklin is not concerned with encouraging piety, as piety emphasizes faith, and 
dedication to particular doctrines, but not necessarily dedication to good works. 
Franklin’s public religion focuses not on the salvation of souls but rather on the 
production of good citizens. By rejecting the idea that individuals must choose between 
working for their own self-interest and the common good, he promotes a public spirit 
whereby public service is linked to individual happiness.   
 
Thomas Paine 
 Franklin lamented the divisive nature of religious belief, and strongly preferred a 
more inclusive public religion, but acknowledged that organized religion could play a 
constructive role in society. In contrast, Paine was deeply skeptical of all manner of 
organized religion. Most famously in Age of Reason, Paine vehemently criticizes 
revealed religion, especially Christianity, which he argues breeds intolerance and 
persecution. The solution for Paine is religious liberty, which he viewed as a right that 
under no circumstances could be legitimately breeched by political authority. Despite his 
uneasiness over religion, Paine maintains a concern for the moral health of society, 
especially as it relates to the preservation of the public good. This public spirit is drawn 
from the equality of individuals, their ability to be independent, and their ability to 
participate freely in their government. This requires a shared sense of purpose that can 
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be sustained by a public religion, though one that is decidedly even less akin to revealed 
religion than that proposed by Franklin.  
 Whereas the most notable critiques of revealed religion in the late eighteenth 
century were primarily academic and technical in character, Paine’s attacks on revealed 
religion were sensational, inflammatory, and unapologetic.35 Written in response to the 
growing trends of secularism and atheism that followed the French Revolution, Paine 
aims in Age of Reason to expose the dangers of revealed religion in corrupting true, 
natural theology. He considered all religious institutions dangerous, whether Christian, 
Jewish, or Muslim, and argued they were only used “to terrify and enslave mankind, and 
monopolize power and profit.”36 Although the first volume of Age of Reason is directed 
against revealed religions broadly, the second volume takes direct aim at the Judeo-
Christian tradition. He described Christianity as the most ruinous of all religions:  
Of all the systems of religion that ever were invented, there is none more 
derogatory to the Almighty, more unedifying to man, more repugnant to reason, 
and more contradictory in itself, than this thing called Christianity. Too absurd 
for belief, too impossible to convince, and too inconsistent for practice, it renders 
the heart torpid, or produces only atheists and fanatics.37 
Most of the arguments Paine leveled against Christianity had been previously articulated 
by authors such as Spinoza, Voltaire, Diderot, and Hume, but Paine’s use of plain 
                                                
35 Paine undoubtedly had access to the religious criticism of Hume, Priestly, and Voltaire, among many 
others. For a broad discussion of influences on Paine’s thought, see Caroline Robbins, “The Lifelong 
Education of Thomas Paine (1737-1809): Some Reflections upon His Acquaintance among Books,” 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 127 (1983): 135-42.  
36 Thomas Paine, “Age of Reason,” in Collected Works, ed. Eric Foner (New York: Citadel Press, 1945), 
1: 464. 
37 Paine, “Age of Reason,” Collected Works, 1:600. 
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language and harsh tone earned him a wide readership as well as widespread 
condemnation.38  
 Despite pervasive accusations to the contrary, Paine was not an atheist and goes 
to great lengths to endorse a natural, deistic religion. This religion carries with it a 
dedication to serving humanity; as Paine describes in Rights of Man, “my religion is to 
do good.”39 In order to combat the spread of atheism, Paine offers his own confession as 
an alternative to revealed religion and as an expression of reasonable faith: “I believe in 
one God, and no more; and I hope for happiness beyond this life. I believe in the equality 
of man, and I believe that religious duties consist in doing justice, loving mercy, and 
endeavoring to make our fellow-creatures happy.”40 These are the major tenets of Deism 
for Paine, which he believes can lead individuals to a moral life uncorrupted by the 
schemes of religious institutions.41 
 Paine actively promoted the principles of Deism as a means to eliminate 
despotism in both its religious and political forms. Paine actually tried to put his 
principles and teachings into practice by working with the Society of Theophilantropists. 
Formed in 1797 as a Deistic society dedicated to the principles Paine espoused in Age of 
Reason, the group celebrated humanistic services that included hymns, lectures, and 
                                                
38 Over thirty replies were published in the 1790s attacking Age of Reason, and its publication lost Paine 
some of his close friends, including Benjamin Rush and Samuel Adams. See Franklyn K. Prochaska, 
“Thomas Paine’s The Age of Reason Revisited,” Journal of the History of Ideas 33 (1972): 561-76.   
39 Thomas Paine, “Rights of Man,” Collected Works, 1: 414 
40 Paine, “Age of Reason,” Collected Works, 1: 464. 
41 Paine refers to his own religious beliefs as either Deism or natural religion. Unlike many Deists of the 
time, though, Paine believes that God maintained a presence in the universe that is manifest in nature. For 
a discussion of Paine’s natural religion, see Jack Fruchtman, Jr., Thomas Paine and the Religion of Nature 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 2-12. 
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discussions about moral, ethical, and religious issues.42 In an address before the society 
in 1801, Paine decried the creeping danger of the spread of atheism and especially the 
error of scientific education in contributing to that problem: “The evil that has resulted 
from the error of the schools, in teaching natural philosophy as an accomplishment only, 
has been that of generating in the pupils a species of Atheism. Instead of looking through 
the works of creation to the Creator himself, they stop short, and employ the knowledge 
they acquire to create doubts of His existence.”43 This type of scientific instruction is 
problematic because it only supplies knowledge of the mechanical operations of the 
universe; it ignores the governing principles of the universe and their Creator. With this 
limited education in scientific principles, Paine fears that individuals will feel that to be 
reasonable they must abandon all religious faith. 
 Paine’s concern was not simply a matter of inspiring faith or ensuring the 
salvation of the soul, nor was his work with the Theophilantrophists simply an example 
of his own personal religious beliefs and positions. He and the other founding members 
hoped the society would have an educative effect, to “give scientific instruction to those 
who could not otherwise obtain it...[and] be led to see the hand of God in all these 
things.”44 Thus, he expected his work with the society and the development of a properly 
developed scientific education to have a salubrious effect for both the individual and the 
public good in helping individuals to understand the principles by which God governs 
the universe.  To understand Paine’s interest in the public good, it is necessary to place 
                                                
42 See Thomas Paine, “Prosecution of The Age of Reason,” Collected Works, 2: 727-48. 
43 Thomas Paine, “The Existence of God,” Collected Works, 2: 750. 
44 Paine, “The Existence of God,” 2: 756. 
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his religious thought in context of his political thought. In this way, it become apparent 
that Paine’s interest in providing a broad education is aimed toward developing a public 
spirit and strengthening political institutions by providing a surer foundation for the 
cultivation of virtue among citizens.  
 As suggested above, much of the scholarship on Paine’s political thought has 
sought to classify him as either a republican or a liberal. Those searching for Paine’s 
republican roots emphasize his explicit commitment to republican government, his 
arguments supporting representation of various interests, and his dedication to the public 
good and the cultivation of virtue.45 Those interested in his liberal origins tend to focus 
on his separation of the public and private spheres and dedication to individual rights. 46  
Paine’s thought, however, is notoriously unsystematic, drawing upon numerous liberal 
and republican sources and hence defying easy classification. Recent work has attempted 
to provide a more nuanced reading of Paine treating him as a transitional figure between 
the republican and liberal traditions.47 As Andreas Kalyvas and Ira Katznelson have 
argued, Paine’s work rejected, adapted, and absorbed the republican tradition, drew upon 
the central elements of Locke’s liberalism, and fundamentally modified both traditions 
                                                
45 Gordon Wood, Creation of the American Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1969), 47, 92, 100; and Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1976), 71-106. 
46 Joyce Appleby, “Republicanism and Ideology,” American Quarterly 37 (1985), 470; Joyce Appleby, 
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to address the modern problems of rights, representation, and commercial society.48  To 
understand the ways in which Paine blends these traditions, I examine his political 
thought, particularly his work on individual rights, social and political obligations, and 
religion. 
 The influence of liberal thought on Paine’s approach to government is clearly 
demonstrated in his sharp division of the public and private spheres. As he forcefully 
argues in his opening to Common Sense, society and government are produced by 
different needs and serve different ends: “Society is produced by our wants, and 
government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting 
our affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices.”49 Here Paine dismisses the 
classical republican argument that the role of government is to cultivate virtue. For him 
government only engages in the negative action of limiting behavior, whereas society is 
a positive force that can be used to promote virtue. As Joyce Appleby has noted, Paine 
essentially “reduced the virtues of classical republicanism to simple policing while 
elevating free association to a new moral plane.”50 This does not indicate that Paine 
believed government was unnecessary, as he explicitly acknowledged that the world 
cannot be governed by moral virtue alone. Even though he believed in the necessity of 
government, he did contend that the more simplistic government is in form, the less 
likely it is to become disordered.  
                                                
48 Kalyvas and Katznelson, “Republic of the Moderns,” 476. 
49 Thomas Paine, “Common Sense,” Collected Works, 1: 4.  
50 Appleby, “Republicanism and Ideology,” 470.  
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 Government should not only be simplistic, but also limited in its power over 
individuals. Paine was a fierce defender of individual rights, particularly the rights to 
property and religious liberty. For Paine the only legitimate government action against 
individual liberty is to prevent individuals from interfering with the rights of others: 
“The exercise of the natural rights of every individual has no limits save those that 
assure to other members of society the enjoyment of the same rights.”51 Whereas in 
Common Sense Paine defends these rights within the American context, in Rights of Man 
he argues for universal human rights. Written as a refutation of Edmund Burke’s 
arguments against the French Revolution, Rights of Man is directed towards a British 
audience and considers “the prospect of a general revolution in governments.”52 Aiming 
to achieve a political transformation of the British system of government, Paine also sets 
the stage for global political upheaval which he believes will ultimately culminate in 
“universal peace” and “a new era to the human race.”53  
 Although political rights maintain primary importance in Rights of Man, Paine 
also is interested in fundamentally changing the social structure that has prevented 
progress in the past. Paine believes that a government founded on a moral theory entails 
not only individual rights, but also communal responsibilities.54 He takes this further 
than most eighteenth-century thinkers, as he proposes an entire agenda to address 
                                                
51 Thomas Paine, “Plan of a Declaration,” Collected Works, 2: 558. 
52 Paine, “Rights of Man,” 1:447. 
53 Paine, “Rights of Man,” 1:356. 
54 Some scholars have argued that Paine moves away from a Lockean dedication to individual rights and 
instead embraces a Rousseauian idea of community, furthering the liberal-republican dichotomy. In fact, 
Paine argues for both rights and responsibilities and believes they work together to reinforce one another. 
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problems of poverty and inequality.  Among his several proposals are plans for the 
elimination of taxes on the poor, funding for public education, a social security program, 
an unemployment program, and monies to help families with the cost of marriage, 
childbirth, and funeral expenses.55 This assistance is not a matter of “charity, but of 
right,”56 and has the added benefit of decreasing the incidences of crime and riots that 
are often associated with poverty. Much as Rousseau argued, Paine believed poverty was 
the result of a bad government and caused a state of dependence among citizens. When 
the community recognizes and addresses the needs of its citizens, it not only preserves 
individual rights but also serves the public good. Similar to Franklin, Paine believed that 
the public good and individual liberty were less at tension with one another than was 
commonly supposed: “Public good is not a term opposed to the good of individuals; on 
the contrary, it is the good of every individual collected.”57 
Paine never published a formal treatise on government, nor did he ever seek to be 
a political philosopher proper. Nevertheless, his writings demonstrate that he was 
conversant with the work of liberal and republican thinkers and that he sought to apply 
these ideas to the particular dilemmas facing modern society. Although he has been 
labeled many things, Paine most often referred to himself as a republican, though he 
clearly broke from many of the classical republican traditions. As Eric Foner has argued, 
Paine took the term republicanism and “made it a utopian ideal of government.”58 
Bringing together strands of secular millennialism, democratic egalitarianism, and 
                                                
55 Paine, “Rights of Man,” 1:431-441. 
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57 Thomas Paine, “Dissertations on Government; The Affairs of the Bank; and Paper Money,” Collected 
Works, 2:372. 
58 Foner, Tom Paine, 75. 
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commercial cosmopolitanism, Paine forged a new, modern understanding of 
republicanism.59 
The particular form of government was of less interest to Paine than the 
principles that government is founded upon. Nevertheless, Paine did provide a rough 
outline for a unified, republican government for the American colonies in Common 
Sense, which included a president who would hold an annual term, a continental 
legislature, unicameral state assemblies, frequent elections, expansive suffrage, and a 
constitution that would secure property and freedom of religion.60 He was quick, 
however, to reject other major tenets of the republican tradition. He explicitly referred to 
the idea of checks and balances as “farcical,” described the English Constitution as 
“absurd and useless,” and claimed that any sense of English liberty was attributable to 
“the constitution of the people, and not to the constitution of the government.”61 Little 
was sacred in either the history or form of the English republican tradition; a new system 
had to be developed that would transcend the “rascally” origins of the English 
constitutional system.  
For Paine, the spirit of a republic was rooted in its dedication to the public good. 
The form was only of secondary concern: “Republican government is no other than 
government established and conducted for the interest of the public, as well individually 
as collectively. It is not necessarily connected with any particular form, but it most 
                                                
59 Thomas C. Walker has argued that Paine is actually a cosmopolitan in his political thought, not only his 
economics, though his analysis is limited to Paine’s approach to foreign relations. “The Forgotten Prophet: 
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60 Paine, “Common Sense,” 1: 28-29. 
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naturally associates itself with the representative form.”62 To the extent that Paine ever 
endorses a particular system of government, he holds up the newly crafted American 
constitution as an example to be followed. By combining democratic elements of 
egalitarian rights with representation, Paine believes the American system is a republic 
that is truly dedicated to res publica – the public good: “By engrafting representation 
upon democracy, we arrive at a system of government capable of embracing and 
confederating all the various interests and every extent of territory and population.”63 
The problem of large republics was overcome through the use of representation, and the 
system of representation allows diverse interests - agrarian, urban, and commercial - to 
all receive a fair hearing through the political process.  
Paine marks a decisive shift from classical republican thinking, as he treats 
societal progress as an important component of ensuring a just political system.64 In his 
arguments for universal rights in Rights of Man, Frutchman has noted a shift in Paine’s 
focus: “True transformation now shifted from politics to society…The focus was no 
longer on political rights and liberties as they affected the individual. It was, rather, on 
government’s responsibility to provide a minimum level of social benefits for citizens 
who were incapable of caring for themselves.”65 Frutchman argues that this ultimately 
                                                
62 Paine, “Rights of Man,” 1: 370  
63 Paine, “Rights of Man,” 1: 371  
64 Although it is unclear whether or not Paine had read Ferguson’s History of Civil Society, he shares 
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65 Fruchtman, Thomas Paine, 259. 
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marks a shift in Paine’s thinking from emphasizing Lockean natural rights to 
Rousseauian communal obligations.66  
Although it is true that the influence of Rousseau is present in Rights of Man, 
Paine differs from Rousseau’s republican formulation in two fundamental ways. First, 
Paine unequivocally accepts the necessity and utility of representation, whereas 
Rousseau believes representation only leads to a loss of freedom.67 Secondly, and more 
importantly for this discussion, Rousseau and Paine are at odds over the role religion 
should play in a republic. For Rousseau, a civil religion is necessary and serves to teach 
citizens to love their communal duties. Even though Rousseau argues that citizens are 
not restricted from holding other religious opinions, belief in the civil religion is a non-
negotiable aspect of being a citizen: “While not having the ability to obligate anyone to 
believe them [the dogmas of the civil religion], the sovereign can banish from the state 
anyone who does not believe them. It can banish him not for being impious but for being 
unsociable, for being incapable of sincerely loving the laws and justice, and of 
sacrificing his life, if necessary, for his duty.”68 Civil religion, thus, not only encourages 
citizens to uphold their duties, but also discourages them from questioning the merit of 
those obligations. 
As Kalyvas and Katznelson have argued, Paine rejected the idea of civil religion, 
as it was associated with the classical republican tradition, especially as outlined by 
                                                
66 In contrast to Fruchtman, Caroline Robinson has cautioned that Paine’s debt to Rousseau is often 
exaggerated. Robbins, “Lifelong Education,” 138. 
67 As Rousseau succinctly argues, “the moment a people gives itself representatives, it is no longer free; it 
no longer exists.” Rousseau, Social Contract, 199.  
68 Rousseau, Social Contract, 226.  
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Rousseau, because it carried a threat of persecution.69 Paine argued that only established 
religions engage in persecution, where the civil authority assumes the authority to punish 
individuals for heterodox beliefs or actions;70 this type of persecution can occur with 
either revealed or civil religions that are established by law. Because Paine was 
uncompromising in his dedication to liberty of conscience and was so fiercely opposed 
to the influence of revealed religion, it is easy to assume that he would also be opposed 
to any type of pervasive religious influence on society at large.71 As discussed above, 
however, Paine not only wanted religion to play a role in society, but he personally 
worked to educate the public in a naturalist, deistic tradition of religion. Firmly rooted in 
the principles of nature, discoverable through scientific means, Paine believes his 
religion is perfectly compatible with religious liberty and also can support the public 
good. Furthermore, he believes this type of religion will help thwart corruption, in both 
society and political institutions, as well as to create a spirit of freedom that will relieve 
citizens from a state of dependence. Though it is appropriate to say that Paine rejected a 
dogmatic civil religion in the tradition of Rousseau, he was dedicated to the idea of a 
public religion that would preserve individual’s liberty while also developing a sense of 
communal obligations.  
The genius of Paine’s writings was not necessarily in the novelty of his 
arguments, as many of his arguments favoring independence had been expressed prior to 
the publication of Common Sense. Likewise, most of the critiques of revealed religion in 
                                                
69 Kalyvas and Katznelson, “Republic of the Moderns,” 467. 
70 Paine, “Rights of Man,” 293. 
71 Kalyvas and Katznelson seem to make this assumption as they discuss Paine’s opposition to civil 
religion but never discuss the positive role Paine hoped a rational religion could play in shaping good 
citizens. 
 148 
Age of Reason were simply restatements of previously published deistic polemics. What 
was truly novel in Paine’s writing was his style. Although many tracts had previously 
been published both on the war for independence and deism, they were primarily written 
for and read by the learned class of society. Using plain language that related his 
arguments to the common experiences of individuals, Paine wrote for the masses in a 
language that was easy for the layman to understand: “As it is my design to make those 
that can scarcely read understand, I shall therefore avoid every literary ornament and put 
it in language as plain as the alphabet.”72  
Paine’s choice of audience and style of argument is important because it 
demonstrates his democratic interest in making high-minded political and theological 
arguments accessible to the masses. The fight for independence, the necessity of 
republican government, and the importance of fair representation were not matters for 
the elite statesman to decide – these were matters that concerned the populace and 
required its support and participation to succeed. Likewise, the reasonableness of the 
Christian religion was not merely a matter for priests and pastors to decide; every man 
and woman deserved to be able to understand and participate in the debates surrounding 
the role of religion in society.73 It is this dedication to widespread education, whether 
formal education or simply education through writings and pamphlets, that demonstrates 
Paine’s dedication to egalitarian principles. Even so, his educational projects were 
always placed within a republican context. Paine wanted greater equality in education, 
                                                
72 Thomas Paine, “The Affair of Silas Deane,” Collected Works, 2: 111.  
73 Importantly, and perhaps drawing from his Quaker background, Paine supported religious education for 
both men and women. As is discussed below, Jefferson also supported public education for women, but 
only at the primary level.  
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wealth, and representation so that individuals would have more opportunities to cultivate 
moral and civic virtue.  
Paine’s is a hopeful vision of human nature. Individuals are born with a natural 
inclination toward virtue, but due to circumstances and necessity, they often are forced 
into vice and corruption. Whereas the republican tradition had looked to government to 
cultivate virtue and limit vice among citizens, Paine sees republican institutions 
especially within the British context as part of the problem. Likewise, religion has 
similarly corrupted individuals by turning them into fanatics rather than instilling 
individuals with knowledge of the natural order of creation. True religion, Paine 
believes, can fill this gap by providing individuals with knowledge of the universe and 
its creator. This knowledge reveals the natural order of the world, the collective 
dependence of all of life, and the logical necessity of a public spirit that follows from our 
shared dependence. The solution is not a dogmatic, overbearing civil religion that is 
forced upon citizens by their government. Rather, Paine endorses a public religion, one 
that is nurtured through education, scientific inquiry, and a fierce dedication to liberty of 
conscience. It is a religion that allows uninhibited exploration of religious ideas and 
allows individuals the autonomy to understand the world, its natural order, and the 
virtues required to sustain it. This type of natural religion encourages a dedication to the 
public good that Paine believes is necessary and will ultimately help sustain a healthy 
society and a good, though small, government.  
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Thomas Jefferson 
 Among America’s founding figures, Jefferson appears to be the most conflicted 
about religion, recognizing both its dangers and its necessity. He does believe religion 
can help cultivate virtue and provide a basis for the liberty of individuals and nations; 
nevertheless, he did not see a role for state support of religion. He often lamented that 
Christianity provided the best collection of moral teachings that had ever been so 
irredeemably corrupted by man. Even so, he considered some religious education 
necessary and implored that religious texts be read alongside Livy and Cicero. He 
claimed that even if an individual were left doubting the divine nature of religion, one 
would still find “incitements to virtue.” Although he rarely expressed his personal 
convictions about religion, it is clear that he found religious study important, especially 
insofar as it sustained the virtue of individuals and thwarted corruption among nations. 
Jefferson saw the study of religion fostering the intellectual virtues such as wisdom but 
also traditional civic virtues such as liberty and participation in government. By 
subjecting religion to close intellectual scrutiny, he hoped to raise the level of inquiry to 
that of a public religion, which would cultivate leaders and citizens capable of sustaining 
their republic.  
In many ways, Jefferson is one of the most elusive American thinkers in terms of 
understanding his views on religion. He notoriously kept his personal religious views 
private, which led to widespread accusations that he was an atheist.74 Despite the debate 
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over his personal beliefs, by focusing on his plans for public education and his private 
letters concerning matters on religion, morality, and politics, it is clear that Jefferson did 
believe that religion could play an important role in the development of a virtuous 
citizenry. Whereas both Franklin and Paine are forthright about their desire to see 
religion play some role in the moral and political education of citizens, albeit in different 
ways, Jefferson is more reticent to endorse religious instruction, especially for young 
students.  
Jefferson, along with Franklin and Paine, was fiercely dedicated to the project of 
religious liberty. He believed that “difference of opinion is advantageous in religion,” 
and that to persecute individuals simply for matters of religious belief only succeeds in 
making “one half the world fools, and the other half hypocrites.”75 Religious liberty, for 
Jefferson, not only protects an individual’s liberty of conscience, but also prohibits 
government endorsement of any religious establishment. Although he claims religious 
liberty is a natural right, he is also quick to note the many benefits that can be gained 
from religious toleration. In his Notes on the State of Virginia, he praises New York and 
Pennsylvania for their disestablishment of religion: “Their harmony is unparalleled, and 
can be ascribed to nothing but their unbounded tolerance, because there is no other 
circumstance in which they differ from every nation on earth. They have made the happy 
discovery, that the way to silence religious disputes, is to take no notice of them.”76  
                                                
75 Thomas Jefferson, “Notes on the State of Virginia,” in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, ed. Merrill D. 
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76 Jefferson, “Notes,” 212. 
 152 
Even though Jefferson was dedicated to religious liberty, he did not aim to 
eliminate religion altogether. In fact, he believed religion could play an important role in 
shaping individuals, though he advocated doing this through a carefully structured 
education that would introduce religion to students at a later age. Whereas many 
believed that instruction in virtue, both private and civic, was best taught through some 
form of religious education,77 Jefferson argued that the study of history, at least to begin 
with, would provide adequate instruction in morality. More than most any other of 
America’s founding figures, Jefferson advocated a comprehensive education plan, 
including primary through university education.78 Every child, male and female, was to 
be guaranteed a free education for at least three years. By providing the people with at 
least a basic education, he hoped to create vigilant citizens who were knowledgeable of 
their rights and would be willing to defend them against encroachments from the 
government. 
Jefferson’s educational system had as its primary and explicit aim the molding of 
good citizens. He was particularly concerned that those students of the highest merit, 
regardless of their personal circumstances, receive an education at the public’s expense 
that would prepare them for public service. He characteristically opens his proposed bill 
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for public education with a preamble that recognizes the importance of this project in 
ensuring the safety and liberty of the citizens at large:  
Whence it becomes expedient for promoting the publick happiness that those 
persons, whom nature hath endowed with genius and virtue, should be rendered 
by liberal education worthy to receive, and able to guard the sacred deposit of the 
rights and liberties of their fellow citizens, and that they should be called to that 
charge without regard to wealth, birth or other accidental condition or 
circumstance….it is better that such should be sought for and educated at the 
common expence of all, than that the happiness of all should be confided to the 
weak or the wicked.79 
Even though Jefferson hopes to educate the most talented students for public service, he 
does not believe that one class is intended to rule over the others. Rather, his educational 
system aims to produce public servants who are tempered by wisdom and moderation, 
and a populace that is always skeptical, vigilant, and that does not hesitate to check the 
power of its governors.80 
Though instruction in virtue was requisite in ensuring both the temperance of 
governors and the vigilance of citizens, Jefferson departed from most educational 
theorists of his time in insisting that young students refrain from reading the Bible as 
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part of this instruction in virtue. He described his aims for primary education at length in 
his Notes:  
The first stage of this education being the schools of the hundreds, wherein the 
great mass of the people will receive their instruction, the principal foundations 
of future order will be laid here. Instead therefore of putting the Bible and 
Testament into the hands of children, at an age when their judgments are not 
sufficiently matured for religious inquiries, their memories may here be stored 
with the most useful facts from Grecian, Roman, European and America history. 
The first elements of morality too many be instilled into their minds; such as, 
when further developed as their judgments advance in strength, may teach them 
how to work out their own greatest happiness, by shewing them that it does not 
depend on the condition of life in which chance has placed them, but is always 
the result of good conscience, good health, occupation, and freedom in all just 
pursuits.81 
Jefferson only wanted students to be delayed in their studies of religion, not 
prohibited from religious instruction and inquiry. When a student had reached an age of 
intellectual maturity and reasonableness, Jefferson believed that the study of religion 
would be most profitable. 82 Whereas Paine actively sought to inform students of the 
absurdity of the Christian religion and of the reasonableness of natural religion, Jefferson 
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wants students to make their own judgments. He explains his position in a letter to his 
seventeen-year-old nephew, Peter Carr. When Carr inquired of Jefferson as to whether 
and how he should approach the study of religion, Jefferson replied: “Your reason is 
now mature enough to receive this object…Question with boldness even the existence of 
a god; because, if there be one, he must more approve the homage of reason, than that of 
blindfold fear. You will naturally examine first the religion of your own country. Read 
the bible then, as you would read Livy of Tactius.”83  
For Jefferson, it is not so much the particular form of moral instruction that 
religion provides that is useful; rather, it is the inquiry into the reasonableness and justice 
of the moral principles offered by religion that provides the greatest rewards. He 
cautioned Carr that the conclusions that he reaches are not as important as the inquiry 
itself:  
Do not be frightened from this enquiry by any fear of its consequences. If it ends 
in a belief that there is no god, you will find incitement to virtue in the comfort 
and pleasantness you feel in it’s exercise, and the love of others which it will 
procure you. If you find reason to believe there is a god, a consciousness that you 
are acting under his eye, and that he approves you, will be a vast additional 
incitement.84 
If it is simply the exercise of studying religion that matters, and not the 
conclusions reached about religion, then why did Jefferson think the study of religion 
was necessary? One possibility, suggested by Thomas Pangle, is that Jefferson believed 
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that acceptance of an afterlife, and more particularly a day of final judgment, provides an 
incitement to virtue for most people that cannot be matched by the study of history 
alone. Pangle nevertheless contends that Jefferson does little to reconcile his views 
toward the afterlife with his rejection of the inerrancy of scripture, particularly the 
miraculous and supernatural aspects of the Bible.85 Although it is true that Jefferson does 
not reconcile these beliefs, it is not necessary that he does. What he does advocate is the 
importance of free religious inquiry. Religious faith that is supported by free inquiry is 
unlikely to lead to fanaticism, persecution, or mob behavior, the true enemies of liberty 
and security according to Jefferson. But unlike many of his era, including even Paine, 
Jefferson does not think religious belief is necessary for a person to be virtuous; even an 
atheist can live a virtuous life.86 Much as Franklin argued, Jefferson believes religion is 
an important aspect of the lives of many individuals, and it can help support both 
personal and civic virtue, but it is not necessary to ensuring morality. 
Given that he considered religious zealotry and factionalism as threats to liberty 
and security, Jefferson was interested in supporting a more tempered and ecumenical 
version of religion. To that end, he produced a carefully constructed revision of the 
biblical gospels aimed at providing a more authentic version of Christianity.87 Entitled 
the “Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth,” Jefferson extracted passages from the 
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gospels that included Jesus’ moral teachings and actions. All references to miracles, 
supernatural interventions, and claims to divinity were omitted, including the 
Resurrection. Though not published in his lifetime, it gives a clear idea of the type of 
moral and religious instruction that Jefferson favored. He did, however, widely circulate 
among his friends a prospective syllabus for the study of Christ’s life and teachings that 
shared many themes with his unpublished work on the gospels.88  
By emphasizing the moral teaching and eschewing the aspects of the gospels he 
considered unreasonable, Jefferson developed a plan for religious education that would 
unify its adherents around the common principles of mercy, benevolence, and justice. 
These virtues would form a foundation around which religious liberty could be 
preserved while also developing a sense of common purpose. By focusing on the moral 
teaching of the gospels, Jefferson aimed to provide an education that would transcend 
religious factionalism and unite individuals to the common goal of preserving liberty and 
security. 
In order to understand how a concern for individual liberty is united with an 
interest in promoting the common good, it is necessary to examine Jefferson’s political 
thought. It is clear that for Jefferson an education in virtue was necessary to support a 
republic and to protect individual liberty. In many ways, Jefferson has been depicted as 
one of the closest heirs to the classical republican tradition. Focusing on his praise for 
agrarian life, distrust of manufacturing, and belief that only a certain character of citizen 
is capable of self-government, many scholars have firmly placed Jefferson within the 
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republican tradition.89 Not even Jefferson, however, has escaped the republican-liberal 
debate. Jefferson’s particularly optimistic view of human nature, his acceptance of 
commercial agriculture, and his dedication to individual rights has also earned him the 
label of liberal.90 To understand Jefferson’s political thought it is important to note his 
use of both the liberal and republican traditions and the evolution of his thought over 
time. 
Jefferson is most popularly known as a patron of agrarian republicanism. Often a 
point of contention in his political debates, most notably with Alexander Hamilton, 
Jefferson believed that agrarian life provided the firmest foundation for a virtuous 
government. As he explains in Notes, “I think our governments will remain virtuous for 
many centuries; as long as they are chiefly agricultural; and this will be as long as there 
shall be vacant lands in any part of America. When they get piled upon one another in 
large cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt as in Europe.”91 For Jefferson, as 
with most other republican thinkers of the eighteenth century, there was a deep tension 
between virtue and commerce. Commerce itself was not dangerous to government, but 
rather the tendency towards wealth and luxury that Jefferson associated with the 
commercial practice he had observed in Europe. Left unchecked, this commercial spirit 
would produce a weak and dependent society disposed toward corruption. 
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 Jefferson goes one step further than many other republican thinkers of the period, 
including both Franklin and Paine, in his appraisal of agrarianism. The work associated 
with agrarian life produces a virtuous character among the people - one that is not found 
among manufacturers or artisans - and that serves as the foundation for liberty in a 
republic: 
Those who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a 
chosen people, whose breast he had made his peculiar deposit for substantial and 
genuine virtue….Dependence begets subservience and venality, suffocates the 
germ of virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition….While we 
have land to labour then, let us never wish to see our citizens occupied at a work-
bench, or twirling a distaff…let our workshops remain in Europe….It is the 
manners and spirit of a people which preserve a republic in vigour.92 
As Jean Yarbrough has rightly argued, Jefferson firmly held that the character of citizens 
was more important to a republic than was the form of political institutions, and the 
character of the self-reliant, independent yeoman farmer was celebrated above all 
others.93 Jefferson was not interested in simply promoting autonomous, economically 
independent farmers who would merely spend their days in isolation and contemplation. 
Rather, he expected that citizens who were deeply invested in their property, and whose 
livelihood depended on their own labor, would be particularly vigilant against any 
governmental attempts to undermine their personal liberties.  
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 Despite emphasizing the virtue of agrarian life, Jefferson did maintain an interest 
in commerce. In fact, much of the debate over the categorization of Jefferson’s thought 
has revolved around his understanding of commerce. Those who emphasize Jefferson’s 
liberalism have taken the term commerce to mean free enterprise or trade, while those 
who focus on his republicanism have taken commerce to mean an opposition to a 
particular type of economic activity that leads to extravagance, dependence, and 
corruption.94 On the whole, we can see that Jefferson actually evolves in his economic 
thought concerning the relationship of commerce to a well-functioning republic. In his 
early writings he seems deeply suspicious of the corrupting influence of commerce, 
deploring the state of manufacturing he saw in Europe and the sloth he associated with 
city life. 95  In his later years, however, Jefferson is undeniably open to the utility of 
commercial projects, particularly commercial farming. 
In fact, Jefferson viewed the project of developing commercial and 
manufacturing opportunities as vital to the stability of the republic. To this end, his 
interest in extending the territory of the U.S. west of the Mississippi river was rooted in 
his desire to preserve the unity of the nation.96 As Rahe rightly argues, the Louisiana 
Purchase was undertaken by Jefferson not as a means to secure abundant farm land for 
western expansion, but rather to secure the Mississippi river as an outlet for exports for 
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those living in the Ohio Valley.97 Moreover, Jefferson later noted that the economic 
shifts in both America and Europe necessitated the growth of manufacturing in the 
states. In a letter to Benjamin Austin, Jefferson warns that anyone “who is now against 
domestic manufacture, must be for reducing us either to dependence on that foreign 
nation, or to be clothed in skins, and to live like wild beasts…I am not one of these; 
experience has taught me that manufactures are now as necessary to our independence as 
to our comfort.”98 This is an important and often underemphasized shift for Jefferson, 
who several decades before had thought the entire spirit of American liberty was rooted 
in the character of the self-reliant yeoman farmer. 
Even so, Jefferson never ceases to praise the virtues that he associated with 
agrarian life, particularly independence and self-reliance. Fueled by a Machiavellian 
distrust of those vested with power, Jefferson sought to ensure that individuals would be 
vigilantly prepared to defend their liberties against encroachments from the government. 
As Rahe has persuasively argued, Jefferson was “mindful of the Machiavellian dictum 
that a legislator must presume all men wicked” and “was persuaded that the only way to 
accomplish this end was to see to it that the American people were never in any fashion 
sheeplike at all.”99 Though Jefferson himself had a particularly optimistic view of human 
nature, believing in humanity’s innate capacity for virtue and possession of a moral 
sense, he also acknowledged that individuals must be alerted to the corrupting influence 
of power. 
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 Although Jefferson’s thoughts on religion have been dismissed as unsystematic, 
inconclusive, or as generally unimportant to his political thought, it is clear that Jefferson 
believed that religion could play an important role in shaping a vigilant spirit of 
independence among the people. When religious study is delayed, and subjected to the 
scrutiny of reason, Jefferson believes it will create a spirit of charity and benevolence 
among the people, rather than the fanaticism and intolerance. Religion tempered by 
reason provides unrivaled incitements to virtue that can inspire both independence and 
vigilance. When religious liberty is preserved, Jefferson believes a rational religion can 
be developed that will still inspire virtue among the people but that will not carry the 
threats of dogma and persecution. In this way, Jefferson defends a public religion that is 
suited to developing the character necessary for a free people to defend their republican 
liberty. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although dedication to individual liberty and religious toleration is often taken to 
mean that religious beliefs and discourse have no place in the public square, it is clear 
from this discussion that Franklin, Paine, and Jefferson share little with this position. 
Each believes that religious diversity poses no threat to republican liberty, and in fact, 
that diversity tends to have a moderating effect on religion overall. Each also 
acknowledges that religion plays an important role in individual’s private and public 
lives, and though they prefer a form of religion tempered by reason, they were unwilling 
to limit religious liberty.  They were primarily interested in finding a way to nurture 
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humanity’s natural impulses toward religion while protecting individual rights and 
hoped to do this by promoting a mild, reasonable, public religion that celebrated the 
virtues of liberty and benevolence. 
They knew that by preserving individual liberty, it would be more difficult to 
develop a shared conception of the common good and a spirit of public service, but this 
was universally considered a risk worth the price. Much as they believed religious 
coercion never produces true faith, only hypocrisy, so they also argued that coercing the 
public to accept a common good or general will was a futile endeavor. Though they fully 
acknowledged that individuals have different interests and passions, they did contend 
that humans have an innate capacity for virtue that allows them to develop a shared 
sense of the public good that respects individual liberty and self-interest. Moreover, they 
each acknowledged that religion can play a formative role in molding good citizens by 
providing incitements to virtue, particularly dedication to public service. Non-coercive 
and non-sectarian, this distinct form of public religion was aimed at developing citizens 
capable of supporting a modern republic, a republic that respects individual liberty but 
that is capable nonetheless of developing a shared sense of the public good. As Lance 
Banning has well argued, “Logically, it may be inconsistent to be simultaneously liberal 
and classical. Historically, it was not.”100  Neither Franklin, Paine, nor Jefferson believed 
he was being inconsistent in supporting both individual liberty, particularly religious 
liberty, and a dedication to the common good. They were quick to acknowledge that 
there were tensions, but they did not think they were incompatible. Insofar as tensions 
                                                
100 Banning, “Jeffersonian Ideology,” 12. 
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existed, they believed that a public religion could serve as a unifying force that would 
rally citizens to the cause of defending republican liberty.
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
Our challenges may be new. The instruments with which we meet them may be new. But 
those values upon which our success depends -- hard work and honesty, courage and fair 
play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism -- these things are old. These things 
are true. They have been the quiet force of progress throughout our history. What is 
demanded then is a return to these truths. What is required of us now is a new era of 
responsibility -- a recognition, on the part of every American, that we have duties to 
ourselves, our nation and the world; duties that we do not grudgingly accept but rather 
seize gladly, firm in the knowledge that there is nothing so satisfying to the spirit, so 
defining of our character, than giving our all to a difficult task. This is the price and the 
promise of citizenship. This is the source of our confidence -- the knowledge that God 
calls on us to shape an uncertain destiny. - Barack Obama, Inaugural Speech 
 
 Given contemporary concerns over decreases in civic engagement and political 
participation, there is little surprise that the civic tradition has received increased 
attention in recent decades. Even President Obama invoked the civic tradition in his 
Inaugural Speech, arguing that America’s ability to meet the challenges facing modern 
democracy are dependent on the virtues of its citizens. Such calls for citizens to pay 
renewed attention to their communal duties and responsibilities are frequent among 
politicians and scholars alike. Nevertheless, these commentators face the difficult 
theoretical and practical task of balancing efforts to encourage collective responsibility 
against claims of individual rights.  
The question of how to achieve this balance was at the center of the work of 
many advocates of the civic tradition in the eighteenth century, who aimed to promote 
virtuous behavior and encourage communal duties while protecting individual liberty. 
For these thinkers, religion played an important role in shaping their understanding of 
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both civic virtue and individual liberty, and it is often their emphasis on the role of 
religion in fostering virtue that allows them to unite their liberal and republican 
concerns. Nevertheless, the importance of religion to the civic tradition has often been 
underemphasized or outright rejected. Even when the importance of religion has been 
acknowledged, it has most often been reduced to a discussion of either the Judeo-
Christian tradition or civil religion. In this dissertation, I have argued that religion did 
shape ideas of civic virtue and citizenship in the Scottish Enlightenment and the 
American Founding. Moreover, I have argued that the influence of religion is neither 
monolithic nor self-evident. In order to understand how religion shaped this tradition, it 
is necessary to take into account that different conceptions of religion produce different 
understandings of what it means to be a good citizen. 
 Among the Scottish and American thinkers I have surveyed, there is a great deal 
of consistency regarding the place of religion in the civic tradition. First, each of these 
thinkers agrees that religion can and should serve the political ends of the state by 
encouraging citizens to look beyond their own particularized interests to support the 
public good. Second, there is general agreement that religion provides an unrivaled 
motivation to virtuous behavior. The promise of an eternal state of rewards and 
punishments provides an incitement to virtue that is not matched by self-interest, or any 
other means of promoting virtuous behavior. Third, there is consensus that religion 
inspires not only private virtues that are related to personal salvation, but also public 
virtues that encourage individuals to support the common good, to be benevolent to 
members of their community, and to be active participants in their government. 
 167 
 One of the most distinctive features of the eighteenth-century civic tradition is 
the effort to develop a new understanding of civic virtue that is compatible with self-
interest. Following J.G.A. Pocock, Gordon Wood, and Paul Rahe, among others, this 
research supports the conclusion that during this period the classical republican 
understanding of the relationship between virtue and self-interest was largely rejected. 
Rather than presuming that individuals are wholly or even predominately self-interested, 
the thinkers surveyed in this research build upon Francis Hutcheson’s argument that 
benevolence forms the foundation for virtuous behavior. Benevolence causes individuals 
to support the common good, even when it conflicts with their own self-interest. 
Beginning from the position that self-interest is not necessarily inimical to the common 
good, each of these thinkers also emphasizes the importance of several virtues including 
industry, frugality, and temperance. While these particular virtues are often viewed as 
private virtues, they argued that these virtues encourage citizens to work hard and have 
the added benefit of contributing to individual wealth. The modern advocates of the civic 
tradition do not share the same inherent skepticism of affluence that marked the classical 
republican tradition. When tempered by these moderating virtues, these thinkers argue 
that wealth actually supports the common good by contributing to the national economy 
and also provides more opportunities for individuals to engage in charitable giving. 
One of the biggest points of departure between the modern civic tradition and the 
classical republican tradition concerns which civic virtues are necessary to ensure that 
individuals place the common interest above their own self-interest. While the classical 
tradition emphasized the virtues of courage, honor, and martial prowess, the advocates of 
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the civic tradition in the eighteenth century are more focused on the virtues of 
benevolence, industry, and frugality. Among the thinkers surveyed in this work, Adam 
Ferguson alone continues to maintain the importance of the classical virtues of courage 
and honor. He contends that these virtues make individuals more willing to sacrifice and 
be actively engaged in their communities and government. Only John Adams comes 
close to Ferguson’s acceptance of the classical republican tradition by championing the 
virtue of honor, but Adams emphasizes the importance of honor as a way to encourage 
the natural aristocracy into public service. Despite this movement away from the 
classical virtues, there is a consensus that the classical republican tradition correctly 
emphasized the importance of civic engagement as the only way to ensure that 
government functions properly and protects the liberty of the people. 
Religion plays a critical role in the eighteenth-century civic tradition because it 
encourages citizens to look beyond their particular self-interest to the interest of their 
community. In short, religion serves as a link between private and public virtues so that 
to be a good person is to also be a good citizen and to serve one’s community is to serve 
God. Hence, religion eases the tension between private, self-interest and the public 
interest. However, there is much debate over how religion should be used to further civic 
ends and the character of that religion. Easily the most disputed civic virtue is piety, as 
there is little agreement over whether individuals must be pious in order to be good 
citizens. For Hutcheson, Witherspoon, and Adams, piety encourages citizens to look 
beyond their own narrow and particularized interests to support the common good by 
fulfilling their duties to one another and to God. By encouraging religious belief and 
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religious virtues, they expect to cultivate better citizens who are more civically engaged. 
The virtue of piety is conspicuously absent, however, in the writings of Ferguson, 
Franklin, Paine, and Jefferson. Although each argues that religious belief can serve the 
ends of the state, they never suggest that piety, at least as understood as an outward 
profession of religious faith, is necessary to being a good citizen.  
Nevertheless, there is overwhelming agreement among these thinkers that most 
people need religion in order to be properly motivated toward virtuous actions. Few are 
willing to go so far as to say that religious belief is irrelevant, and there is consensus that 
atheism generally has a pernicious effect on society. While Franklin and Jefferson are 
willing to entertain the possibility of a virtuous atheist, even they concede that such a 
person would be a rarity. On the whole, each of these thinkers argues that combating 
atheism and irreligion is in the state’s interest because of the corrupting effect these 
beliefs may have on individuals’ willingness to support the common good.  
In order to promote civic virtue, each of the writers examined in this study agrees 
that a proper education is necessary and that religion must play a role in this instruction, 
but there is disagreement over exactly what form this education should take. Hutcheson, 
Witherspoon, and Adams argue that the state should support religious instruction and 
directly encourage religious belief as a matter of civil interest. Ferguson is less specific, 
but given his insistence that knowledge of providential order is essential for good 
citizens, it is reasonable to conclude that he would support some form of religious 
education. Franklin, Paine, and Jefferson all emphasize the importance of using religion 
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to teach good morals, but they all consciously stop short of arguing that the aim of this 
education is to promote religious faith.  
 One of struggles in which each of these thinkers engages is over how to promote 
civic virtue while protecting individual liberty. There is no dispute that religious liberty 
is important, and everyone emphasizes that liberty of conscience must be protected, but 
there is disagreement over the type of beliefs that deserve protection. As noted above, 
atheism does not necessarily fall under the category of protected beliefs for most of these 
thinkers. Moreover, they do not share contemporary concerns that freedom of religion 
means that religious beliefs and discourse have no place in the public square. For 
Hutcheson, Witherspoon, and Adams, individuals have a firm right to believe and 
worship as they please, but the government also has the right to encourage religious 
belief. They saw no tension between having the government promote religious faith 
while protecting individual religious liberty. In contrast, Ferguson, Franklin, Paine, and 
Jefferson never suggest that government should promote religious faith, only knowledge 
of religion and civic virtue generally.  
 In a clear break from the classical republican tradition, each of these authors 
knew that by protecting individual liberty, especially freedom of religion, it would be 
more difficult to develop a shared conception of the common good, but this was 
considered a price worth paying. Forcing individuals to hold a particular set of religious 
beliefs was regarded as counter-productive, and most feared that it might actually lead to 
vicious behavior and disrespect for the government and laws. Though they accepted that 
individuals have different passions and interests, they believed that all individuals have a 
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capacity for virtue that can be encouraged through government action. By promoting 
civic virtue, especially by providing a solid moral foundation in religious education, they 
argued that it is possible to develop a shared sense of the public good that respects 
individual interests and liberty. They believed that religion provides an unrivaled 
incitement to virtue that encourages individuals to be civically engaged, respect the 
rights of others, and support the common good.  
Contemporary efforts to reinvigorate the civic tradition emphasize the 
importance of encouraging civic engagement, cultivating civic virtue, and promoting the 
common good, but the compatibility of the civic and liberal traditions remains a concern. 
Liberalism guarantees a right to pursue one’s own conception of the good life, and this is 
often taken to mean that the government has no legitimate interest in the character of its 
citizens. Yet, this study suggests a strong historical justification for government 
promoting religion. In contrast, advocates of republican revivalism at times seem to 
privilege the importance of the political life so much that they may neglect the value of 
private life and associations. Nevertheless, the historical examples provided here 
demonstrate a dedication to balancing the state’s political interest in promoting the 
public good with individual’s private interests. The key debate then, as it often is in 
contemporary discussions, concerns finding ways to encourage communal responsibility 
while protecting individual liberty. To speak of a liberal republican government, one that 
protects individual rights and nurtures the character of its citizens, is not an oxymoron, 
but it is a balancing act.  
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